

Ostróg – Dubno – Brody
Campaign of the 18th Infantry Division against Budënný’s Horse Army
1 July to 6 August

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Notes

This should not be relied upon other than as a rough guide, as I can’t actually read Polish.

The text is mostly straight from the original, with only the references to the order numbers and some redundant map references removed.

Place names have mostly been left in the original Polish as otherwise it is very difficult to follow the text on the attached maps (and at the time of writing, the entire area was inside Poland in any case). Poles retain their Polish names, obviously, but Russians have been changed to more normal transliterations.

The Poles of the time were haphazard with Soviet military terminology. I have used the more normal translations of the Russian names, even when citing quoted orders, so the infantry units are “Rifle” and I have changed “Horse” to “Cavalry” when referring to divisions and below – only the “Horse Army” retains its more correct nomenclature. (“Horse” during the period was generally used only for mixed formations of cavalry and infantry, not pure cavalry units.) For variety I have sometimes used the Soviet abbreviation of *Konarmia* for the First Horse Army.

I have tried to maintain a consistent terminology for the Polish units, but using the nearest English variants. “Ułan” in the original is “Lancer”.

I have retained all the original footnotes. My own are differentiated by being in Cambria font.

The original book came with a couple of maps of the overall area, but my copies did not have them.

It should be noted that while the enemy units the 18th Infantry Division faced in this text are almost all from the Soviet First Horse Army, that up to 7 July it was mainly fighting Kotovski’s Cavalry Brigade and infantry. While those units had been temporarily attached to Budënný’s Army, they were not core *Konarmia* units.



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Original Introduction

The battles between the Polish army and Budëunny's Horse Army, in the regions of Volhynia and Podolia from June to November 1920, and the unforeseen success of the Soviet cavalry, aroused widespread interest outside the borders of the combatants. Such great success by cavalry against infantry armed with modern weapons was unexpected, and the reasons for the Polish high command ordering the retreat across a broad front, thanks to the infiltration of several divisions of enemy cavalry into its rear, were not understood. It is therefore necessary to gather information about those events and explain them in detail.

The following description of the battles of the 18th Infantry Division, fought in the Volhynia region, between Starokonstantynów, Ostróg, Dubno and Brody, from 1 July to 3 August, 1920, is one of the most interesting parts of that campaign.

The battles preceding this period have already been partly described,¹ the later ones are in the making.² These descriptions, as a whole, will make it possible to take in many valuable observations and conclusions.

On the opening day of the action for the 18th ID, Budëunny's Horse Army was in the middle of a large gap in the Polish front, formed between the Polish 2nd and 6th Armies. In relation to the 18th ID, it was a few dozen kilometres further north and west.

The 18th ID was ordered to pursue the Horse Army and take commit it strenuously to battle.

The first period of the battles described – *“the Pursuit of Budëunny's Horse Army”* – relates how having caught up with it, after 12 days of strenuous marching and fighting, the Division faced its target, but was of itself too weak to give decisive battle to the entire Horse Army, which was made up of four cavalry and two infantry divisions. Thus a second period emerged – *“the Struggle to Contain”* – until the arrival of further Polish forces, which would allow us to fight a decisive battle under favourable conditions. That period lasted 14 days. After that, the Polish high command had enough units at its disposal to enter into a major battle. The third period – *“the Battle of Brody”* – lasted 7 days.

This study is divided into those three main sections.

The results of the battles are given at the end of each of these sections. The results were entirely favourable to us.

The unwavering energy of the commander of the 18th Infantry Division, General Krajowski, and his unceasing efforts to keep the initiative in his hands, allowed the weak 18th ID to not only fight against Budëunny's numerical superiority for three full weeks, but was able to inflict heavy losses thanks to the speed of its movements and the vehemence of its attacks, and effectively stopped the progress of the Cossack waves, until their complete collapse.

Despite the 18th Infantry Division suffering heavy losses, both in men and material, in spite of the fact that it had to constantly retreat, and in spite of the fact that the Bolsheviks boast about their trophies from this time, we can call this period a success and one of the most wonderful episodes of the Polish-Bolshevik war.

The 6th Army was in a very difficult position, the 2nd Army had several units heavily damaged, the Polish cavalry was at that time going through a critical period of reconstruction, and the defence of Lwów was not yet organised, so the way to that city was open for Budëunny. It was then that the 18th Infantry Division made its contribution to holding back Budëunny's army, delaying its march on Lwów and inflicting heavy losses on it. During that time, the High Command was able to form two new

¹ Maj. General Kurcusz, *“Campaign of the 13th Infantry Division against Budëunny's Horse Army in the area of Skwira – Samhorodek and Koziatyn”*, Bellona, 1921.

² Maj. General Stanisław Haller, *“Manoeuvre in the rear of the Horse Army”*.



cavalry divisions, as well as some volunteer cavalry formations, which at the Battle of Brody at the end of the campaign, were able to successfully resist Budënný's cavalry onslaught.

This period is remembered with pride by the soldiers of the 18th Infantry Division, who call it a period of "victory" for the Polish Army.

And that this victory was a real one is shown by the superior morale of our soldiers. Despite great losses, retreats and enormous hardships, the soldiers of the 18th Infantry Division never thought that they might be on the defeated side. Everyone stated with pride that they belonged to the "victorious 18th Division". Many were afraid and sometimes even nervous, but not a single soldier considered himself beaten.

On the contrary, the Cossacks of Budënný's 11th Cavalry Division, towards the end of the battles described, sent us secret envoys every day with offers to come over to our side, as they could fight no more.

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Due to gaps in the archival material, it is possible that there are still inaccuracies in this description. The period of heavy fighting did not always allow for the regular keeping of combat diaries. Participants in the battles of the time are therefore invited, if inaccuracies are found, to send in additional comments in order to ascertain the historical truth.



I. Description of the Terrain

1. General overview. The area in which the battles described below took place – that is, the space bounded by the quadrilateral of Starokonstantynów, Zwiahel, Rożyszcze (20 km north of Łuck), Zloczów, Starokonstantynów – is part of the great Volhynian theatre of war.

That area had already played a great role in the World War in 1914, 1915 and 1916, and was to again be the theatre of intense combat in the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1919-1920.

To the north, it is bordered by the Polesie³, an area which greatly impedes the movements of large armies, and to the south by part of the Podolian theatre, whose characteristic ravines, stretching north-south towards the Dniester valley, make it difficult for an enemy to move quickly in large numbers, making it easier for us to defend.

This theatre of operations forms a kind of a natural entrance gate, especially convenient for attacks avoiding terrain obstacles.

The area described looks like a two-pronged fork, whose base is the area between the Styr River and the line of the Ikwa and Stubła Rivers, while the arms are forestless strips stretching from west to east, separated by the Polesie Małe belt.

2. Division into sectors. Polesie Małe, bounded more or less by the villages of Połonne, Szepietówka, Szumsk, Andruha (7 km north of Kremeniec), Kamienica (11 km south of Dubno), Ostróg, Sławuta, Rohaczów (20 km south-east of Zwiahel) contains a compact range of forests on the eastern side of the mentioned quadrangle, up to the line of the Ikwa River.

The area described could therefore be broken down into the following four zones:

- (a) Polesie Małe,
- (b) the Równie corridor, between Polesie Małe and Wielkie and bounded to the west by the Stubła River,
- (c) the southern zone, bounded to the west by the Ikwa River,
- (d) the western zone, i.e. the area west of the Stubła-Ikwa River line up to the line of the Styr River.

3. Polesie Małe. Polesie Małe is not so marshy as to make troop movements impossible, but is a belt of dense forests through which only a small number of very sandy roads lead; it is therefore unsuitable as a battlefield of manoeuvre. However, the movement of troops from the “Równie corridor” through Polesie Małe to the zone of southern Volhynia and *vice versa* is possible.

An enemy advancing from east to west, must therefore at the start conduct effectively two separate operations, to the north and to the south of Polesie Małe, linking them up further west. On the western edge of the northern zone, i.e. the Równie corridor and the southern zone, the Stubła and Ikwa Rivers create serious obstacles, convenient for defence.

The Wilja River, flowing from the Szumsk region until it meets the Horyń River at Ostróg, divides Polesie Małe once more – into an eastern part, less difficult to cross, and a western part, sandier and with more virgin forest.

4. Northern and southern zones. The Równie corridor and the southern zones are areas eminently suitable for action.

The southern zone, around Starokonstantynów and Zasław, is slightly undulating, while the Równie corridor is hilly. The terrain of both zones is sparsely wooded and very clear. Throughout the area, a

³ The exact southern border of the Polesie, as a separate theatre of operations, cannot be strictly defined. The Zwiahel – Rożyszcze line is the southern border of the large Polesie forest complex. The southern border of the Polesie marshes runs just north of the Korosteń – Sarny line, and then more or less to Kamień-Koszyrski.

The Polesia area is generally known as the Pripet Marshes in English, while Polesie Małe is often called Little Polesia.



large number of excellent observation points are found, allowing observations of up to 7 km, and sometimes up to 15 km.

5. Western zone. Observation in the western zone is more limited due to the heavier forest cover. A number of large forested areas form as clumps, between which there are corridors convenient for the operation of all types of weapons.

These areas are:

- a) the forests between the Ikwa and Stubła, in the area to the north-east and north-west of the road junction at Młynów;
- b) the forests around the Pełcza River, bounded more or less by the roads linking Dubno, Werba, Kozin, Wołkowyje, Bokujma, Dubno, also called the "Dubno orchards";
- c) the forest on both banks of the Sitenka River, north of Radziwiłłów, between that town and Chotyń, reaching east to Karpiłówka and Iwaszczuki;
- d) the forest in the Styr basin near Stanisławczyk, reaching south to the Krasne – Brody railway line;
- e) the forest between the Styr River and the Western Bug River, Toporów and Kamionka Strumiłowa.

Thus corridors are found,

- on both sides of the Werba – Dubno road, bounded on the east by the swampy Ikwa valley and on the west by the forests of the "Dubno orchards",
- along the line Dubno – Młynów – Targowica, on both banks of the Ikwa, from its bend near Dubno to its confluence with the Styr,
- on the line Iwanie Puste – Kozin – Beresteczko, on both banks of the Plaszewka River, and so on.

6. Rivers. A network of swampy river valleys, cutting into the area described and creating natural movement obstacles, completes the picture.

These valleys are:

- firstly, the wide, swampy Ikwa valley from Krzemieniec through Dubno to Arszczyń,
- the valley of the Styr River, swampy especially from Stanisławczyk to Strzemilcze,
- the swampy, almost parallel valleys of the right tributaries of the Styr, i.e. the Bołdurka valley from Brody, the Słoniówka valley from Radziwiłłów, the Plaszewka valley from Iwanie Puste, the valley of the lower Ikwa from Arszczyń to Targowica, as well as the valleys of the Sydołówka and Lipa, the left tributaries of the Styr,
- further on, the valley of the Stubła River, which from Satyjów forms a kind of extension of the Ikwa line, curving westwards suddenly near Dubno, and the valley of the Horyń River, crossing all three zones from Podolia to Polesie.

7. Crossings. All the rivers mentioned above carry a lot of water. Even in dry times they are up to 2 metres deep and 20 to 50 metres wide. The swampy valleys have many passages, but only at well-defined points.

The most important of these valleys, the Ikwa valley, can be crossed from Krzemieniec to Arszczyń with larger detachments, at Sapanów, Studzianka, Nosowica, Straklów, Dubno, Iwan and Arszczyń. The passages at Nosowica and Arszczyń require special attention, as they are not very conspicuous on the map, but are very convenient for an enemy.

8. The communication network. This is very poorly developed throughout the described area.

There are only the following railways and highways:



Railways:

- the line Połonne – Szepietówka – Równe – Kovel,
- the line Zviahel – Szepietówka – Starokonstantynów,
- the line Równe – Dubno – Brody – Lviv and its branches: Kiwerce – Łuck and Kamienica – Krzemieniec.

Roads:

- from the east there is only one road: Zviahel – Korzec – Równe.
- Further west, Równe – Łuck – Kowel,
- Równe – Młynów – Demidówka,
- Równe – Dubno – Ptycza,
- Brody – Złoczów,
- Łuck – Dubno – Krzemieniec
- Ostróg – Szumsk – Krzemieniec.

All other roads are either *tracts*, without a hard surface, or dirt roads. In the area of Polesie Małe they are very sandy.

9. Fortifications. The fortifications of Równe, Łuck and Dubno, a well-known Russian strategic triangle, lie inside the area described. They were built between 1834 and 1880 and were not modernised in later years.

The fortifications of Równe, built as a circular fortress, had a dozen or so old forts and earthen redoubts in 1920.

The fortifications of Łuck, built as a one-sided bridgehead on the western bank of the River Styr, had four earth forts.

The fortifications of Dubno, conceived as a bridgehead on the western bank of the Ikwa, had only two forts, situated a few hundred metres apart on both sides of the Dubno – Brody railway line near the village of Zahorce. The Zahorce fort was of a slightly newer type; it was built in 1903.

None of these fortifications were equipped for defence in 1920 and they had no permanent garrisons.

Only one of the Dubno forts (at Zahorce), located west⁴ of the railway track, was garrisoned at this time, with part of the Reserve Battalion of the 50th Infantry, stationed in the Dubno barracks. The second Dubno fort, located east of the railway track, completely in a swamp, was not used.

10. Population. The villages and towns are scattered quite densely, on very fertile soil.

The population of Volhynia – harassed by several years of war – was generally hostile to the army in 1920. As a result there were isolated incidents of hostile mood towards our troops. The reasons for this, however, always lay in the inappropriate behaviour of the local authorities.

In the south-western portion of the described area, the area of the former Austrian partition, the population was remarkably favourable towards Polish troops.

⁴ The original text has “east” here, which is a mistake. This is modern Tarakaniv Fort, just south of the town of that name. (Zahorce in the text refers to modern Mali and Velyki Zahirtsy, just west of the fort.)



Positions

II. General Locations

Sketch map 1

The Polish front, stretching through Ukraine from the Romanian border near Końnica, through Krzyżopol (south-east of Wapniarki), Ladyżyn, Hajsyń, Lipowiec, Pohrebyszcze, Skwira, to the bridgehead in Kiev, was broken in the first days of June 1920 by the Bolshevik First Horse Army, more than four divisions strong, under Budëunny's command.

The breakthrough took place in the Skwira – Samhorodek area at the junction of our 2nd and 6th Armies.

After fierce battles against the 13th Infantry Division, reinforced by the units of the 5th Infantry Division and a division of cavalry,⁵ the enemy managed to drive back the left wing of that division to Koziatyn and then moved with all his strength to Berdyczów and Zhytomyr, leaving the Polish troops behind.

There, having fought a successful battle with the rear troops and support units of the 2nd Army, the enemy pushed further west towards Równe.

Under this blow, as well as blows from Soviet troops which had crossed the Dnieper River north of the Kiev bridgehead, the Polish southern front was shaken. The Supreme Command ordered its retreat from near Kiev, Koziatyn, Hajsyń and Wapniarka to the west.

A huge gap, 50-80 km wide, opened up between the 2nd and 6th Armies, in which Budëunny's cavalry army could operate.

The commander of the 2nd Army tried several times to halt Budëunny's march, throwing hastily drawn units (parts of the 1st, 3rd and 6th Infantry Divisions and General Sawicki's cavalry brigade) into battle against the Horse Army. However, due to their uncoordinated actions and insufficient strength, the desired effect was not achieved.

On 28 June the Horse Army captured Korzec, throwing our 3rd Infantry Division back to Huszcza and Tuczyn.

On 29 June the general situation was as shown in Sketch Map 1. The 6th Army (composed of several Ukrainian divisions – equivalent in strength to one Polish division – and our 12th and 13th IDs) had been occupying the sector from Jampol, east of Bar through Latyczów, Stara Sieniawa up to Starokonstantynów, for several days already, repelling the assaults of the 14th Soviet Army near Starogrod, Bar and Stara Sieniawa. Meanwhile, the 2nd Army, under the incessant assaults of the enemy Horse Army, could not hold its ground.

The gap between the left wing of the 6th Army, i.e. the 13th Infantry Division, and the right wing of the 2nd Army, i.e. the 3rd Infantry Division, was already 80 km wide, while the right wing of the 2nd Army was already 50 km further west of the left wing of the 6th Army. In this gap was the 10th Infantry Brigade. However, neither the Headquarters of 2nd Army nor the 6th Army had any communication with that unit, and there was no information from it.

It was known that Budëunny's army was located in the area of Połonne, Szepietówka, Korzec, and Zwiahel; however, there was information on where the individual divisions were, and what task the Army had.

III. The Commander's Decision and Grouping of the 6th Army

11. Decision. (Sketch Map 1). In the situation the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General Romer, decided, despite the attacks of the enemy 14th Army to the front of his Army, to withdraw the

⁵ Described by Maj. General Kurcusz in the "Bellona" notebooks 6, 7, 8 and 9 of 1921.



entire 18th Infantry Division, from the area of Novaya Sieniawa and Latyczów – shifting his remaining forces accordingly – to throw it through Starokonstantynów in the direction of Równe:

“so that it would take part in a major battle against Budëny over the Horyń, starting from Zaslav.”

This decision was made by General Romer of his own accord, without any orders from the Front commander or the Supreme Command. He believed that a major battle could take place on the Horyń, as at that time Budëny's army was still 30 km east of that river. It was thought that the resistance offered by the units of the 2nd Army would last until the 18th Infantry Division arrived at the battlefield. The Horyń was, after all, a strong natural obstacle.⁶

12. Combat Composition of the 18th Infantry Division was as follows:

Branch or formation		Commander	Notes
Staff	Division Staff	Lt-General Krajowski	Commander
		Maj-General Arciszewski	Chief of staff
	35th Infantry Brigade	Colonel Machcewicz	Soon to leave
	36th Infantry Brigade	Lt-General Linde	
Infantry	42nd Infantry Regiment	Captain Zagórski	Regiments of 3 battalions each. Battalions of 3 companies and a machine gun company, plus an HQ machine gun company. Battalions were about 400 men including machine gun crews. Total for the division was 105 officers and 4,000 men.
	49th Infantry Regiment	Captain Nadachowski	
	144th Infantry Regiment	Colonel Szuszkowski	
	145th Infantry Regiment	Major Steinbach	
	French training. Due to constant fighting in recent times, training had been neglected, with only an NCO school at each brigade. The division had not received any reinforcements since its arrival from France (it was then the 7th ID). The demobilisation of the senior ranks has left great gaps, especially in the NCOs.		
Artillery	Staff 18th Artillery Brigade	Colonel Ostrowski	
	19th Field Artillery Regiment	Major Kondrat (acting)	
	1st <i>Divizion</i> , 19th FAR	Captain Pietras	Two batteries (2nd and 3rd), each four French 75 mm guns
	2nd <i>Divizion</i> , 19th FAR	Captain Alikoff	Three batteries, each four French 75 mm guns
	3rd <i>Divizion</i> , 19th FAR	Captain Dawidajtis	Three Batteries, each four French 75 mm guns
	1st <i>Divizion</i> , 19th Heavy Artillery Regiment	Vacant	Two batteries of French 75 mm guns
	The size of crews was small: typically 2 officers, 75 men and 80 horses per battery.		

⁶ See also Chapter VII, “Results of the fighting from 3 to 12 July”.



Branch or formation		Commander	Notes
Cavalry	Squadron Horse Rifles	2nd Lieutenant Radzimirski	70 sabres, mostly untrained recruits
Sappers	1st and 2nd Companies, 18th Sapper Battalion	Vacant	100 men per company
	18th Sapper Column		
Supply	Supply <i>Divizion</i> Staff	Lieutenant Michalewski	
	242nd Supply Column		20 wagons
	249th Supply Column		33 wagons
Medical	18th Sanitation Company	Medical Major Dr. Pracki	
	601st Field Hospital		
Services	Financial office	Lieutenant Dziama	
	Field Abattoir		
	Field Bakery		
Armoury	Armoury	Lieutenant –	

13 Troops assigned to the 18th Infantry Division by the commander of the 6th Army as of 1 July in the area of Starokonstantynów.

Infantry	44th Infantry Regiment (from 13th ID)	Lt-Colonel Szyling	Minus one battalion. Combat strength of 600 men per battalion. Good training. The regiment has previously fought Budënyy.
	1st Battalion, 4th Podolian ⁷ Regiment	Captain –	Combat strength of 300 men.
Art.	Ukrainian Half battery		2 Russian field guns.
Cav.	6th Lancer Regiment	Colonel Cieński	4 squadrons, each 40-60 men and 1 MG squadron of 4 HMGs.

⁷ Podolia is the mountainous eastern part of the former Austrian partition of Poland. These units are often termed “Highland” as a result.



14. Regrouping of the army. During the evening of 29 June, the move of the troops of the 18th Infantry Division, began from the Nowa Sieniawa – Latyczów sector.

On 30 June, the 145th Infantry Regiment, which was partly the division's reserve, was called up and went by rail to Starokonstantynów.

15. The positions in the Starokonstantynów area were as follows:

The troops of the 13th Infantry Division occupied, from right to left wing, the villages of: Stara Sieniawa, Misiorówka, Dreczana, Charkowce, Józefówka, Ostropol, Rajki, Jeremicze, Chiżniki, Agiejewcy. Further to the north-west and west of Starokonstantynów there were only mounted patrols. The headquarters of the 13th ID was in Starokonstantynów. The division had been in those positions for several days.

The enemy did not attack the front of the 13th Infantry Division. From patrols it was known that it was occupying Adampol (10 km north of Stara Sieniawa), Ożanówka (east of Ostropol), Lubar, Onackowce and Łabuń. Aviators reported (on 30 June) the movement of long columns of wagons on the Połonne – Szepietówka road and about 600 horsemen in the area of Makiejowce – Czetyrboki (15 km south of Szepietówka) appearing to be moving in the direction of Starokonstantynów. An enemy armoured train was seen in the area of Puzyrka (30 km south of Zasław), while patrols of enemy cavalry were now seen 10 km west of Starokonstantynów. In the evening of 30 June the enemy infantry seized Hryców, located 22 km north of Starokonstantynów.

The activities and position of our own 10th Infantry Brigade, which should have been somewhere in the Zasław region, were not known.

These positions showed the enemy's desire was to strike at the 6th Army's left wing. However, whether the enemy intended to do this with the main forces of Budëny's army, or only with weaker units, while at the same time moving their bulk towards Równe, could not be predicted.

1 July

On 1 July, immediately upon the arrival of the 145th Infantry Regiment at Starokonstantynów, the Army commander formed a "Hohenauer Group" (an officer of the 6th Army staff) with the task:

to strike without delay at the enemy group near the town of Hryców, with the aim of breaking it up and pushing it back to the north-east, and, having fulfilled this task, to concentrate between Hryców and Starokonstantynów, as a base for the concentration of the 18th Infantry Division.

The combat units of the 18th ID were designated to concentrate in the area of Kisiele, Agiejewcy, and Radkowce, while the wagons were to go to Hryhorówka, Swinnoje, Matrunki-Suszki and Michałowce.

The commander of the 18th ID, General Krajowski, was still in command of the Latyczów sector up to 1 July, inclusive. The units of his division, partially replaced during 30 June and 1 July in the Latyczów sector by formations of the 12th ID, by forced marches were able to reach by the evening of 1 July:

the 3rd Battalion, 144th IR (on carts) were at Starokonstantynów by 8 p.m.;

three battalions of the 49th IR and two batteries were at Łysanowce and Pańkowce (12 km northwest of Stara Sieniawa);

two battalions of the 144th IR and three batteries were at Międzybórz (16 km west of Latyczów);

the rest of the division, i.e. the entire 42nd Infantry Regiment, and five batteries, had not yet moved from their old positions.

2 July

By 2 July the redeployment of the 18th ID to the area of Starokonstantynów was in full swing (Sketch Map 2).



A new operational order from the commander of the 6th Army, General Romer, issued in Starokonstantynów at 9 o'clock, directed General Krajowski:

to direct the current group of Colonel Hohenauer under the command of General Linde and the 6th Cavalry Regiment to Zasław in order to strike at the rear and flank of the enemy concentrated there. The rest of the 18th Infantry Division is to assemble, possibly in stages, in the general area of Hryców, in order to continue the action against the enemy's southern group (Zasław) tomorrow, 3 July.

The same order placed two battalions of the 44th IR, from the 13th ID, at the disposal of General Krajowski.

General Romer thus continued his intention to fight a pitched battle on the Horyń River. However, what the main forces of Budenny's army, i.e. his four cavalry divisions, were doing between 29 June and 2 July was unknown.

16. Battle at Butowce. Meanwhile, Colonel Hohenauer's group had already struck at Hryców and Gubcza at 18:00, throwing out the weaker enemy.

The commander of the 18th Infantry Division, arriving at Starokonstantynów at 10:30 by car, took command of the troops already in the area. He immediately sent Battalion 3/144 and one cavalry squadron from Starokonstantynów to the village of Butowce (13 km north-west of Starokonstantynów) to extend and secure the division's assembly area.

Arriving at Butowce village, the battalion occupied Hill 337, sending the assigned squadron of the 6th Lancer Regiment out to reconnoitre. Near the village of Lisińce that squadron encountered several hundred Cossacks, who immediately charged on seeing them. A fierce pursuit along the road went all the way to Butowce village and through it. The lancers took casualties. The Bolsheviks, taking half of their cannons with them, continued their pursuit. They completely missed the infantry of the 3/144 hidden in some grain, which, after the lancers had passed through its line, opened up with rapid rifle and machine-gun fire from close range. The Cossacks' charge broke down completely; and when the Bolsheviks tried to save the guns which had followed along, two officers of the 3/144, having collected a handful of scattered lancers, charged from their flank and captured two cannons.

The civilian population of Butowce later recounted that Kotovski, the commander of the Bolshevik cavalry brigade to which these Cossacks belonged, personally shot two "comrade artillerymen" as a result of this.

The 3rd Battalion of the 144th Infantry Regiment was superbly commanded by Lieutenant Kramczynski.

At 19:00 the 3/144, was again firmly attacked by some 400 infantry and 300 horsemen from the direction of Łaszki village, but the attack was repulsed without getting close.

However, fearing further major assaults by Kotovski's group on that weak battalion (just 200 bayonets), the commander of the 18th ID ordered, during the night of 2/3 July, the redeployment to Hill 337 of Battalions 1/ and 3/144 and three batteries of the 2nd *Divizion* of the 18th Field Artillery Regiment, which had arrived meanwhile at Kisiele. General Linde, who had already taken command of the 36th Brigade, was ordered at the same time to establish communications during the night with the 3/144, by seizing Gubcza, while the 6th Lancer Regiment was advanced from Starokonstantynów to Czerniatyna Bol., to secure the left wing of that battalion.

The position of the left wing of the 6th Army is as shown in Sketch Map 2 as of dawn on 3 July.

On that day General Krajowski intended to begin a general action. Due to the previous day's order from the 6th Army commander, he could not wait for the arrival of the 42nd IR and the remaining five batteries, nor give even a short rest to his tired troops. The marches of the last three days had been strenuous; 1/ and 3/49 IR, for example, had covered 80 km in the previous 34 hours. But the overall situation did not allow for rest.



Pursuit of Budënný's Horse Army, 3 to 12 July

IV. The Strike from Starokonstantynów to Zasław

17. The nature of the fighting. General Krajowski was well aware of what he was facing when he launched the operation, as Budënný's Horse Army had hitherto been invincible. Its units had had been successful everywhere they fought. Units of our 13th ID, 3rd ID, part of the 5th ID, and General Sawicki's cavalry brigade, recalled the bloody battles fighting it. The very name "Budënný" was a terror to men of weaker spirit. The older, well-trained Cossacks – on horseback since childhood, used to robbery and murder, and enraged to the extreme by war and revolution – were going up against soldiers with little training, somewhat demoralised by the retreat of their own side, and terrified by the very word "cavalry".

The general therefore strove with all his power to make the first skirmishes successful, first and foremost to convince the officers and soldiers that Budënný's troops did not represent such a great danger.

As he himself expressed it, "God gave General Krajowski luck" in the first skirmish of the 3rd Battalion, 144th IR at Butowce. The general decided to continue concentrating his forces, both during marches and in stopovers, in order to maintain that "luck". Any superfluous wagons were to be left far from the fighting troops, in order to increase the mobility of the men. Operating initially during the day, the general intended to switch over as soon as possible exclusively to night operations, as the best method when facing cavalry.

3 July

18. Commencement of the action (Sketch Map 2). At 07:00 on 3 July the 18th Infantry Division began a general move to the west. Seemingly in retreat, but nevertheless with the enemy in front of it.

19. Fighting at Hryców. The southern group of the 144th IR set off as planned at 07:00. General Linde's northern group waited in Hryców until Battalions 3/145 and 2/49 approached with the artillery. At 06:30 the enemy's 399th Rifle Regiment launched an attack on Hryców. The attack was repulsed after a two hour battle. At 10:30 the Bolsheviks attacked again from the north and northeast the villages of Kurganówka and Szkarówka Bolsza. At first the enemy managed to throw back our lead units,⁸ but a counterattack of 2/145 and one company of the 49th IR, under the command of Lieutenant Wiktorowski, supported by the effective fire of Battery 9/18, which had previously distinguished itself, drove back the enemy. Several prisoners and two HMGs were taken. It was found that the attack was led by the 400th and 402nd Rifle Regiments from the Soviet 45th Rifle Division, with the support of one battery.

After repelling the attack on Kurganówka and Szkarówka, General Linde ordered the commander of 2/49, Captain Kocurów, to lead a demonstration with his battalion and the 2/145 in the area of Łabuń, while he himself, with the bulk of his forces, moved at 18:00 to Końsków.

20. The left column and battle of the 6th Lancer Regiment. Meanwhile, the left column, i.e. the 144th IR and a field artillery *divizion*, was advancing towards Werbowcy. On its left the 6th Lancer Regiment advanced through Łaszki and Medwedówka towards Puzyrki. Having noticed at 15:30 the presence of the enemy in the town of Puzyrki Bolszoi, the lancers went onto the attack. The third and HMG squadrons attacked towards the railway station from the east, the second squadron from the village of Hryców. At first the enemy only returned light fire. However when the troopers reached 1000 metres out they suddenly received fire from two HMGs, while two columns of cavalry of about 200 horsemen seemed to be preparing for a flanking counterattack. In addition flanking movements by small detachments were observed from the area of Medwedówka Mały and from the south along the railway track. In view of this the squadrons, whose total combat strength was only 65 sabres and two HMGs, withdrew and garrisoned the Dracze manor. One of the lancers' HMGs broke down during the

⁸ This was the first Bolshevik attempt to crush the left wing of the 6th Army. The attempt, repeated on 6 July after the 18th Infantry Division had moved on to Zasław, was to be successful for the enemy.



battle. The enemy cavalry occupied the hill east of Medwedówka and was followed by infantry. It was evident that this was Kotovski's cavalry brigade that had attacked Butowce the day before.

There was no communication with the 4th Lancer squadron, which had gone to Podlaszczyki. It had recently reported the presence of the enemy in the towns of Antoniny and Maniowce.

The column of the 144th IR, reached Brykula at 17:00. There an enemy patrol with HMG was lurking and attacked our advance guard at a distance of a few dozen metres, but it was soon thrown out. Sulżyn was taken at 18:00 after a short but fierce firefight.

Battalion 1/144, which was acting as a liaison detachment between the 144th IR column and General Linde's group, advanced very slowly, as until 18:00 it was partly absorbed by the battles being fought by General Linde at Hryców.

In Sulżyn and Werbowcy the troops immediately fortified themselves against cavalry attack, posting strong pickets around those towns.

21. Battles near Końków, Biełopol and Makiejowce. The 1st Battalion of the 4th Podolian Rifle Regiment from General Linde's group took Końków around 20:00 after a bloody fight with outnumbered forces. Battalions 1/49 and 3/49 pursued the retreating enemy towards Makiejowce.

The right flanking guard of General Linde's group, consisting of Battalions 1/145 and 3/145, reached Biełopol at about 02:00 on 4 July and met an enemy column there, which was marching through Biełopol at the time, heading south. The encounter occurred at 300 to 400 metres. Thanks to the foresight of Major Steinbach, commander of the 145th IR, the battalions immediately opened rapid fire, and the Bolsheviks – not expecting Polish troops to be already there– were so surprised that they abandoned their cannons, weapons, ammunition and wounded, and dispersed completely. According to the testimony of the captives, it was entire brigade of the 45th RD, made up of two infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment and eight guns. Eight guns and a mass of ammunition, weapons, wagons, paperwork and several dozen prisoners were captured.

After a short time the enemy attacked Biełopol in the moonlight with cavalry, but were repelled with heavy losses.

Almost simultaneously Battalion 3/49, under the command of Captain Mościcki, arrived in Makiejowce from Końków. Again there was an approach to a short distance, then a daring bayonet attack, in which the enemy had 17 bayoneted and left in our hands, along with a number of carts with ammunition, food supplies and 15 horses.

These fortunate encounters with enemy mounted units gave our soldiers much confidence and encouragement for the future.

22. Positions at dawn and orders received. At dawn on 4 July (Sketch Map 3) the 49th IR reached the village of Wołkowce, which it occupied after a short battle thanks to the very prominent assistance of 8/18 field battery.

The 6th Lancer Regiment spent the whole night in the town of Dracze, in close contact with Kotovski's brigade. Constant skirmishes between patrols established that the enemy was moving from Puzyrki Bolszoi to Markowce at 04:00, and then in a north-westerly direction.

In the morning, the positions were as shown in Sketch Map 3.

The situation was not very favourable. This was felt most acutely by the staff officers of the division and of General Linde's 36th Brigade, who had to travel several times during the day with orders or as liaison officers. Wherever they moved outside of the bounds of Polish troops, they met patrols and detachments of Bolshevik troops. For example, Lieutenant Laskowski took from 12:00 to 16:00 to ride from the division headquarters to General Linde, i.e. about 9 km, and did not return to Sulżyn until 23:00, having spent only half an hour at 36th Brigade HQ. Lieutenant Koperski, adjutant of the 36th IB, had a similar journey. Every order, and all of the more important reports, had to be sent by an officer with several lancers. Sometimes two officers had to be sent simultaneously by various routes between



the division headquarters and General Linde. This occurred ever more frequently in the days and weeks that followed.

Telephone communication with Starokonstantynów worked well. Around midnight of 3 July, the division command in Sulżyn received an operational order from the army commander confirming the previous instructions given verbally by General Romer on the battlefield at Butowce.

The order read: (see Sketch Maps 1 and 3)

I) The 3rd Legion Division, in its attack, on Korzec, suffered heavy losses on 1 July and retreated under enemy pressure to the Horyń River. A plane, in a flight between 0500 and 0700 of 2 July, dropped an operational order to General Szymański's group – the 10th IB. According to the aerial reconnaissance of 2 July, about 300 wagons, 700 cavalymen and 150 infantry were spotted in the area of Horodyszcze, Sudlików, Szepietówka, Zasław and Bereźno. The retreat of enemy columns and cavalry in a north-easterly direction and from Szepietówka to Połonne was also observed. (!) Around 17:00 a scattered column of up to 600 wagons was moving from Sudlików – Szepietówka to Połonne. In the towns of Szepietówka, Sudlików, Połonne, about 400 wagons and 400 cavalymen were stationed. At Zasław, according to air reconnaissance, the situation was unchanged.⁹

Kotowski's brigade was repulsed at Butowce yesterday by General Krajowski's troops. Two guns and some prisoners were captured.

There was no major action on the 6th Army front line, but there were local combats.

II) The main effort of General Krajowski's group is still a vigorous action, to resolve a battle on the Horyń River in our favour, starting from Zasław.

III) To this end General Krajowski, with the forces he already has (nine battalions with artillery), is to continue the attack on Zasław.

Lt-Colonel Szylling¹⁰ (44th IR), followed by the 42nd IR, as soon the two will be under the command of the 35th IB commander from the 18th ID, will immediately move (for the time being each separately) through Kośków – Zilince, and then further on to Szepietówka or Zasław, according to the situation or General Krajowski's orders.

IV) Although the 6th Army is now about 70 km ahead of the front of the 2nd Army, the 6th Army will remain in its present situation in order to relieve the other army.

Only in the event of a failure in the battle on the Horyń River and the intervention of General Krajowski's group will the 6th Army make a retreat, in the direction of the Zbrucz River, in order to cover Eastern Lesser Poland.¹¹ In this case, General Krajowski's group is to maintain communication with the 13th Infantry Division, heading in the direction south of Lachowiec, while General Krajowski's group's primary task will be to defend the Brody railway line.

Detailed orders will be issued in time.

V) General Krajowski is to endeavour to maintain constant communication through Starokonstantynów during the present action, and will be constantly informed by the Army command, through the 13th Infantry Division.

VI) I leave the 13th Infantry Division the freedom to throw local forces towards Zasław, in order to win the battle of the Horyń.

VII) Acknowledge receipt etc.

⁹ It is not known who held Zasław.

¹⁰ The original text is not consistent with spelling his name.

¹¹ In Polish, Małopolska.



This was the first order from which the commander of the 18th ID could deduce the positions of the 2nd Army, to whose aid he was coming to. The general positions, shown on Sketch Map 1, were not known to him.

The defeat of the 3rd ID at Korzec had occurred on 1 July. It was now 04:00 on 4 July. The 3rd ID could therefore be somewhere in the Huszcza or Równe area, i.e. about 80 km north-west of the 18th ID. Budënyy could move at will in the 80 kilometre vacuum: west towards Dubno and Łuck or south directly to the flank and rear of the 6th Army.

Combat contact with the Horse Army was made by the 18th ID, already in combat with the Soviet 45th Rifle Division, during the day of 3 July and the night of 3/4 July. A rendezvous with Budënyy's main force, that is, with his massed four divisions of cavalry, could be expected at any moment.

23. Continued march to Zasław. Moving further and further into the operational zone of the Horse Army, General Krajowski decided to manoeuvre only at night. He intended to carry out reconnaissance during the day, march at night, and strike at the enemy in the mornings. He intended to make daytime stops in strong groups in the woods and villages, in order to be safe from charges by large bodies of troops.

Thus, on the evening of 4 July, the 18th ID (Sketch Map 3) moved in several columns in a westerly direction to cross the Horyń River during the morning of 5 July. The night march took place without encountering the enemy. The Soviet 45th Rifle Division had been so beaten up during 3 and 4 July that it preferred, it seems, not to face the 18th ID again and retreated temporarily to the north.

5 July

At 05:00 the southern column reached Michnow, without meeting the expected Kotovski group. The bridge at Michnow was found to be completely destroyed, and the repair required 6 to 8 hours of work. A sapper company, assigned to the southern column, therefore began construction immediately. One infantry battalion moved to the left bank of the river as cover.

General Linde's northern column reached Zasław at 04:30 and found – to the great joy of both parties – the 10th Infantry Brigade, commanded by General Szymański.

That brigade¹² had been completely out of communication. It had been waging war basically on its own for a week. The 2nd and 6th Army commands had sent orders to it several times, but they did not seem to get through. At Sławuta and Szepietówka it was badly battered by Budënyy's cavalry divisions, and it settled in around Zasław – Mokrzec – Bielczyn, conducting reconnaissance in all directions, but unable to establish communications anywhere. The morale of one of its regiments, the 105th IR, suffered considerably.¹³

General Krajowski therefore took immediate command of the 10th IB.

Positions on 5 July

By noon on 5 July the troops of General Krajowski's group had taken the following positions:

¹² The 10th IB was part of the 5th ID, which was still part of the 6th Army in May 1920, and occupied the sector between the 12th and 13th IDs in the Hajsyn area (Sketch Map 1). It was replaced in the second half of May by the 18th ID, and began embarking to leave for the northern front. When half of the transports had left, Budënyy's Horse Army attacked the 13th ID. Further transport of the 5th ID was halted and the 10th IB faced Budënyy. All of June, July and up to the middle of August 1920 it remained on the southern (Ukrainian) front, with no divisional establishment. Only 4 batteries remained with the two infantry regiments and the brigade headquarters.

Supply of the brigade was made from 6 July to 5 August via the 18th ID. The infantry regiments of the brigade were already barely 500–600 bayonets each at this point.

¹³ The 105th IR was from a Reserve Brigade, and temporarily assigned by the 2nd Army as reinforcements for the 10th IB. It numbered approximately 2,500 bayonets.



The 6th Lancer Regiment was in Płużnoje, with reconnaissance in the directions of Kuniew, Ostróg and Bielotyn.

The 36th Brigade was largely in Borysów and Mokrzec with patrols towards Bielotyn. That included the brigade headquarters, the entire 49th and 145th IRs, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Podolian Rifle Regiment, the 3rd *Divizion*, 18th Field Artillery Regiment (FAR) and a sapper company.

In Juwkowcy was the 144th IR (less one battalion) and the 2nd *Divizion*, 18th FAR.

In Gnojnica Wielka was the HQ of the 18th ID, the 44th IR (less one battalion), the Ukrainian battery, a sapper company and a squadron of divisional cavalry.

In Bielczyn was the 10th IB staff, the entire 19th IR and a battery of the 5th FAR.

In Luterka (5 km north-west of Zasław) was the entire 105th IR and a battery of the 5th FAR.

In Zasław was the entire 40th IR and a battery of the 5th FAR.

Battalion 3/144 was at the bridge in Michnow.

All the 18th ID's regimental transport and divisional establishments were in the district of Lachowcy, on the river Horyń 30 km south-west of Zasław.

There was no news of the whereabouts of the 42nd IR and the remaining batteries of the 5th FAR, which were on their way from Starokonstantynów following the division.

The command of the 18th ID, from the moment of its arrival in Wielka Gnojnica lost all communication with the higher authorities. Although there was a radio station at the division headquarters, no other Polish station could be reached, despite attempts all day – not the station of the 13th ID headquarters (as it had just evacuated Starokonstantynów due to ordered general retreat of the 6th Army), nor the 6th Army HQ (as it had just been attacked by the 8th Cavalry Division at Płoskirów), nor the 2nd Army HQ (as it had just started withdrawing in front of the main forces of Buděny's Army coming from Równe).

In fact, the headquarters of the 35th Brigade, the 42nd IR, and a handful of batteries, which had remained on the Latyczów section for two days longer than other divisional units, were trailing behind the division. For unknown reasons, the brigade commander did not combine all these units to cross the dangerous region between Starokonstantynów and Zasław in a compact group but marched in two columns. In the first was the brigade headquarters, two battalions of the 42nd IR, and three batteries. That column passed through Starokonstantynów on 4 July at 17:00, and having fought a small skirmish near Sulżyn, passed through Szczurowice on 5 July at 18:00, reaching the division on 6 July at 01:30. It covered 70 km in just under 32 hours, even though it had already marched from Nowa Sieniawa to Starokonstantynów. The second column passed through Starokonstantynów on 5 July 18:00 and reached Szczurowice in the evening. The heavy stock of the 42nd IR, moved in the wake of the heavy stock of the other regiments of the division.

The bulk of General Krajowski's forces had almost no contact with the enemy until the evening of 5 July.

At 12:00 there was only a weak attack of the lead elements of the 6th Cavalry Regiment in Płużnoje and it was repulsed.

At 19:00 the enemy attacked Zasław from the east with three regiments of cavalry, with the support of armoured cars. Although part of the town on the eastern bank of the Horyń River fell into enemy hands, units of the 10th Infantry Brigade advanced rapidly to the right and left of the town along the river and successfully repulsed further attacks. General Krajowski's positions did not change as a result of these battles.

The General intended, in accordance with the previous order of the 6th Army commander, to strike at Ostróg, and to this end issued orders for a night march on 5/6 July towards Ostróg with an attack on the town at dawn on the 6th.



However, since all the regimental commanders and the commander of the 36th Brigade reported that the men and horses were so completely exhausted that no serious fighting could be risked, the general postponed the attack until the following day, ordering a rest for the night of 5/6 and day of 6 July. Vigorous reconnaissance was to be undertaken in all directions, and especially in the direction of Ostróg.

One of the first messages received from the reconnaissance was a report from the commander of 36th IB, General Linde, which read:

Of the patrols sent out for reconnaissance via Storoniczy to Ostróg, via Bielotyn to Ostróg, and via Chorowica to Polany and Sławuta, only the patrol from Bielotyn has so far returned. It encountered strong cavalry units there and, being attacked by them, returned to Borysów. This patrol captured a Bolshevik coachman, who reports that Ostróg was occupied on the 3rd by one cavalry division.

Civilians report that Buděenny's army, operating in this sector, is said to number seven cavalry divisions.

Zdołbunów was probably taken yesterday.

The bulk of the cavalry was headed, according to information from the civilian population, in a south-westerly direction.

This was the first news of Buděenny's mounted divisions received through direct combat contact. Although somewhat exaggerated as to the number of those divisions, it did, after all, give the freshest picture of enemy movements, which had to be taken into account.

6 July

24. Battles of the 42nd IR. Before dawn on July 6, the Zasław sector reported hearing heavy cannon and machine-gun fire about 15 km away to the south (!) – see Sketch Map 4.

It was the second column of the 42nd IR, marching with three batteries from Nowa Sieniawa following the division. It was encircled at night in Szczurowice and attacked simultaneously from all sides. However as it had very strong artillery support, following a three hour battle it managed to repel all the attacks and break through to Michnow, where it crossed the bridge over the Horyń River, protected by Battalion 3/144.

25. The positions at dawn on 6 July is shown in Sketch Map 4. That map also shows the attack of the Soviet 45th Rifle Division on the left wing of our 13th ID on 5 and 6 July. The Headquarters of the 18th ID had no information about that attack, nor about the positions of the units of the 2nd Army shown.

26. Supply columns. The wagons of the 42nd IR, which had not been moving with the rest of the division's wagons, but were following them some distance back, had an incident similar to that of the second column, almost at the same time. The result of the fighting, however, was sadder.

During the march from Starokonstantynów to the west, the heavy stock of the 42nd IR was attacked and scattered at Antoniny. The scattered troops found themselves, after a few days, with the formations of the 13th ID.

General Krajowski was not too worried by the news, as during the retreat in the Ukraine from Niemirów, through Winnica, Latyczów to Starokonstantynów, the wagon trains of all the regiments in the division had assumed unbelievable proportions. No force, nor the gravest orders from the division's command were able to reduce that terrible ballast.¹⁴

¹⁴ It turned out that once the troops were allowed to requisition even just one civilian wagon in excess of the prescribed quota that it was impossible later, especially during the retreat, to bring the wagons down to the desired small number. It was alarming how many peasant carts were seen after just a few days.

Aware of the state of affairs, the general had ordered the division's troops to stock up with five days' food and eight days' ammunition right at the start of the operation in Starokonstantynów, and to leave all the heavy wagons in that area.

He later directed those wagons so that they were always close to the division, but never in direct contact with the regiments.¹⁵ The entire divisional rear establishment and the wagons were placed under the orders of the chief of the division's 4th Department, Captain Cetnerowski, starting from Starokonstantynów. He maintained mounted communication with division headquarters and organised two companies and half a squadron for its defence out of the men attached to the wagons, plus a detachment of troops from the reserve MGs who were also attached to the wagons. Marching at night, and barricading themselves in the forests and villages during the day, he led them superbly, several times overcoming the resistance of patrols and smaller Bolshevik detachments.

The wagon group, led by Captain Cetnerowski, included:

- the rolling stock command,
- two columns of wagons, 20 and 33 carts respectively,
- the 609th Field Hospital,
- the divisional financial section,
- a small animal slaughter team,
- the divisional headquarters wagons, with postal unit,
- a telegraph company,
- a heavy sapper battalion,
- a sapper column,
- the heavy rolling stock of the 49th, 144th, 145th IRs, 18th Artillery and the 6th Lancers,
- several stray train elements from the 13th ID.

Observed by our own airmen on 7 July, this group stretched for 20 km! However this was not all of it, for while going into battle with Budëny, despite the separation of heavy rolling stock, the division's marching column did not become short. On 11 July, as the division marched in a single column through Obgów to the town of Antonowcy, its length was still 14 km – for a fighting force of only about 5,000 bayonets and 11 batteries.

V. Ostróg

6 July

27. General positions. Sketch Map 4 shows the positions at dawn on 6 July. But not all given in that map was known at the headquarters of the 18th ID – only what was happening in the immediate vicinity of its subordinate troops. There was no news at the time of the movements of the enemy 45th Rifle Division, and only slim information about the position of the main forces of the 1st Horse Army.

Civilians returning from Ostróg claimed several times that an entire brigade of Budëny's cavalry was there. This news caused great satisfaction at the division headquarters, and thought was given to the opportunity of defeating that isolated brigade.

28. Orders received. At about 09:00 Lieutenant Sawicki from the divisional squadron of the 13th ID, turned up at the division headquarters with ten lancers. He had sneaked bravely and cleverly between the Bolshevik troops circulating between Starokonstantynów and Gnojnica, the current location of the 18th ID HQ, and carried orders from the 6th Army Command.

Operational Order No. 29 of 5 July provided for the possibility of the retreat of the entire 6th Army to the line of the Zbrucz and divided the retreat into four parts. Day X, on which the retreat was to begin, was not specified in that order. The tasks for the individual army units were included as follows: (Sketch Map 5).

¹⁵ The position of the rolling stock can be seen on Sketch Maps 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11.



- 1) Covering the right wing of the 6th Army is to be General Pavlenko's Ukrainian group.
- 2) The 12th Infantry Division, has as its main task the defence of the railway line and the route Płoskirów – Tarnopol.
- 3) The 13th Infantry Division is to defend the line Zbaraż – Założce, aiming to keep in constant contact with the 18th Infantry Division.
- 4) The 18th Infantry Division, as in previous orders, operates in the area of Zaslów – Ostróg. Still covering the left flank of the army, it is to concentrate its left wing in the Krzemieniec – Sapanów – Dubno area with the task of defending the way to Radziwiłłów – Brody. It is to maintain communications with the 2nd Army. One infantry brigade, with artillery, is to be in the Kozin area as an Army reserve.

The second of the orders brought, designated 23:00 of 5 July as Day X.

At the same time, Lieutenant Sawicki brought a personal order from the army commander for General Krajowski, which stated: (Sketch Map 4)

In view of the situation of the 2nd Army and the abandonment of Równe, as well as the threat to the right wing of the 18th Infantry Division, General Krajowski's main task, in the event that he is no longer able to take part in the battle against Buděny, will be to defend the Krzemieniec – Dubno line.

The officer also brought a copy of a Hughes conversation¹⁶ between the army chief of staff, Colonel Kessler, and the chief of staff of the 13th Infantry Division, Major Kurcusz, in which it was said that:

send a platoon of the 13th ID divisional horse squadron to follow the 18th ID, with the army commander's order that the 18th ID is no longer to head for Równe, but is to aim to occupy and garrison the line Dubno – Krzemieniec.

Having received these orders, General Krajowski was able to take the shortest and best route through Szumsk to reach Krzemieniec and Dubno. But the opportunity that presented itself to beat up Buděny's isolated brigade at Ostróg prevailed. The general decided to not leave the occupied region quietly. He decided to smash the lone brigade in Ostróg first, and only then to head to the Krzemieniec – Dubno area. In that spirit, he confirmed the order to strike Ostróg, issued on 5 July, setting the night of 6/7 July as the final date.

To the 10th Infantry Brigade the General gave the order to begin the retreat on the night of 6/7 July and to reach:

7 July – Miakoty – Dobryń – Korytnoje;

8 July – Wańkowcy – Kutry;

9 July – the line of the eastern hills of Krzemieniec, covering thus the left wing of the group striking at Ostróg.

This was the general's way of responding to the new task and also his desire to strike at Ostróg.

Just before he set off for Ostróg a plane dropped at Borisov, near the headquarters of the 36th Brigade, an order from the 6th Army commander to the commander of the 18th ID, which read:

I) The enemy has occupied Równe and Ostróg. The 2nd Army has withdrawn to the north but is to aim to enter the gap between the Horse Army and Kowel.

II) The 18th Infantry Division will therefore not continue its advance to Równe, but will head for the Dubno – Krzemieniec line to secure the railway line to Brody and Lwów. The march must be expedited.

¹⁶ The Hughes was an early type of teleprinter using telegraph lines, which was widely used at the time.



General Linde, commander of the 36th Brigade, who read this order first, started to change from the instructions given for the march to Ostróg, but General Krajowski learned of this intention in time and repeated, in spite of everything, his order to attack Ostróg.

“As you are my Zhid, so I am your Zhid”, said the general, who never lost his golden sense of humour. “We will strike at Ostróg precisely because Budënyy has taken Równe, as only that will prevent his free march on Lwów. Perhaps he will be tempted to withdraw some of his troops to face us, causing him to lose a few days, during which the 2nd Army will be able to regroup and turn to face the Horse Army again, and the 6th Army will still have time to block its path to Lwów.”¹⁷

29. Move on Ostróg and the occupation of the town. The division therefore marched out on the evening of 6 July at the appointed time. The regiments carried only light rations and ammunition. The divisional staff had as its entire rolling stock one carriage and the commander's car with a folder of maps and some writing paper. All the staff officers were on horseback.

The spirit of all the soldiers was high. The victorious battles of the previous days had contributed to the excellent mood. Food – requisitioned on the spot – was plentiful, as was ammunition (400–600 rounds per battery). Only bread had been in short supply for several days, as during such fast marches and under such circumstances it was impossible to supply people with it regularly.

7 July

Using four different routes, the division reached Ostróg at dawn on 7 July (Sketch Map 4). Patrols sent out in front of the columns encountered enemy outposts on all the roads near the town.

What was surprising, however, was that a relatively weak attack pushed away the outposts and the town was occupied at 09:00. The enemy cavalry, which had in fact remained in Ostróg for the two days before, had departed in the direction of Dubno, leaving only a weak garrison in the town with the commissar at its head. He had fled on hearing of the arrival of large Polish forces. One machine gun, a herd of cattle, considerable food supplies and 69 Polish prisoners, who the said commissar had forgotten to take with him, were taken.

Immediately after taking Ostróg, the division commander ordered all exits from the town to be manned and prepared for defence, as he expected counter-attacks.

For the positions see Sketch Map 5.

The “overall” position given in that map, as already said, was not known to the commander of the 18th Infantry Division. He only knew the “detailed” position shown in the inset section.

30. Counterattacks. The general's expectations were quickly fulfilled. The seizure of Ostróg by considerable Polish forces, well to the rear of the mounted units of Budënyy's army, must have caused quite a stir on the Bolshevik telephones and in its staffs. Barely a few hours later, an entire cavalry brigade arrived from the Zdobunów area and immediately launched furious assaults from the north-west, west and south-west on Ostróg.

Thus, an isolated unit of the Horse Army confronted forces many times stronger than itself and, in addition, attacked them while mounted.

The Bolshevik attack began at 13:00, by several squadrons, on the positions of the 44th IR, near the barracks. The Cossacks raced through the high standing grain on horseback, and the 44th IR, only opening fire at 500 metres, laid them down in a row on the ground. After half an hour an enemy artillery bombardment of the town began. For 30 minutes shells from two batteries were lobbed furiously, then strong attacks came simultaneously from Michalpol on the positions of the 44th IR and from Rozwał on the positions of the 49th IR. The Cossacks charged furiously, brandishing their sabres, but at 500 metres and closer to our positions they fell to as if cut by a scythe. Some of them reached as close as 10 paces to our positions near the barracks, and when their horses tumbled, they advanced further with drawn blades. However, few returned. Our artillery thundered and took a heavy toll.

¹⁷ See note to Item 34.



At 16:30 the Bolsheviks launched another attack, but this time on foot and from the woods south-west of the town, on the positions of the 44th and 144th IRs.

It was stated by prisoners that the attacks were carried out by a single mounted brigade, later reinforced by two more regiments of cavalry, and that it suffered very heavy losses.

The first objective of the Ostróg operation, i.e. to defeat an isolated unit of Buděny's army, was thus achieved splendidly.

31. Communications. The division's radio station, set up in Ostróg, operated all day, with no one to call. Not a single plane even appeared in the sky, much less brought orders or directions.

32. Sounds of fighting near Równe. Dull isolated shooting was heard from the direction of Równe. It was assumed that these could only be the sounds of fighting by Ukrainian insurgent units, about which there was much talk in those days. It was not suspected that it was the sounds of the 2nd Army fighting, as it was known from General Romer's orders of the day before that the 2nd Army had "withdrawn to the north but is to aim to enter the gap between the Horse Army and Kowel" and that "the 18th Infantry Division will not continue its advance to Równe, but will head for the Dubno – Krzemieniec line". This news, given by an airman as late as the evening of 6 July – barely 16 hours before those sounds of fighting – had to be considered accurate. There was no mention in the 6th Army commander's orders of any intention to counterattack with the 2nd Army on Równe.

In reality, however, the opposite was true.

33. The activity of the 2nd Army from 29 June to 3 July.

On 29 June (Sketch Map 1) the Ukrainian Front Command, exercising command over the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Armies, issued order No 92, which stipulated a break with the previous system of conducting cordon defences and a shift to fighting by movement in combination with large unit actions.¹⁸

1 July

On the night of 30 June/1 July, the movement of the 3rd Army's 1st ID from the Łopaticzy – Zabara area to the south began. The Front commander's order envisaged a joint assault by the 1st, 3rd and 6th Infantry Divisions, on the right wing of the enemy Horse Army in the Korzec and Zwiahel area, with the intention of reaching those towns on 2 July.

2 July

But the three divisions did not co-ordinate in their action. The divisions had no communication with the others and did not know what they were doing. One of them even had no communication with the Army command throughout the day.

After many tiring marches, most of the units involved returned to their starting positions in the evening of 2 July, having failed to reach their goal.

The Front commander, General Rydz-Śmigły, ordered, in view of this, on 3 July:

hold the line of the Horyń River and defend Równe, at the same time positioning the troops for a concentric strike against Buděny's army at the moment of its attack on Równe.

and ordered to that end:

6th Army will remain on its line, striking with the 18th ID, in the direction of Sławuta.¹⁹

2nd Army will defend the Horyń on its defensive line – keeping firm possession of the Równe area.

3rd Army remains on its line, moving the 1st Legion ID to the region of Rudnia-Stryj²⁰ – Lewecze.

3 and 4 July

¹⁸ A similar thought was thrown up by General Romer, almost at the same time, in an order of 28 June considering regrouping the 6th Army and throwing the entire 18th Infantry Division, through Starokonstantynów, "to take part in the battle against Buděny on the Horyń".

¹⁹ This order to the commander of the 18th ID, never arrived.

²⁰ There many Rudnia's and Stryj's. I think this is a place that was 12 km NE of Ludwipol (Sosnove).



However, Budënyy had already broken the 2nd Army's front lines by 3 July, occupying Sławuta and Ostróg.

In addition, the 3rd Legion ID suffered another defeat at Korzec, which resulted in the withdrawal of the 2nd Army to the Uście River, Równe and Zdolbunów by the evening of 3 July.

At dawn on 4 July the 3rd ID occupied the area east of Równe, that is Kolodenka – Biała Krynica – Horodyszcze; the 6th ID, was in the Siedliszcze – Kostopol area, 30 km northeast of Równe, and was to move to Aleksandrija on 4 July; a cavalry brigade in the area of Tajkura – Novy Mylsk – Zdolbica covered the right flank of the army.

The Front commander intended to wait in those positions until the arrival of the 18th ID from the south and the 1st ID from the northeast, for the time only using the 6th ID on 4 July for a counterattack from Aleksandrija to the area east of Równe. The 1st ID, was at that time still in the Zabara area

In the evening of 4 July, the 1st Legion ID reached the Mokre Rudy area, halfway between Zabara and Ludwipol. On the same day the enemy attacked Równe from the east and south and took the town. The 3rd Legion ID withdrew towards the north.

The 6th ID failed to make the intended attack on 4 July.

5 July

On 5 July the 1st ID reached the Ludwipol area.

The commander of the 2nd Army, General Raszewski, planned for that day, according to the order of the front commander:

3rd Legion ID to secure the line from Reszuck (10 km north of Równe) to Mariendorf,

6th Legion ID to secure the line from Mariendorf to Rzeczyca,

1st Cavalry Brigade, to the right of the 3rd ID, from Reszuck (10 km north of Równe) to Susk, with the task of reconnaissance towards Równe, Dietkowicze and Klewań.

11th Lancer Regiment is to maintain communications between the 5th ID and the 1st Legion ID.

This grouping was adopted (Sketch Map 4).²¹ The 1st ID reached the Ludwipol area during the day.

The 2nd Army commander intended, immediately after the arrival of the 1st Legion ID in the Aleksandrija area, to launch an attack towards Równe with his entire force.

6 July

The day of 6 July passed in regrouping the army for the assault. The 1st Legion ID reached Tuczyn late in the evening of that day. Sketch Map 5.

7 July

The day of 7 July also passed with regrouping the army. On that day the commander of the 2nd Army, General Raszewski, issued an order with the following content:

I. According to air reconnaissance, the enemy, having sent about one division of cavalry from Równe through Bielów to Łuck, has concentrated the main part of the Horse Army in the vicinity of Równe, with a strong force in Klewań and securing the line of the Horyń from Tuczyn to Susk.

II. By order of the Ukrainian Front Command, the 2nd Army will attack the bulk of Budënyy's forces with the task of destroying him and recapturing the Równe – Kowel railway line.

The 1st Legion Division is in the vicinity of Tuczyn – Rzeczyca, where it has engaged in combat with a brigade of the enemy 4th Cavalry Division and has already established permanent communication with the Army Headquarters.

According to a message from the Ukrainian Front Command, Ostróg was to be attacked on 6 July by the 18th ID, after which action the 18th ID was directed to Równe.

III. In order to carry out the intentions above I order:

1) The 3rd ID, will concentrate immediately and will march today, i.e. 7 July, to the vicinity of Behenia, securing the crossing of the Horyń River making certain to secure the crossing to the south;

²¹ The 2nd Army was thus cut off from Kowel. Later it ran out of food and ammunition.



- 2) The 6th ID, will slightly extend the bridgehead south of Aleksandrija today;
- 3) The 1st Legion Division will concentrate today in the Kotowa – Mariendorf area, securing it from the east and along the Horyń River;
- 4) The 1st Cavalry Brigade, remaining in place in the Behenia area, will today commence vigorous reconnaissance in the directions of Ołyka via Klewań and Bielów; to Dolhoszyje via Peresopnica; and in the direction of Krylov (between Równe and Dubno via Diatkowicze, the bridge on the Stubła River (south-east of Satyjów), Bozkiewiczena Młynów and Diatkowicze);
- 5) The 11th Lancer Regiment is to report directly to the army command and will establish direct communication with it;
- 6) The 12th Infantry Regiment will remain in the area south of Behenia;

Once the ordered concentration has been carried out, the army will proceed to execute the attack.

IV. Grouping and execution of the attack.

From the concentration points ordered above units will set off: from Behenia in the following order:

- 1) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will march out at 03:00 on 8 July via Karajewicze – Karpilówka to Jadwipol, with the task of conducting the above-mentioned reconnaissance from the latter village and securing the western flank of the army's attack, possibly attacking and disturbing the enemy west of Równe.
- 2) The 3rd Legion Division will march out at 04:00 from Behenia and attack Równe through Karajewicze – Ponebel – Obarów with two regiments, leaving one infantry regiment on the Karajewicze – Karpilówka line to insure the right flank of the army towards Klewań.
- 3) The 12th Infantry Regiment will march at 03:00 on 8 July from Behenia to Chocin, from where it will establish communication with the right wing of the 6th Infantry Division as soon as possible, moving together with it in a direction through Wielki Aleksin to Zolotyjów, as a reserve for the 6th Infantry Division, to which it is directly subordinate from Chocin.
- 4) The 6th Infantry Division will depart at 02:00 on 8 July from Aleksandrija through Kustyń – Szpanów – Tiutkewicze to Równe.

It will stop in Kustyń until the front of the 1st Legion Division reaches Zaborol, and only then will it begin a further attack.

- 5) The 1st Legion Division, with the exception of one infantry regiment and one battery of field artillery, will set out at 03:00 on 8 July from Aleksandrija via Zaborol – Żytyn Mały – Barmaki and attack Równe from the east. One regiment of the 1st Legion Division plus one battery of the field artillery regiment will stop in Aleksandrija as a direct retreat of the 2nd Army.
- 6) The 11th Lancer Regiment will cross the Horyń River at Aleksandrija 03:30 on 8 July and will march east of the village of Zaborol – Żytyn Wielki, from where it will secure the left wing of the Army's attack from the east, accompanying it as the attack progresses.
- 7) The armoured trains *Groźny* and *Strzelec Kresowy* are to be near the railway bridge in Aleksandrija. At 02:00 on 8 July they will accompany the attack of the 6th Infantry Division, carrying out reconnaissance in the direction of Równe.

V. It is noted that the further supply of ammunition and provisions will be possible once the action commences only from the railway line Równe – Sarny.

VI. The 2nd Army's HQ's position until 02:00 on 8 July will be the Lubomirskaja railway station, then with the beginning of the attack at Aleksandrija manor, and it will then follow the path of the 6th ID.

VII. The intention of the Army command is to, after capturing Równe, as soon as possible establish rail communications with Kowel and secure that line.

After a successful attack, the accommodation of the 6th Infantry Division is to be in the area of Szpanów – Wielki Aleksin. The 1st Legion Division in Równe. The 3rd Legion Division in Obarów – Stawki – Ponebel.



VIII. The 11th Lancer Regiment will endeavour during tomorrow to establish, by means of an officer patrol, communication with the 18th Infantry Division, marching from Ostróg to Równe.

8 July

On 8 July the 2nd Army's attack began.

Even by 09:30 though, it seemed to the Army commander that the enemy's positions had changed fundamentally in the meantime. He therefore changed his dispositions from the previous day and ordered:

I. The enemy (the bulk of Buděny's forces) marched out yesterday from the Równe area in the general direction of Łuck – Kiwerce via Klewań. The 3rd Legion Division crossing at Behenia is being heavily contested by the enemy.

II. The 2nd Army will begin pursuit of the enemy.

III. To this end it is ordered:

1) The 1st Cavalry Brigade will set out immediately after receiving this order from Behenia through Karajewicze – Michałówka Colony – Bielów in the direction of Ołyka, carrying out reconnaissance through Klewań to Berezno – Derażno, through Klewań along the road in the direction of Łuck, through Peresopnica to Dolhoszyje and through Diatkowicze and the bridge on the Stubła River (southeast of Satyjów) to Młynów.

2) The 3rd Legion Infantry Division will march out of Behenia today, one hour after the departure of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, via Karajewicze – Broniki – Klewań with the task of overpowering and securing both the railway and highway bridges over the Stubła River with an offensive facing to the west.

3) The 12th Infantry Regiment will immediately march behind the 3rd Legion Division through Karajewicze to Ponebel, where it will join the 6th Infantry Division.

4) The 6th Infantry Division, (without the 12th Infantry Regiment) will march immediately upon receipt of this order through Kustyń – Szpanów – Obarów – Karpilówka – Michałówka to Bielów – Stary Żuków with the task of capturing the Stubła River crossings at Bielów and Peresopnica with an offensive facing to the west.

5) The 11th Lancer Regiment will immediately march through Zaborol – Żytyn Mały – Równe – Jasieniewiczze – Krywicze – Peresopnica to the village of Suchowce with the task of securing the southern flank of the 2nd Army.

6) The 1st Legion Division will march immediately through Zaborol – Żytyn Mały – Szpanów – Zolotyjów – Obarów – along the Klewań road in the direction of Klewań, placing at the disposal of the 2nd Army command one infantry regiment with one battery, as a reserve for the army.

7) The infantry regiment plus one battery from the 1st Legion Division, placed at the disposal of the Army Headquarters in Aleksandrija as reserve, will set off in the path of the 6th Infantry Division, to Ponebel, and then along the road to Klewań.

8) The task of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, like the 6th Infantry Division, will be to support the 1st Legion Division from the south towards Gołyszów, should the 1st Legion Division find too much resistance in the Klewań area.

9) The 1st Legion Division will march with its left flank through Równe to clear it of any remaining enemy forces.

10) The armoured trains *Strzelec Kresowy* and *Podhalanin* are to accompany the attack of the 2nd Army up to Równe, after which they are to withdraw to Sarny.

11) In the event that the aviation report is mistaken and the bulk of Buděny's forces are after all in the Równe area, the first of the nearest divisions to Równe will attack it with its entire division, to be reinforced by the Army's reserve and the nearest units of the 6th Infantry Division.

12) The position of the 2nd Army HQ until the completion of the bridge crossing at Aleksandrija is with the 1st Legion Division to Aleksandrija manor, then on the line of march of the 6th Infantry Division, passing via Ponebel, and continuing along the road to Klewan

Consequently, the 2nd Army no longer moved concentrically towards Równe but at around 12:00 on 8 July, pivoted the front of the entire army around its right wing, and took a westwards direction.



However, the fighting of the 6th and 1st Infantry Divisions between Aleksandrija and Równe was heavy. Two of Budëunny's cavalry divisions were found to be in the Równe area.

The 2nd Army commander therefore ordered the 6th and 11th Infantry Divisions to co-operate around Równe, while the 3rd Infantry Division, temporarily slowed the pace of its movement.

9 July

At dawn on 9 July, units of the 1st Infantry Division occupied Równe (Sketch Map 7). They remained in the town until that evening.

Later the entire 2nd Army moved westwards to the Stubła River and further to the Styr River and the Łuck – Kolki area.

34. Further action by General Krajowski's group. General Krajowski, as already mentioned, knew nothing about any of these movements of the 2nd Army. He had merely heard, on 7 July, the distant cannon shots from the direction of Równe and assumed that partisan fighting between Ukrainian insurgents and Bolshevik troops was taking place there, or that Ukrainian insurgents had attacked the Bolshevik rear. The main forces of Budëunny's army had, according to the news received in Ostróg, already moved from the Ostróg – Równe area towards Dubno on 5 July, i.e. two days previously. The latest orders from the commander of the 6th Army, dated 3 July, spoke of the withdrawal of the 2nd Army from Równe to the north, with the aim of moving between the Horse Army and Kowel.

General Krajowski, taking into account the orders, as well as the information gathered in Ostróg that the bulk of Budëunny's army was headed towards Dubno and Młynów, decided to leave Ostróg in the evening of 7 July and follow Budëunny's main forces to the Dubno area.²²

VI. From Ostróg to Dubno.

35. Fighting at the exit from Ostróg. (Sketch Map 5). The separation of General Krajowski's troops from the enemy advancing on Ostróg was to take place unnoticed.

The shortest route from Ostróg to Dubno was via Mizocz and Mirohoszcz. However, it was feared that the enemy forces, surrounding Ostróg from the west, would oppose such a movement too vigorously and hinder its speed. The general therefore decided to leave Ostróg in the evening, in two columns, via Kuniew and Nowomalin – Inset to Sketch Map 5 – to reach the Buderaz area in the morning of 8 July.

Because of the danger of renewed assaults, the general gradually pulled troops from the front, launching them southwards. The rear guard remained temporarily in position.

But once the troop movements began, it turned out that the road leading from Ostróg to Kuniew was already under fire from enemy machine guns, positioned in the Bielmaż forest.

Thus at 20:00, while the 44th IR and the 144th IR were repelling renewed assaults on their sectors, conducted with incessant shouts of “ura” and heavy artillery fire, the 145th IR was making an attack from Ostróg towards Bielmaż, on the Kuniew road side, in order to open the division's exit to the south-east.

²² In item 28, I deliberately quoted extensively the thoughts of the commander of the 18th Infantry Division, when deciding to strike from Gnojnica to Ostróg, because soon after the war I heard a high-ranking general question why the 18th Infantry Division did not strike from Ostróg at Równe on 8 July.

Insofar as this did not happen, it was by no means the fault of the commander of the 18th ID. The strike from Zasław on Ostróg had already been carried out on his own initiative and was the responsibility of General Krajowski. He could not have advanced from Ostróg even further north against the strict orders of the 6th Army commander for him to speed up a march to the Krzemieniec – Dubno line, without any communication with the command of that army and without any general knowledge of the actions of the 2nd Army. If the higher commands had wished that option, it is to be regretted that the appropriate order was not sent by air, for there is no doubt whatsoever that the strike would have been properly executed.



At about 21:00 the front of the division's left column moved through Międzyrzecz towards Kuniew – Ilyaszówka. The other part of the division went, as the right column, towards Łuczyn – Nowomalin – Buszcza. The rear guard of these columns, the 44th IR, did not leave Ostróg until 03:00 on 8 July.

At noon on 8 July, the group's troops halted, after a very arduous march through the sands of Polesie Małe, in the area of Buderaż. (Sketch Map 6)²³

36. Reorganisation of command in the group. General Krajowski's entire group was assembled for the first time in Buderaż. As well as the heavy regimental stock and rear establishments, the divisional train and the 10th Infantry Brigade, everything subordinate to General Krajowski was there.

In total there were: 14 infantry battalions, 10 Polish batteries and one Ukrainian, five cavalry squadrons, two sapper companies and two medical units.

In order to facilitate their command, a reorganisation of these formations was required. The following groups were formed:

- 1) 36th Brigade, General Linde – 49th IR, 145th IR, 3rd *Divizion* of the 18th FAR, 3rd Squadron of the 6th Lancer Regiment, 2nd Company of the 18th Sappers.
- 2) 35th Brigade, Colonel Machcewicz – 42nd IR, 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 144th IR, 2nd *Divizion* of the 18th FAR, 4th Squadron of the 6th Lancer Regiment, 1st Company of the 18th Sappers.
- 3) Lieutenant Colonel Szylling's Group – 42nd IR, 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 44th IR, 1st Battalion of the 4th Podolian Rifle Regiment, 1st *Divizion* of the 18th FAR, Ukrainian battery, the Horse Rifles squadron of the 13th ID.
- 4) Military train, Lieutenant Kramczynski – 3rd Battalion of the 144th IR.
- 5) At the disposal of the division command – two squadrons of the 6th Lancer Regiment.

37. Battles around Buderaż. Only a few hours after taking up positions at Buderaż, patrols began to clash all around the positions, with an especially strong attack on the sector of the 144th IR. These attacks, supported by artillery fire, lasted from 16:00 to midnight, but were all repulsed with the effective cooperation of the artillery, especially the 2nd and 3rd Batteries of the 18th FAR.

38 Communications. The division's radio was set up immediately on arrival, worked for a long time, and, being seen by all the units in the group, gave encouragement to officers and soldiers who thought there was a connection. But in reality there was no connection. Only the Lwów station reported to the call several times, accepted the situation report and replied with nothing. No airmen appeared, no orders or general positional information arrived.

9 July

39. From Buderaż to Obgów. Fighting at Moszczanica. So General Krajowski gave orders around midnight, after repelling the enemy attacks on the 144th IR, to continue the march towards Dubno.

At 04:00 on 9 July, the group left the Buderaż area, moving in two columns:

- 1) through Sujmy along the northern bank of the Zbytyńka River, towards Bondary – Nagorany,
- 2) via Wielka Moszczanica – Stupno to the Obgów region.

The road leading to the right on the northern edge of Polesie Małe – on the southern slopes of the hills of the Równie corridor through Czerniawka straight to Obgów – was not used as it was thought to be too sandy.

²³ The northern wing of the 6th Army, the 13th Infantry Division, reached Bazalja on the night of 7/8 July, 52 km south-east of the 10th Infantry Brigade, at Szumsk. The 2nd Army occupied Równie, 32 km north of Buderaż on 8 July with its southern flank. Buderaż lies on the northern edge of Mały Polesie, and Szumsk on the southern. There was thus 22 km of dense forest between the two groups. See Item 3.



Just before the departure from Buderaż, at 03:30 there was a renewed enemy attack on the positions of the 144th IR. The attack was repulsed after a battle of nearly half an hour.

The march to Obgów was to be short, in order to give the men and horses a rest, as the previous night's march from Ostróg to Buderaż through Polesie Małe had been very tiring, and serious fighting was to be expected before reaching Dubno.

They set off at around 04:00.

Initially, the march went as planned. However, in Moszczanica Wielka the left column confused the route and went north into the valley of the Zbytyńka River, through which the right column was marching.

The two huge columns then advanced side by side along a single road until they came to a narrow bridge, north-west of the town of Stupno, which is reached by a narrow causeway.

The bridge could only be crossed by one column, and the columns were crowding together. The division's staff officers personally regulated the passage to avoid confusion. At that time, almost simultaneously at around 09:00, the first cannon shots were fired at the advance guard in front of Bondary and Obgów and at the rear guard on the hills of Wielka Moszczanica – Sujmy.

Strong enemy forces simultaneously blocked the division's path in front and attacked its rear guard.

General Krajowski immediately ordered General Linde, commander of the 36th IB, to completely halt the enemy's advance on the rear guard using all the 145th IR and Battalion 3/144 supported by four batteries, while he personally took command of the advance guard and led the assault on Obgów and Nagórzany.

The wagons drove slowly across the bridge and clustered in the dips of the undulating and disjointed terrain between the villages of Bondary and Stupno.

General Linde's rear guard fought successfully. Several attacks by the enemy cavalry, both led on horseback and on foot with the support of artillery, were counter-attacked. Battalions 1/145 and 3/145 particularly distinguished themselves. In the meantime, the division commander managed, with a strong artillery group, to break through the enemy resistance in Obgów and take Nagórzany and Obgów.

40. In the Obgów area. Shortly after the capture of Nagórzany, a counter-attack was made by the enemy cavalry, but was repulsed by the 44th IR with the support of Batteries 2/18 and 3/18 FAR.

General Linde's rear guard gave way, as planned, after a two-hour battle. At about 12:00 the whole of the Krajowski group was in the area of Obgów – Nagórzany – Bondary – Słupno, again forming a "hedgehog" as on the previous day at Buderaż. (Sketch Map 7)

The 10th IB reached the Krzemieniec – Białokrynica area without contact with the enemy. The heavy wagons of the regiments, as well as the divisional establishments and wagons of the 18th ID, reached Radziwiłłów on the same day.

There was absolutely no news of the enemy or of neighbouring divisions. Of the six officers sent scouting from Ostróg and Buderaż to Dubno and Młynów, none had yet returned. As it later turned out, four were caught by the Bolsheviks just past the line of our forward posts, only one managed later to return with timely news, and one with news which was already out of date.

Peasants who were returning requisitioned horses to Równe told us that the Bolsheviks were well aware that a strong group of Polish troops that had managed to get into Budenny's rear, and were gathering troops from all over in order to neutralise the group.

41. Communications. The division's radio station set up quickly, and worked for a long time, but no one answered. No plane brought orders or even some orientation about the general situation.

42. Bolshevik intelligence. Meanwhile at division headquarters we noticed a detail of that audacious adventurism of which only Budenny's Cossacks were capable.



At about 04:00 an isolated shot was fired from close range near the division headquarters, and the bullet whistled just above the ear of the operator of the radio station, standing a few steps away from the division headquarters in Obgów. Not much attention was paid to one shot. A few minutes later there was a second shot. That bullet pierced the door of the radio station's vehicle, where the operator was working. A search was started, but nothing turned up. About five minutes later, a third shot was fired from the same direction, and as several soldiers turned to look for the sniper in the high corn, a Cossack, dressed in full blue Haller uniform, jumped up 150 paces away, leapt onto a horse that was also rising and escaped, despite a pursuit.²⁴

VII. Manoeuvre from Obgów through Krzemieniec to the Left Bank of the Ikwa

9 July

43. Intentions of the group commander. (Sketch Map 7) General Krajowski intended to strike Dubno from the Obgów area on the evening of 9 July.

To this end he ordered the 35th Brigade and Lt-Colonel Szilling's Group²⁵ to prepare their forces for an assault on Iwanicze and Trościaniec, and on the dominant Hills 327 and 339, six kilometres north and southwest of Obgów.

44. Detailed positions. After a thorough reconnaissance, it was found that the village of Trościaniec, as well as the hills west and south of the village, up to Hill 339, were heavily occupied by the enemy. In addition, at 17:30 a number of large detachments of cavalry was observed in the forest to the northwest of Trościaniec.

The terrain was very inconvenient for the attack on Trościaniec. The enemy flanked the plain in front from the Iwanicze hills and from Hill 327 with guns and HMGs. The fire of several enemy batteries hit Obgów and Nagórzany from the west, and Słupno from the east.

From the eastern side, along the previously mentioned road leading on the northern edge of Polesie Małe from Czerniawka to Obgów, the enemy attacked the positions of the 145th IR and Battalion 3/42, so that they had to be repulsed by counterattacks.

At 16:00 an observer of 49th IR noticed a long column of enemy cavalry and artillery, moving very quickly in two groups of 1,500 to 2,000 horsemen each, along the road from Mizocz to Mirohoszcz, as well as an enemy armoured train on the railway line Równe – Dubno, standing near Mirohoszcz.

At 17:30 the previously mentioned intelligence officer returned from Dubno with a report that there no bridges left on the Ikwa. He had also seen, around 15:00, a column of enemy cavalry of about 3,000 to 4,000 horsemen on the march from Dubno through Semiduby to the south.²⁶

The general picture thus confirmed the peasants' stories.

²⁴ A large percentage of Budëny's soldiers wore Polish uniforms. The Cossacks stripped Polish prisoners of their good Polish uniforms in a flash, giving them their rags instead. French Haller uniforms were especially sought after.

However, those Cossacks who did not have Polish uniforms, were dressed in ordinary peasant clothes, boots, caps, hats, etc. Waging war against such an enemy was extremely difficult. This made reconnaissance very easy for Cossack patrols. A Cossack without a horse and without a weapon looked no different from any peasant in a Volhynian village – or, dressed in a Polish uniform, from a Polish soldier.

²⁵ For its composition, see Item 36.

²⁶ This news was later confirmed by a situation report of the commander of the 10th Brigade.

From these observations and the strength of the enemy attacks, General Krajowski concluded that Buděny's main forces had not yet crossed the Ikwa.

The main objective of the manoeuvre on Ostróg and Buderaz was thus achieved. Buděny had broken off his advance on Łuck and Beresteczko and turned against the 18th Infantry Division, losing time against the 2nd and 6th Armies.²⁷

45. Decisions of the group commander. Around 15:00 General Krajowski was still undecided whether to strike at Dubno, but still wished to. However, the recent news convinced him that the conditions for that battle would be much more favourable to the enemy than to us.

1) All the bridges over the Ikwa near Dubno were broken and forcing the swampy river from east to west would be extremely difficult.

2) It was likely that the enemy – stronger than the 18th ID – intended to attack the 18th Infantry Division while crossing the Ikwa from both north and south.

3) The soldiers of the 18th Infantry Division, were showing great fatigue from the last few days, and for this reason he was not at all confident in fighting against a larger force.²⁸

4) General Szymanski, commander of the 10th IB, had requested help from Krzemieniec against numerous approaching enemy forces.²⁹

Ultimately, therefore, the general decided to move with the entire division from Obgów in a single forced march through Antonowcy to Krzemieniec, and there to smash the enemy advancing on the 10th IB. Then, before Buděny noticed at Obgów, to cross the Ikwa River at Krzemieniec and strike at Dubno by its western bank, thus then facing towards Buděny's front and blocking his further passage to Lwów.

46. March from Obgów to Krzemieniec. Orders were quickly issued. At 17:30, as darkness was already falling and so making it difficult for the enemy to observe, the group set off from Obgów towards Antonowcy. Due to the lack of roads it was in a single column.

The units were assembled in such a way as to be able to enter combat at any time, even if in the forest or from marching column.³⁰ The troops currently in contact with the enemy were given placements in the rear guard.

In order to secure the right flank in the area of Budki Obgowskija and further on, three kilometres to the south, the front of the column sent out flank guards to the right. Those guards then re-joined the rear guard after the column passed.

10 July

²⁷ The effectiveness of the strike of the 18th Infantry Division, from Zaslav to Ostróg and the march to Obgów is denied in Soviet military writings, but there is no doubt that the objective of this manoeuvre was achieved. Only those moves, together with the manoeuvres of the 2nd Army, could have caused Buděny – who had hitherto been pushing unstopably westwards – to not only to suddenly halt his troops at Dubno on 7 July, but to turn eastwards against the 18th Infantry Division on 9 July. When one further considers that the 18th Infantry Division, after making a surprise move from Obgów to Krzemieniec, and from there along the left bank of the Ikwa to Dubno, still found Buděny in the same situation on 13 July as he had been in six days before, one can safely say that General Krajowski's intentions were fully achieved. Buděny lost six days.

²⁸ The combat strength of the 18th ID, together with the 44th IR and the 1/4 Podolian Battalion, was about 5,000 bayonets. Buděny already had two cavalry divisions at Dubno, of 4,000 sabres each, and an armoured train.

²⁹ The battle condition of the 10th IB – that is, the 19th IR and the 40th IR – amounted to about 1,000 bayonets. Although the 105th IR had about 1,500 bayonets, it was not fully combat ready

³⁰ Infantry units were interspersed with artillery and the wagons.



The night march through the difficult, overgrown and sandy roads of Polesie Małe was very tiring. The night was completely dark, the road very sandy, and the column was interrupted several times as a result of the sleepiness of the peasants on the carts. Despair gripped the officers on liaison duty along the column, but their inexhaustible energy managed to get it to its destination in good order.

47. Antonowcy. Between 06:00 and 12:00 on 10 July, the division arrived in the village of Antonowcy without meeting the enemy. Forming a “hedgehog” again, it paused there for a rest; the artillery and rolling stock in the middle of the protecting infantry circle.

The stopover in Antonowcy lasted 6 hours.

48. News of the enemy. Information from patrols and intelligence was that there was a large force of enemy cavalry in the Semiduby – Pererośła – Tartak area. Also Szumsk had been occupied the day before, i.e. 9 July, by three rifle regiments, which in the morning of 10 July had moved westward on carts.

A further march might therefore meet that force just before Krzemieniec.

49. From Antonowcy to Białokrynica. The general therefore placed five battalions and four batteries as flank guards on both sides of the Antonowcy – Białokrynica road and moved the rest of the troops and wagons through that corridor to the Białokrynica – Berezina area and to the Białokrynica – Szepetyń – Lisznia – Wesołowka area.

At midnight of 10 July the leading units of the 18th ID made contact with the regiments of the 10th IB, on the eastern edge of Białokrynica. By 04:00 on 11 July, all the units of the group had reached the designated areas, without encountering the enemy on the way.

11 July

50. Krzemieniec. By 04:00 the units of General Krajowski's group had organised themselves in the areas of Szepetyń, Lisznia, Białokrynica and Krzemieniec.

51. Locations of 10th IB. The reports of the commander of the 10th IB gave its situation as follows:

There was no news about the location or activities of the 2nd Army. (The positions given in Map 8 were not known).

The 10th Brigade garrisoned Białokrynica with the 19th IR and Krzemieniec with the 40th IR, being a total force of 1,000 bayonets and four batteries. The 105th IR remained in reserve at Berezina. Patrols dispatched from the brigade in the direction of Wiśniowiec had failed to establish communication with the 13th Infantry Division. The southern wing of the brigade, at Krzemieniec, had been attacked by a considerable force of enemy cavalry.

On 9 July an officer from the Brody garrison had arrived in Krzemieniec, and related the panic in Brody, and that Colonel Jasiński's group, made up of several stage battalions, was there, and that the reserve battalion of the 50th IR was defending itself at Fort Dubno against a strong attack by Budëny's cavalry. The officer had encountered Bolshevik patrols on his way from Brody to Krzemieniec in the Hrada area, i.e. about 12 km west of Krzemieniec.

Although not very plentiful, it was nevertheless the first news “from the outside world” for the division's staff in five days. It at least provided a general orientation, and therefore more certainty for the commander in taking further decisions.

The morning of 11 July passed relatively calmly and was used to regroup the troops. The 19th IR moved from Białokrynica to Krzemieniec; Battalion 1/4 Podolian left that village and was placed as a reserve at the disposal of the commander of the 10th IB.

52. Orders received. Around noon wire communication was finally established with the 6th Army command via Rudnia, after a 10-day break. The first telegraph gave brief orders directing;

The 13th Infantry Division, will garrison the area of Toki (10 km north of Podwołoczyska) – Kutysk – Zukowce – Peredmirka – Bol. Oknin – Podhajce – Nowosiełki (the last 4 villages on Sketch Map 8).



The 10th Infantry Brigade is to be in the Krzemieniec – Białokrynica region;

The 18th Infantry Division is to be at Krzemieniec – Dubno;

and I order the 18th Infantry Division to immediately surrender two battalions of the 44th IR to Wiśniowiec.

At the same time came a second order, commanding:

The 18th ID, together with the 10th IB, is to smash the enemy cavalry division positioned in the Mirohoszcz area east of Dubno and to regroup afterwards in the area of Iwanie Puste – Nowo Poczajów.

Thus, the order was not quite in line with General Krajowski's previous line of thinking, as it would have been unfortunate to abandon the assault on the enemy at Krzemieniec and miss a good opportunity to defeat the enemy forces positioned there – who might be awkward in the future. In spite of that, it was necessary to proceed quickly with the execution of the orders, as the Army commander's reasons for giving them were unknown. The commander of the 18th Infantry Division had had almost no news of Budëunny's actions since the march from Obgów.

General Krajowski therefore intended to set out at midnight of 11/12 July from Krzemieniec, leaving only two battalions of the 44th IR there, as given in the Army commander's order, to leave for the 13th Infantry Division, and Battalion 1/4 Podolian to go to the 10th Infantry Brigade.

However, the events at Krzemieniec and new orders from the 6th Army commander soon changed this decision.

53. Enemy assault. Around 16:00 the enemy launched a sudden attack on the south-eastern wing of the Krzemieniec positions. The fragmented terrain of the area was extremely difficult to defend with the small force the 10th Infantry Brigade had at its disposal, and convenient for the advance of the overwhelming enemy forces. After heavy fire from artillery and machine-guns, the 40th IR was thrown back and the enemy forced its way into the city. It was not until a counterattack was made, with the assistance of Battalion 1/4 on Grabówka, that the 10th IB recaptured its former positions, around 23:00.

In the meantime, at 18:00 enemy infantry, supported by heavy artillery fire, attacked the positions of the 42nd IR near Wesołowka. This attack, however, was repulsed with considerable losses to the enemy.

54. New orders. At this time, around 18:00, a new operational order from the 6th Army commander arrived:

Airmen report the advance of columns of cavalry and wagons in the direction of Krzemieniec. At 11:30 the head of the column (1,500 wagons and 400 horsemen) was at Katerburg. There are plentiful movement of horse patrols in the area north and south of that line.

Two large columns of cavalry and wagons are marching from the east in the direction of Dubno, but a tendency towards the north-west is visible.

General Krajowski, to whom General Szymański's group (10th Brigade) and temporarily Colonel Jasiński's group (3,000 bayonets, 220 sabres and 12 cannons in the area of Brody – Dubno) is subordinated, will strike at the enemy column marching towards Krzemieniec. After breaking it up, General Krajowski will garrison Krzemieniec – Dubno with General Szymański's group, to which he will subordinate Colonel Jasiński's group, while the 18th Infantry Division will regroup in the area of Pełcza (15 km west of Dubno) – Rudnia – Hrada (12 km west of Krzemieniec). The rest of Colonel Jasiński's troops are to be at Brody.

The enemy columns, seen at 11:30 on the march to Krzemieniec, were therefore probably the same ones that attacked the 10th Brigade at 16:00 and 18:00.



55. Our counterattack in front of Krzemieniec and the movement on Dubno. General Krajowski therefore immediately reverted to his previous plan and ordered two infantry regiments to strike without delay, from the hills south of Wesołowka in a southerly direction on the enemy's right flank.

The 42nd and 44th IRs, with four batteries, immediately began to form up for the attack, due to take place at dawn on 12 July. At the same time, the general ordered the other regiments of the 18th Infantry Division to prepare themselves: "to either take part in this battle, or to quickly march to Dubno". The order envisaged an attack by the 44th IR with Batteries 2/ and 3/18 FAR from Hill 392 through Lipowiec to Grabówka, and the 42nd IR with Batteries 4/ and 5/18 Heavy Artillery from Wesołowka through Czugali to Novosiełki Male and Wielkie.

Should this attack not make progress, the General intended to strike with the 144th IR as well, from the town of Lisznia towards Ludwiszczce.

12 July

The 42nd and 44th IRs advanced from their starting positions just before dawn on 12 July.

56. Commander's decision. About 08:00 in the morning, when the first signs that the attack was going well came through, the general decided, without waiting for the further course of the battle, to move with the rest of the 18th Infantry Division immediately through Werba to attack Dubno.³¹

The 18th IR command, the 35th IB command, the 36th IB command, the 18th Artillery Brigade command, 49th IR, 144th IR, 145th IR, three *divisions* of the 18th FAR, Sapper Companies 1/ and 2/18 and two hospital columns left their positions in the area of Szepetyn, Lisznia and Białokrynica and moved through Białokrynica – Sapanów – Turja towards Werba. The 6th Lancer Regiment was ordered to move through Nosowica to the western bank of the Ikwa River to the town of Ptycza, to conduct strong reconnaissance from there to Pełcza, Bokujma, Kol Smyha, Straków, Dubno and Mirohoszcz and to cover the movements of the 18th Infantry Division from Białokrynica to the area of Werba – Ptycza from observation by enemy patrols.

The 44th IR, 42nd IR, Battalion 1/4, Batteries 4/ and 5/18 Heavy Artillery, plus the Ukrainian battery, remained in the Krzemieniec area, under the orders of General Szymański, commander of the 10th Infantry Brigade.

57. Attack of the 42nd and 44th IRs. The attack of the 42nd and 44th IRs hit the flank and rear of the enemy and took it completely by surprise.

The 42nd IR quickly smashed the Bolshevik 403rd, 404th and 405th Rifle Regiments, which fled in panic, leaving about 120 dead and a great quantity of war material on the battlefield. The 44th IR then, in accordance with the 6th Army commander's orders, set out after the end of the battle in the direction of Wiśniowiec, to return to the 13th Infantry Division, and to establish communication with its left wing, which had not yet managed to occupy Novosiełki, designated by the 6th Army command as the point of contact between the 13th and 18th Infantry Divisions.³²

58. Evening Positions. On the evening of 12 July the troops under General Krajowski reached the following positions:

The 18th IR command, the 35th IB command, the 36th IB command, 49th IR, 144th IR, 145th IR, the 6th Lancer Regiment, the entire 18th FAR, and Sapper Company 2/18, were in the area of Ptycza – Werba. Patrols of the 6th Lancer Regiment had reached Nikitycze, Piratyn, Milcza, Pełcza and Sudobiczy, discovering those villages were garrisoned by the enemy.

³¹ This manoeuvre will be discussed later.

³² This march was full of surprises and successes thanks to the excellent regimental commander Lt-Colonel Szyling. On the way to Wiśniowiec he unexpectedly encountered Kotovski's cavalry brigade and smashed it thoroughly. He took seven cannons and recaptured Captain Drozdowski, who had been taken prisoner two days ago in his car, while acting as the army commander's courier to the 13th ID's HQ. Details of the action are unknown to the author



10th IB occupied with the 19th and 40th IRs the former positions east of Białokrynica and Krzemieniec. The 42nd IR, with batteries of the 2/18 and 3/18 Heavy Artillery, after clearing the area in front of 10th IB moved to its right wing, as reserve. Battalion 1/4 was also there.

The 44th IR, with the Ukrainian battery, moved from Krzemieniec towards the left wing of the 13th ID.

The 105th IR was set up as a liaison group between the grouping of the 18th ID, in Werba and Ptycza, and the grouping of the 10th IB, near Krzemieniec. It manned the crossing of the Ikwa River.

59. Colonel Jasiński's Group. This group placed at General Krajowski's disposal by order of the 6th Army commander, and was still in communication with him on 12 July, by motorcycle. In order to use it to garrison the Ikwa crossings on the Krzemieniec – Dubno line, Colonel Jasiński was ordered to alert his troops in Brody and move in the direction of Werba, leaving only one Guard battalion in Brody.

The composition of Colonel Jasiński's group was as follows:³³

In Brody: Commander – Colonel Jasiński.

9th Border Rifle Regiment ³⁴ (less one company)	24 officers, 783 men, 4 HMGs
Guard Battalion ³⁵ 4/2 (less one company)	3 officers, 230 men
Two Gendarmerie ³⁶ platoons from Ostróg and Zaslów	4 officers, 229 men
[Artillery] School <i>Divizion</i> , 3 batteries	16 officers, 457 men, 12 guns
Railway Company 2/2	
Railway Hospital Train No. 7	

In Fort Zahorce: Commander – Major Matczyński.

Reserve Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment	7 officers, 520 men, 5 HMGs
Sapper Company 2/8	2 officers, 120 men
One company of the 9th Border Rifle Regiment	3 officers, 136 men
One company, Guard Battalion 4/2	2 officers, 102 men
One platoon, field Gendarmes from Krzemieniec	23 men
One platoon, 6th Field Artillery Regiment	2 officers, 45 men, 2 guns

Right next to the fort was the armoured train *Chrobry* 8 HMGs, 2 guns

VIII. Results of the Battles from July 3 to 12

Compare Sketch Maps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

The period of fighting so far described was the pursuit of the 18th Infantry Division, behind Budëny's Horse Army. The original purpose of the pursuit was for the division to participate in an anticipated major battle against that army.

At the time of General Romer's decision of 29 June, as commander of the 6th Army, to withdraw the entire 18th Infantry Division from the Latyczów section (Sketch Map 1), the main forces of the enemy Horse Army were in the area of Korzec. General Romer supposed that he would be able to regroup his army quickly enough that the 18th Infantry Division would be able to take part in "a major battle against Budëny" "across the Horyń River from Zaslów". This explains the content of his first order.

However, in spite of the great haste and forced marches, the transfer of the 18th Infantry Division from the Latyczów area to the Starokonstantynów area took so long that the real start of General Krajowski's action, i.e. breaking away from the left wing of the 13th Infantry Division and moving in to the north-west (Sketch Maps 2 and 3), could not take place until 3 July. The reason for the delay was

³³ Numbers given are for total men. The combat strengths are unknown.

³⁴ Officially the Border Rifles had "squadrons", thanks to their origins, but these are pure infantry.

³⁵ *Bataljon wartowniczy*, presumably originally intended for internal security.

³⁶ Item 54 gives this overall group having 220 cavalry, which is presumably these. Such men were intended as police, with the prevention of desertion as their primary role.



that the 18th Infantry Division, in accordance with the 6th Army commander orders, had to wait in the Latyczów section for relief by the 12th Infantry Division, which itself still needed to be relieved in the section from Kopajgród to Bar by the Ukrainian troops of General Pavlenko. Those changes and related marches alone needed three days, especially as they took place in the midst of fighting (east of Kopajgród, north-east of Bar).

Due to those other circumstances then, that delay meant that a major battle involving the 18th Division could no longer be fought at the Horyń River.

That was because the enemy had already crossed the Horyń River at Hoszcza and Ostróg on 3 July 3 (Sketch Map 4), so that by the time the 18th Infantry Division reached Zasław, the enemy was already near Równe, sending reconnaissance out to Dubno and Klewań.

General Romer's decision to send the 18th Infantry Division, to fight at the Horyń River was a bold one. Weakening his army by an entire infantry division – reinforced with three and a half more battalions and a lancer regiment – on his own initiative, without an order from Supreme Command, and in addition at a time when the army sectors at Kopajgród, Bar and Sieniawa were being strongly attacked, showed a deep understanding of the strategic situation on the Polish southern front.

The enemy's Horse Army, consisting of four cavalry divisions with a total strength of 18 to 20,000 sabres and two infantry divisions (44th and 45th Rifle Divisions), constituted the main enemy battering ram on the Ukrainian front. The bulk of our forces had to be directed there as well.

As soon as he gave the orders to carry out his resolution, General Romer thus became the main initiator of all the fighting described here. The clearly defined guiding idea: "to fight a major battle with Budëny's army" guided all future decisions of General Krajowski as commander of the 18th Infantry Division.

The detachment of the 18th Infantry Division from the left flank of the 13th Infantry Division and its vigorous assault on the enemy forces grouping for the assault on the left flank of the 6th Army (Sketch Maps 2 and 3) caused a temporary redirection of these forces heading north. Immediately upon the 18th Infantry Division moving away, however, the Soviet 45th Infantry Division struck in a southerly direction (Sketch Map 4). The effect of that attack was to push back the left wing of the 13th Infantry Division, at the critical moment when the ordered retreat had begun. That defeat could have been avoided if the 6th Army, having earmarked nearly one-third of its forces for the battle on the Horyń River, had not remained on the previous line of Jampol – Bar – Latyczów – Starokonstantynów, but had followed the Supreme Command's directions and retired in line with the 18th Infantry Division's action, in a westerly direction.

Leaving the 12th and 13th Infantry Divisions in their former positions, was intended to relieve the pressure on the Polish 2nd Army (cited in Item 22 – the 6th Army Command order of 3 July, paragraph IV). That objective was not achieved. By leaving the 6th Army weakened and cordoned off in its former positions, the gap between the 6th and 2nd Armies only widened further, and the left wing of the 13th Infantry Division was exposed to the unpleasant consequences of the days of 5/6 July, while the rear of the army was exposed to the enemy's raids, which destroyed a lot of valuable material in Czerny Ostrów and Płoskirów.³⁷

Leaving the left wing of the 6th Army 50 km further east of the right wing of the 2nd Army was also very risky because of where the bulk of Budëny's army was. Already in Sketch Map 1, for 29 June, we can see the danger that threatened the 6th Army. An attack by the main forces of Budëny's army, between 26 June and 6 July, on the left wing and rear of the 6th Army, if combined with an offensive of the Soviet 14th Army, could have had serious consequences.

With the capture of Zasław and the observation that Budëny's main forces had already crossed at Równe heading west, General Krajowski began a period of searching for those forces. A strike at

³⁷ Described by Colonel Marjan Kukiel in "Bellona", October 1922.



Ostróg followed, intending to make Buděnyy concerned about his rear, and then followed a pursuit from Ostróg in the direction of Dubno.

The fighting of a major battle, initially foreseen on the Horyń River, in the Ostróg – Równe area, was nevertheless possible, despite the delay of the 18th Infantry Division. That battle did not take place due to a lack of coordination between the 18th Infantry Division and the 2nd Army. The opportunity to fight the sought-after pitched battle was missed, with the withdrawal of the 2nd Army and the 18th Division from Ostróg and Równe to Dubno and Łuck.

However, despite the non-participation of the 18th Infantry Division in the battle of Równe, the subsequent outcome of its actions still yielded positive results. Partially tied down by the advance of the 2nd Army at Równe, Buděnyy lost time, whereas the 18th Infantry Division move towards Dubno – in order to close the dangerous gap there – allowed Buděnyy to break away from the 2nd Army and move towards Lwów without major obstacles.

On 12 July the 18th Infantry Division was stationed in the Werba area. Whereas on 1 July it was still 80 km behind Buděnyy's Horse Army, by 12 July it was now in front of it and would be able to delay its march towards Lwów – until the moment of the desired battle, with the assistance of the other retiring divisions.

The results of the battles and marches of the 18th Infantry Division, during the period from 3 to 12 July, are therefore favourable. The sought-after enemy was caught, and some serious losses were even inflicted on it, without losing too much itself. Another enemy group, seriously threatening the left wing of the 13th Infantry Division, was defeated at Krzemieniec. Finally, what is also very important, the spirit of its own soldiers was raised by disproving the fable of invincibility surrounding Buděnyy's troops.



The Struggle to Contain: 12 to 26 July 1920

IX. First Assault on Dubno

60. Situation. While the 18th Infantry Division was stationed in the evening of 12 July in the area of Werba – Ptycza,³⁸ General Krajowski had no detailed information about the enemy's positions. Patrols from the 6th Lancer Regiment had already encountered the enemy in the villages of Sudobicze, Nikitycze, Milcza, Pełcza – everywhere a few squadrons. The general picture from the reports was that of a moving cloud of squadrons, whose number could not be determined. What was behind them was unknown.

There was no news about the positions of the 2nd Army. The line of demarcation between the 2nd and 6th Armies was to pass through Młynów.

61. The commander's assessment of the position and his decision. The intention was to reject the enemy forces, which had already crossed the Ikwa near Dubno, back beyond that river, seize Dubno, garrison that city with Colonel Jasiński's formations and strike in the direction of Młynów to establish communication with the 2nd Army. If that was not possible, due to excessive enemy strength, then to halt the advance of the enemy forces towards the south until the arrival of the right wing of the 2nd Army. The withdrawal of the units from the 18th Infantry Division to the 6th Army's reserve – in the area of Pełcza, Rudnia, and Hrada, in accordance with the received order³⁹ – could of course only take place after the area south and west of the Ikwa was cleared of the enemy.

General Krajowski assumed that a major battle with Budëny's army, with the participation of the 2nd Army, might take place in the Młynów area – a meeting that had been sought since Zasław.

He therefore decided to move at dawn on 13 July towards Dubno and Chorupań, with a wide front but keeping the bulk of his forces concentrated on the right wing, while keeping the 6th Lancer Regiment on the left wing.⁴⁰

In this spirit, an operational order was issued in Werba on 12 July at 21:30 to attack Dubno.

62. News from Fort Zahorce. Shortly after the order had been given, around midnight, the division commander received a report from one of the battery commanders. By chance (probably through the contact of telephone wires, as the telephone connection between Werba and Fort Dubno had been broken by the enemy) he had managed to talk briefly to Fort Zahorce.

The situation report went:

The enemy occupies the town of Dubno, with its main forces – cavalry with artillery – in the area of Mirohoszcz – Raczyn. Several squadrons, with six guns, surround and shell the fort. Four enemy guns are near Tarakanowo, two near Aleksandrówka colony.

Almost at the same time a written report on the position at the fort reached the division command, with the following content:

21:00 on 12 July. The situation is critical. Immediate assistance is necessary, or the fort will be abandoned during the night. Enemy situation: in an arc from Tarakanowo to Zahorce almost through to Kamienica station.

(–) Niewieszcański

Lieutenant and commander of the armoured train *Chrobry*.

So the second report did not agree with the previous, more recent, and somewhat calmer one. Haste in carrying out the actions of the 18th ID, however, was necessary.

³⁸ The location of the units is described in Item 57.

³⁹ See Item 54.

⁴⁰ There was a corridor convenient for operations on both sides of the Werba – Dubno road. To the west of that corridor was the forest complex of "Dubno Orchards". See Item 5.



13 July

63. Attack of the 18th ID from the Ptycza – Werba area on Dubno. On 10 July, at 02:00, in order to exploit the advantage that infantry had over the enemy cavalry during the hours of darkness, the division's move began.

At that time the 3rd Battalion of the 49th Infantry Regiment crossed the Ikwa near Nosowica to operate on its eastern bank via Sudobiczy to Dubno.

At 05:00 the 145th Infantry Regiment moved with two batteries through Piratyn to Aleksandrówka Colony, and at 06:00 the front of the division's main force along the road to Dubno. In the advance guard of the main column was the commander of 36th Brigade, with two battalions of the 49th IR and batteries 2/ and 3/18 field artillery. They were followed by the commander of the 35th Brigade with the 144th IR and three batteries as the division's reserve.

The march from Ptycza to Podłuża took place without encountering any significant enemy; just Cossack patrols appearing behind almost every hill.

In front of Fort Zahorce, the leading company of the 49th IR met a few dozen horsemen, but after a short machine gun battle it broke through the resistance and reached the fort.

The division HQ entered with the first infantrymen. The hero of the fort, Major Matczyński, had commanded its defence despite being wounded, and now joyfully greeted his liberators. The main pillars of the fort's defence were the Reserve Battalion of the 50th Infantry Regiment and 2/8 Sapper Company.

However, the Bolshevik troops surrounding the fort did not give way completely. Battalion 1/49, which was in the hills to the west of the fort, fought an even longer battle before it was able to repel the enemy squadrons operating there. In that fighting, the excellent commander of the 49th Infantry Regiment, Captain Nadachowski, was wounded. However, that brave officer did not leave for the hospital but remained with the regiment's train. Command of the 49th IR was taken over by Captain Kocur and he led the regiment immediately to an attack on Tarakanowo. There, after a short battle, he drove back the Cossack squadrons towards Dubno and to the west of that town, capturing two machine-guns, several ammunition and hospital carts, and a few loose horses.

The elevated terrain north of Tarakanowo left the enemy still with a foothold though. In particular the Bolsheviks defended the Palestyna Park suburb of Dubno with very heavy machine-gun fire and with the support of an armoured car, operating on the Dubno road. It was so fierce that even a vigorous attack by the 49th Regiment, supported by accurate artillery fire, failed to drive them back from there.

64. The left column. Battalions 2/ and 3/145 and two batteries left at 04:00 from Ptycza through Piratyn to Aleksandrówka colony, while battalion 1/145 with battery 2/18 field artillery and the 6th Lancer Regiment were left as protection in the Buderaż – Smordwa area.

Battalions 2/ and 3/145 reached Piratyn without fighting. There, however, they received news that Sady was held strongly by the enemy. Battalion 3/145 assaulted it without warning. Surprised by the strong assault, the enemy's cavalry dispersed into the woods, leaving a large amount of rolling stock and several prisoners from the Soviet 11th Cavalry Division in our hands.

It was almost at the same time when the 49th IR occupied Zahorce fort and in their further advance encountered the mentioned resistance at Palestyna Park.

65. Fighting prior to the capture of Dubno. It was now daylight. The enemy squadrons operating in the area to the south-west of Dubno constantly advanced and retreated, trying to strike at the flank or rear of the 49th IR. Although the fire of our artillery inflicted heavy losses on the Cossacks, day time favoured them and, changing their battle formation frequently and quickly to react to the artillery fire, they deftly carried out their manoeuvres to reach their intended goals.

At 09:30 the division commander noticed a pattern in the movement of the enemy squadrons, moving partly through the woods, to between the left wing of the 49th IR and a clump of the 145th IR. The enemy was also gathering squadrons in the woods around Krywuchy.



General Krajowski immediately moved the division's reserve, the 144th IR, through Zahorce in that direction. Having thus established a link between the 49th IR and the 145th IR, he moved the entire division to a concentric attack of Dubno at about 11:00.

The Bolshevik cavalry suffered so badly under the fire of our batteries that, seemingly, it was no longer capable of effective resistance. Frequently forced to retire, it withdrew loosely in the direction of Chorupań – Golowczyce.

66. Fighting of the left flank guard. According to the orders issued, Battalion 1/145 with Battery 2/18 FAR and the entire 6th Lancers, was supposed to be in Golowczyce at that time, which would have blocked the route of the retreating enemy.

But that group was no longer there. Battalion 1/145, superbly commanded by Captain Uldanowicz, had reached the town of Chorupań through Pełcza, almost without a fight, and after a fierce battle had occupied the village at around 10:30, but was immediately counterattacked strongly by several regiments of cavalry with artillery, and after a two hour struggle had to retreat back towards Sady.

The 6th Lancer Regiment (173 sabres), tasked with protecting that battalion's left flank, lost contact with it and was unable to regain it.

67. Right flank actions. Battalion 3/49, which crossed the Ikwa near Nosowica at 02:00, fought hard during the day. As early as about 04:00 the advance guard of the battalion encountered a strong enemy detachment behind the railway track west of Sudobiczy, with a dozen machine guns. Battalion 3/49 was without artillery, as the bridge across the Nosowica was too weak for it and there had not been time to repair it. Supporting the battalion's attack on Sudobiczy with artillery positioned on the west bank of the Ikwa was also impossible at night. The battalion commander, Captain Mościcki, therefore concentrated a dozen or so men with rifle grenades and, after a short but heavy fire from them, threw the 10th Company into a determined attack. The assault was fully successful. The battalion managed to force its way into the enemy's position, the crews of which had fled, leaving in our hands four machine-guns and a fleet of fifteen horse-drawn wagons.

Exploiting the advantage we had over the cavalry at night, Battalion 3/49 advanced rapidly, pursuing the frightened enemy. After breaking through short resistance in Dietynicze, Captain Mościcki took Strakłów at 08:00.⁴¹ Here, however, enemy attacks began from all sides. The enemy had a huge numerical advantage, with a ratio of forces about 10:1. Armoured cars were also present. But Battalion 3/49 valiantly withstood all the assaults, thus preventing the enemy forces from striking over the bridge on the Ikwa to the rear and flank of the 18th ID, which was moving towards Dubno. Battalion 3/49 lost 11 killed (one officer) and 47 wounded, i.e. 20% of its number. However, the enemy's losses were much higher. The 10th and 12th Companies, under the command of Lieutenant Siedlecki, were especially distinguished.

Dubno was taken at 13:30.

68. Assault from Dubno to the north-west. After regrouping in Dubno, the entire 36th Brigade, with the 145th IR in the lead, immediately left for Chorupań and Golowczyce, while the 144th IR garrisoned the town. Chorupań was taken at 20:45, after breaking several strong attacks by enemy cavalry, supported by strong artillery. The enemy was driven back with heavy losses to Smordwa, Młynów and the north bank of the Ikwa.

The 36th IB attempted to establish communications with Battalion 1/145 and the 6th Lancer Regiment but failed.

69. Evening positions. Towards evening, several regiments of enemy cavalry retreating from the vicinity of Młynów was observed, as well as the movement of several dismounted squadrons in the forests south of Chorupań.

All the soldiers of the 36th Brigade were now very tired.

⁴¹ At this time the bulk of the division moved from around the fort via Tarakanowo to Dubno.



The 145th IR was positioned in Chorupań (and on Hill 206) under heavy enemy artillery fire from the north bank of the Ikwa.

The 9th Border Rifle Regiment from Colonel Jasiński's group, which arrived in Werba at 09:00 from Brody, was ordered to march to Fort Zahorce and be placed at Major Matczyński's disposal.

The 105th IR, manned the crossings of the Ikwa River, from Krzemieniec up to and including Ptycza, throughout 13 July, thus securing the rear of the 18th ID, and forming a link with the 10th IB in Krzemieniec. Two companies of that regiment were left at the disposal of Major Matczyński.

The 10th IB learned from Krzemieniec that the enemy infantry had retreated somewhat to the east, but that part of Kotovski's cavalry, about one regiment with six guns, had had been in the area of Gaje (16 km west of Białokrynica) and Poczajów, and was making its way towards Radziwiłłów, scattering our wagons as it went.

From Brody it was reported that Bolshevik parties had been seen in the areas of Góry "Makutra" and Gaje-Dytkowieckie.

Information gathered from the prisoners was not very clear.

Peasants told of the passage of some 4,000 horsemen in the evening of 11 July through Bokujma towards Beresteczko. Those troops supposedly stayed overnight in the area of Wołkowyje – Demidówka – Kniahinin. On the basis of that information, as well as the testimony of the prisoners of war, division HQ came to the conclusion that the 11th Cavalry Division was operating in the Dubno – Strakłów area, the 6th Cavalry Division in the Młynów – Klewań area, the 4th Cavalry Division south-west of Młynów, and there was no news of the 14th Cavalry Division.

The movement of one mounted division (the 4th?) to Demidówka and Kniahinin could have been very unpleasant. For it would appear that, despite the haste of the 18th ID, Budëny's men had again managed to slip into the gap between the 2nd and 6th Armies.

The front of the 13th ID was tottering under heavy enemy pressure.

A general orientation, received during the afternoon from the 6th Army command, confirmed the news, gathered by the 18th Infantry Division, on the ground.

Weak in strength – including the 9th Border Rifle Regiment and the garrison of Fort Zahorce, just 4,000 bayonets (with two infantry regiments still in Krzemieniec) – the 18th Infantry Division was standing with Budëny's cavalry divisions all around it, and there was no question of any communication with the right wing of the 2nd Army.

70. The 2nd Army's activities from 9 to 18 July. (Sketch Map 7). The 2nd Army, as stated, had its left wing late in the night of 8/9 July at Równe and it remained there until the evening of 9 July.

An order from the front commander, General Rydz-Śmigły, ordered this army to protect the Łuck – Kowel area. On 10 July the 1st Legion Infantry Division was placed by the front commander back under the orders of the 3rd Army, operating north of the 2nd Army in the forests and marshes of Polesie.

9 July

In the evening of 9 July, the 2nd Army departed from near Równe in the direction of Łuck and Rożyszcze, sending the 1st Legion ID to the 3rd Army in the area of Kolki on the Styr River (Sketch Map 7).

10 July

In the evening of 10 July, the 2nd Army reached the area of Pełcza, Chorłupy, Romanów (halfway between Klewań and Łuck), sending the 1st Cavalry Brigade to the area south of Łuck, where the 1st Cavalry Division, coming from Zamość, was supposed to be located.

11 July

On the evening of 11 July, the 2nd Army stood on the Styr River in the positions shown in Sketch Map 8.

The army commander had no information about the direction of Budëny's main forces had taken from Równe. But patrols of Soviet cavalry were approaching the Styr.



The task of the 2nd Army was:

Operate from the area of Łuck and Rożyszcze in the direction of Równe or Dubno, to secure the Rożyszcze – Kowel railway line and roads leading from Łuck into the interior. Rest the troops and give them an opportunity to sort out any deficiencies, as well as to put the units in order.

12 July

On 12 July, the 2nd Army extended the sectors of the 3rd and 6th IDs towards each other, with a junction at Kulczyn, while it entrusted its two subordinate cavalry brigades to cover its flanks. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was given the task of covering the Styr River from the left flank of the 4th ID as far as Nawóz, which was the southern flank of the 1st ID, now part of the 3rd Army, while the 4th Cavalry Brigade was given the task:

Man the section of the east bank of the Styr around the villages of Krupy and Mały Podhajce, and secure with the help of patrols and reconnaissance groups the section of the Styr and Ikwa southwards to Młynów inclusive.

On the night of 12/13 July, on the basis of the news received from the 6th Army Headquarters that the 18th Infantry Division would attack Buděny's Horse Army occupying Dubno on 13 July from the Werba area,⁴² the 2nd Army Commander ordered the departure of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, together with one infantry battalion and one battery from the 6th Infantry Division:

through Radomyśl and Michajłówka towards Beresteczko, with the task of attacking the enemy's northern flank

13 July

The commander of the 2nd Army directed two further battalions from the 6th ID,

through Michajłówka to Kozin to establish communication with the 18th Infantry Division.

It was not until the night of 13/14 July, on the basis of the news that the 18th ID had thrown back the large enemy cavalry force on 13 July⁴³ and occupied Dubno, that the Front commander ordered:

In order to exploit the success of the 18th ID, and to break up a part of Buděny's Horse Army, concentrated in the area northwest of Dubno, the 2nd Army will attack the enemy with the 6th ID and the 1st CB. During 14 July the 3rd Army will take over the observation of the sector of the 1st CB from Nawóz to the Zapust colony. The units of the 6th ID in Łuck will be relieved by two battalions of the 157th IR (sent 02:40 on 14 July).

14 July

The 2nd Army commander had orders to behave defensively. The Front commander was not yet sure in which direction the main forces of the enemy's horse army would go, whether towards Lwów or towards Kowel.

71. Organisation of the defence. This is how the 2nd Army commander ordered the 3rd and 6th IDs, on 14 July, to prepare for the defence of the Łuck area.

The organisation of this defence was envisaged as follows:⁴⁴

I. The enemy's tactics, in which breaking through our front at one point has, up to now, compelled us to roll up the front and withdraw it to the next line, gives us a little chance of not being forced through at some point by the enemy's cavalry. This compels our command to now apply a defensive system, which will consist in the creation of a number of strong defensive points (redoubts) along the south-eastern front line, which, after the enemy's cavalry has broken through our front, will be capable of defending themselves for longer. That will halt the further advance of the enemy until a suitable manoeuvre can be made to close the gap.

II. The army command, in accordance with the order of the Front command, orders: the fastest possible establishment of two points of defence (redoubts): in Łuck, by the 6th Infantry Division, and in Rożyszcze, by the 3rd Legion Infantry Division.

⁴² The Front and 2nd Army commands thus had good information about the movements of the 18th ID.

⁴³ Until then the Front command had no news in which direction the bulk of Buděny's army had gone.

⁴⁴ The order is quoted verbatim to compare the defensive system with that of another, given in the following items.



III. Resources to carry out the task for each defensive point: one infantry regiment, with a strength of at least 1,000 to 1,500 bayonets, and one artillery *division* of the respective division, are to be a permanent garrison for those points, and all technical means are to be ordered there for the duration of the defensive organisation of these points.

IV. Carrying out the task will include organising the defence of these points in such a way (and as quickly as possible) that they are equipped with fourteen-day's supply of ammunition and food, so that in the event of the withdrawal of neighbouring troops and these points being cut off and surrounded by the enemy, they will be able to defend themselves from all sides until a counterattack by their own troops. Designated personnel are forbidden to leave the defensive points, which will be allowed only on an express order of the Army command (possibly by air).

The divisional commands will reply with the names of energetic officers with great initiative who will be designated as commanders of the defensive points concerned.

V. The size and extent of the defensive point (redoubt) must be dictated by two considerations: 1) the conditions of the terrain, 2) the size of the forces which the point is to hold.

One of the next orders of 16 July supplemented these instructions as follows:

1) The conditions for defence of a vast area with relatively small forces, with the moral condition of our soldier, who is excellent on the offensive, but is easily overcome by panic on the defensive and cannot withstand an attack, points us towards an active defence as the only method which will ensure that we hold the positions for any length until our counter-attacks.

2) The essential idea of active defence is to constantly control the foreground by:

(a) intensive reconnaissance which, on the one hand, obscures the enemy's insight into our positions and, on the other, reveals the enemy's concentrations in the vicinity:

(b) by immediately breaking up any forces concentrating, at moments convenient to us, by appropriately directed expeditions.

3) The actions of the Front command, the Army command and the commands of the individual divisions, carried out from the beginning of July 1920⁴⁵ are nothing but active defence. Active defence, however, requires initiative and independence from all commanders, up to and including those leading companies. As well as major manoeuvres, there are profitable situations in which it is not the size of the forces involved that matters, but where the immediate incursion of even the smallest detachment can have momentous consequences.

4) So far, the actions of our troops after reaching the line of the Styr River, and especially the behaviour at the defensive points of Łuck and Rożyszcze, has been entirely defensive. This allowed the enemy to settle down up to our line of wires in the town of Teremno and the Teremno colony, right in front of Łuck, and as a result we suffered one great loss when one of our planes was forced to land near Teremno colony.

5) The Army command, according to the concept of active defence, orders:

(a) intensive reconnaissance with troops so strong that they do not need to avoid a clash with a meeting with 50 or 60 Cossacks, but can smash them;

(b) the ruthless clearing of the immediate foreground of the defensive points, within a radius of 3 to 4 km of the enemy, through the spontaneous activity of the commanders of the relevant sectors;

(c) to organise excursions to places of the concentration of enemy forces within a strip of 8 km from our front lines.

In organising raids, the use of wooded terrain should be taken into account. Ambushes and night raids should be organised as far as possible, as they are the most effective against cavalry with small forces, as it is not the strength of the unit, but vigorous, determined and above all quick execution that will ensure success. As the most recent example: the raid of one company of the 12th Infantry Regiment from Łuck, which broke up four squadrons, captured one machine gun and a prisoner of war and cleared the area. Particular attention should be paid to the pedagogical aspect of these outings, involving the new recruits in this method of this battle, as well as to raising

⁴⁵ See Item 33, first sentence.



the spirit in the soldiers demoralised by the recent retreats, and gradually developing in them confidence and belief in the superiority of their arms.

It is stressed that the speed of the fortification work must by no means suffer, and that it is to be carried out intensively.

72. Further activities of the 18th Infantry Division. The 18th ID, despite its rapid assault from Krzemieniec on Dubno and Chorupań on 13 July, did not establish any links with the 2nd Army, as discussed.

According to the 6th Army commander's last order, the point of contact between the 2nd and 6th Armies was to be Młynów. The 18th ID was therefore already in place. The 6th Army command, however, could not give information as to when the arrival of the 2nd Army troops could be expected.

In the circumstances, the rumour of the passage of an entire division of the cavalry through Młynów towards Beresteczko was a very unpleasant surprise for the commander of the 18th ID – especially as he received confirmation of that news in the evening. A Polish plane had observed, before noon on 12 July, a column of cavalry and wagons about 15 km long on the march from Młynów to Beresteczko.

General Krajowski therefore immediately ordered the 6th Lancer Regiment to carry out reconnaissance to Perekale – Demidówka – Wołkowyje and Dobrowódka – Kozin, in order to follow the movements of that enemy unit. The general intended to leave the bulk of the division in the Chorupań area, so as not to miss any opportunity to establish communication with the 2nd Army.

In the evening the general received from the 6th Army commander an order:

The 18th Infantry Division and parts of the 13th Infantry Division are to attack in a westerly direction Budëny's divisions that have broken through the front, anticipating according to the situation, either pursuit of the enemy or withdrawal of the entire Army front to the line Kamionka Strumiłowa, Sokol, Busk, Gliniany, Rohatycze.⁴⁶

That order was dated the evening of 12 July, and thus issued before the 18th Infantry Division had attacked Dubno. Another order was then received dated 13 July, now issued on the basis of the results of the fighting of the 18th Infantry Division, which overruled the previous one and ordered:

pursuit of the enemy from Dubno in the direction of Młynów to establish communication with the 2nd Army.

At the same time General Krajowski received for his information an order from D. O. G. Lwów,⁴⁷ referring to the actions of the 18th ID, dated 13 July, and stating:

the 2nd Army directs simultaneously from Łuck one division of cavalry to Beresteczko, and the troops of D. O. G. Lwów are to garrison the towns of Krasne, Busk and Złoczów.

This is how the night of 13/14 July passed.

The division's staff, at the Dubno staging area, were constantly receiving news of enemy movements, and all of them indicated that Budëny was moving the bulk of his forces, some two to three divisions, through Młynów to Beresteczko.

These messages were given to the Army command each time. However, as the telephone and Hughes connections between Dubno and Werba, and between Rudnia and Radziwiłłów, were very often interrupted, and there was a fear that the enemy was eavesdropping on telephone conversations, General Romer, the Army commander, gave General Krajowski full freedom of further action on the basis of the instructions given so far⁴⁸ expressing on this occasion his satisfaction with the course of action to date. This authorisation was all the more valuable to General Krajowski, as in battles with the

⁴⁶ Compare this order with the previously quoted order of the 2nd Army commander in Item 71.

⁴⁷ Dowództwo Okręgu Generalnego (Command of the General District) "Lwów", which was the Ministry of Military Affairs body tasked with administrative, economic, mobilisation, garrison and public order functions.

⁴⁸ This is important for the understanding of a whole range of later decisions made by General Krajowski.



enemy's cavalry the situation changed almost every hour and always required an immediate decision.⁴⁹

73. Decision of the group commander. From Starokonstantynów onwards, General Krajowski had been fighting Budëny's army by manoeuvre, while at the same time breaking up any individual, isolated groups. While on 1 July he was still 80 km behind the enemy army, by 13 July he was now standing in front of it, having inflicted heavy losses on it, and having lost only 200 wounded himself. Meanwhile Budëny had remained almost stationary for six days. From this point on, however, the General expected a concentrated attack by all Budëny's divisions on the 18th ID, rather than a renewed pursuit by him of the enemy. In the event though that Budëny did not react to the seizure of Dubno and continued to advance through Beresteczko to Lwów, the General intended to keep the entire 18th ID in pursuit of Budëny in cars and carts until he appeared for battle.

As recently as four days previously, on 9 July, Budëny had had the road to Lwów completely open (Sketch Maps 5 and 7). Now (Sketch Map 9) the 18th ID was on the route and threatening any further march. The performance of one of the division's tasks: "to protect the Dubno – Lwów line" – was therefore already possible, and the performance of the second task: "to fight a major battle with Budëny alongside the 2nd Army" was greatly simplified. The latter depended solely on the timing of the arrival of the 2nd Army in the Młynów area, or a close agreement between the 2nd Army Command and the 18th ID Command as to the manner of cooperation.

The time had come to fight a larger enemy, with the main task being to halt its advance going deeper into the country, inflicting the greatest possible losses on it, and not allowing himself to be smashed.

General Krajowski therefore sought to use Colonel Jasiński's formations to relieve as quickly as possible those formations of the 18th Division left at the Ikwa crossing, in Kamienica (one company of the 144th IR), in Strakiów (Battalion 3/49), and in Dubno (144th IR) – in order to draw together as many forces as possible.

14 July

On the morning of 14 July, the General ordered that the Ikwa line be left under the defence of the 105th IR and Major Matczyński's group, consisting of the garrison of Fort Zahorce and the 9th Border Rifle Regiment, and that the 18th ID be concentrated in the area of Ptycza – Werba – Kozin. From there it could operate offensively, depending on the situation, either through Beresteczko to Sokol – Kamionka Strumiłowa, or through Beresteczko to Młynów. (Sketch Map 10)⁵⁰

The 42nd IR, which had already been ordered to return from Krzemieniec to the 18th ID, was ordered to move to Rudnia.

The order to set out for the area of Ptycza – Werba – Rudnia – Białogórdka went out at 07:00.

At the same time, the requisitioning of carts, for possible later use in transporting troops in pursuit, began. The division's heavy wagons, then in Radziwiłłów, were also used for that purpose.

74. Communications. Despite the superhuman efforts of the division's communications chief, Lieutenant Jerzykiewicz, and his assistant, Lieutenant Maćkowiak, the communications systems functioned "variously". The division's Hughes station was in a railway carriage at Werba station, but Bolshevik patrols circling everywhere kept cutting the wires, despite the constant patrolling of the

⁴⁹ See note to Item 64.

⁵⁰ General Krajowski thus envisaged leaving the Ikwa line manned by observation units, consisting of less combat worthy troops (105th Infantry Regiment, 9th Border Rifle Regiment), despite the presence of the enemy's cavalry, but allowing him to concentrate his combat forces for the counterattack. Fort Zahorce was perfectly suited to sustain the resistance of troops on observation duty at the Ikwa River.

Compare this defensive system with that of the commander of the 2nd Army – Item 71 – and the commander of the 6th Army – Item 72 – and also bearing in mind that neither army had any major reserves.

Compare these defensive systems with the fourth system of "defensive nodes", used by the 13th ID at Koziatyn (Major Kurcusz, *Bellona* Nos 7, 8, 9, 10 of 1921) and by the 12th ID on the Zbrucz (*Tactical Studies #1*).



railway track by armed locomotives and the armoured train *Chrobry*, carrying the division's food and ammunition to the division's distribution point at Kamienica.⁵¹ There was also a radio station next to the Hughes station at Werba, which supplemented the precarious wire connection with Army HQ.

There was even a telephone line from Werba to Fort Zahorce, and from the fort to the town of Dubno, but this could only be used to make cheerful calls to the Bolsheviks, who had joined the line. Communication between Dubno and Werba was provided almost exclusively by the division commander's car. A field telephone was established from Dubno to Chorupań. There was sometimes a telephone connection from Werba to Brody and Radziwiłłów, but it was more reliable to send orders by locomotive, or occasionally by armoured train.

75. Enemy attack on Chorupań and withdraw of the 18th Infantry Division to the reserve. At 08:00 on 14 July, before receiving the order to march, the 36th IB was vigorously attacked at Chorupań, after a fierce artillery bombardment from the enemy. After a bloody battle, it managed to repel the attack.

At 11:30 the 36th Brigade set off from Chorupań and Golowczyce via Pełcza to Ptycza; the 36th [sic] Brigade from Dubno to Werba.

76. New orders from the commander of the 6th Army. General Krajowski's plan to strike at the flank or rear of Budëny's army, should that army ignore the presence of the 18th Infantry Division, in Dubno, and go to Lwów, was postponed on the basis of later news.

Even before the arrival of the division HQ at Werba, the 6th Army Staff had called the communications officer of the 18th ID to the Hughes apparatus. The whole front of the 13th ID was being attacked by the enemy so rapidly that the Army Commander urged the withdrawal of the 18th ID from near Dubno and the dispatch of one brigade to Dunajów, and the other to Iwanie Puste, as the reserve of the Army, to be used in case the enemy broke through the front of the 13th ID. At the same time the Army Commander ordered the securing of the section from Młynów to Krzemieniec and a counterattack from Krzemieniec to the south.

Thus, it seemed that the 18th Infantry Division would have to abandon action against Budëny's army for the time being in order to support the front of the 13th ID. The Army Commander feared an enemy attack on the vast sectors of the 12th and 13th IDs; this was the enemy's shortest road to Lwów.⁵²

The Front's operational order dated 13 July, issued on the basis of the actions of the 18th ID, ordered the 2nd Army to move on 14 July, one brigade of cavalry from Łuck, along the eastern bank of the Styr River, to the area of Młynów and to occupy that locality. The same order directed the entire 6th ID to attack the Bolshevik divisions northwest of Dubno, through Młynów.

Another notification informed that the 2nd Army had sent one infantry division from Łuck through Michajłówka to Kozin on 13 July for a joint action with the 18th ID against Budëny, and the 6th Army then inquired on 14 July whether contact had been made with that division.

In this situation it was difficult to keep oriented. The main thing – that is the whereabouts of the infantry division from the 2nd Army, said to be marching to Młynów, and the mentioned cavalry brigade – could not be determined at the time (noon on 14 July).

77. Group Commander's decision. Having received this array of news at 11:00 in Werba, General Krajowski ordered the immediate handover of the 42nd IR, which was on the march from Krzemieniec to Rudnia, as the Army's reserve, and then intended to wait for the temporary assembly of the 18th Infantry Division in the area of Ptycza – Werba.

78. Evening positions. At 22:00 the 18th ID made it to the Ptycza – Werba area. The rear guard of the 36th Brigade was on the march in contact with enemy cavalry patrols, and by this time such patrols were reaching as far as Ptycza. Dubno was shelled all afternoon by enemy artillery from the east.

⁵¹ The same method of supplying the division was used later from 17 to 19 July. See Sketch Maps 11 and 12.

⁵² The battles fought at that time by the 12th IR are described in "Tactical Studies" Volume I, by Colonel Marjan Kukiel – "The Battle of Woloczyskami".



There was no new news of the enemy during the day on 14 July. An Army aviator observed at 10:00 unchanged large formations in all the villages east of Dubno.

For the positions at 22:00, see Sketch Map 10.

During 13 July Colonel Jasiński left for D. O. G. Lwów, and the command of the 9th Border Rifle Regiment was taken over by Colonel Szemiot. The command of the defence of the town of Brody was taken by Captain Majewski, commander of the Guard Battalion.

General Linde, commander of the 36th Brigade, had already left on 11 July to take command of the 6th Infantry Division, part of the 2nd Army. Command of the brigade was assumed by the newly arrived Colonel Hausner.

X. Second Assault on Dubno

15 July

79. Positions. (22:00 14 July, Sketch Map 10).

There was no major fighting in the section of General Krajowski's group in the morning of 15 July. Budëny's divisions gave the impression that the General's concerns about them moving through Młynów to Beresteczko were not to prove true. Based on air reports and their own observations, it seemed that Budëny was concentrating the bulk of his troops in the area east (!) of Dubno. There was no news of the enemy cavalry division, which had already been observed marching through Młynów to Beresteczko on 12 July.

In a Hughes conversation between the 6th Army and General Krajowski, General Romer stressed:⁵³

Great importance be placed on repelling strong enemy attacks on the front of the 12th and 13th IDs, as these defend the shortest route to Lwów. On the right wing of the 12th ID, communications with General Pavlenko's Ukrainian group have been lost, again allowing the Bolsheviks to break through at Kręciłów, in unknown numbers. One infantry and at least two cavalry divisions (8th and 9th) were observed in front of the 13th ID, and in front of the 12th ID is one infantry division and, it seems, Zhloba's cavalry corps.⁵⁴

On 14 July the enemy attacked Tarnoruda six times, while in the 13th Infantry Division's sector, the enemy attacks on Domaninka – Wyszogródek lasted all day long with strong artillery support. Expecting the imminent arrival from the 2nd Army of the 6th Infantry Division and a cavalry division from Łuck to the Młynów area, I no longer fear for the left wing of the army as much as I do now for its centre.

He therefore ordered:

immediately send one regiment of the 18th ID to the assistance of the 12th ID at Tarnopol and group the bulk of the forces of the 18th ID in the area of Dunajów – Iwanie Puste, to be used primarily on the left wing of the Army, and if necessary in its centre, or even to be transferred to its right wing. The Army commander considers further work on the final linking of the wings of the 2nd and 6th Armies to be a matter for the 6th ID, which is coming from Łuck.

General Krajowski, for his part, expressed concern:

that the strike of the 6th ID, led from the north, does not force Budëny's main body through the forests of Mały Polesie to Krzemieniec, and does not lead to the merging of his 4th CD with Kotowski's cavalry group and the cavalry corps operating in front of the 12th and 13th IDs, and does not create too great a concentration of enemy cavalry.

⁵³ The content of Hughes' conversation is given almost verbatim. See also the note to Item 76.

⁵⁴ Zhloba was actually facing Wrangel in the Crimea at this time.



General Krajowski therefore proposed:

to send the 42nd IR from Rudnia to the 12th or 13th IDs immediately, but to leave the bulk of the 18th ID in the area of Ptycza – Werba, in order to strike at Budëny's forces, now east of Dubno,⁵⁵ on 15 July on the east bank of the Ikwa River, and to throw them, in junction with the 6th Rifle Division, in the direction of Równe.

The general reported at the same time that:

a counterattack from Krzemieniec to the south is already in progress and that Battalions 1/4 and 1/144, have been sent back there from the 18th ID to reinforce the 10th IB.

General Romer, while not actively in favour of this course, nevertheless finally agreed:

immediately send the 42nd IR back to Tarnopol, while grouping the bulk of the 18th ID, in order to strike on Dubno – Młynów, or to the front of the 13th ID.

The 18th ID, therefore, remained during the middle of 15 July in the area of Ptycza – Werba, conducting vigorous reconnaissance and taking advantage of a break of several hours in operations for rest. The 42nd IR began embarking at Rudnia railway station.

At 14:15, the group HQ received a report from Dubno that the town had been reoccupied by the enemy during the evening of 14 July, that the garrison had retreated to the fort, that about one brigade of enemy cavalry was approaching from Chorupań, that enemy artillery was dug in at Iwanie, and that Milcza and Zahorce were already occupied by enemy troops. The fort commander presented the situation as dangerous and asked for reinforcements, as the assigned 9th Border Rifle Regiment was not up to the task.

Almost simultaneously, a new order from the army commander arrived:

According to aerial reports from before midday, Dubno is again occupied by the enemy. Strong columns of cavalry are advancing from Dubno to the south-west and from Młynów to the forests located between Dubno and Beresteczko. The 18th ID will therefore immediately launch an attack to the north to repel this enemy to the northern bank of the Ikwa.

General Romer was thus returning to his previous thought of fighting a decisive battle with Budëny.

The enemy action on the 12th and 13th ID was therefore not as threatening as previously thought and the forces of those two divisions were sufficient to repel it for the time being.

80. Grouping preliminary to the second assault on Dubno. In view of the above, the group commander ordered an immediate assault.

The 144th IR, Batteries 4/ and 6/18 field artillery, and the commander of the 144th IR were given the task:

Assemble this group at Fort Zahorce. Move during the night of 15/16 July to Chorupań; and position yourself there at dawn on 16 July in such a way as to close the crossings of the Ikwa between Dubno and Młynów.

With this move, made while it was still dark, General Krajowski intended to cut off the line of retreat of the enemy forces located in the area between Chorupań, Dubno and Ptycza, intending to carry out a strike with the division's main forces from Ptycza to Dubno.

The 144th IR group set off from Werba within half an hour, i.e. as early as 15:30. The general placed six trucks for transporting the infantry at the regiment's disposal.

⁵⁵ Indeed, the latest news of the enemy stated the concentration of the Horse Army was in the area east (!) of Dubno.



Near the fort, the 144th IR group encountered enemy riflemen, stationed on a hill to the west of the fort. But forewarned in time by an added squadron of lancers, it advanced quickly and, with the help of artillery, drove the enemy northwards.

The bulk of the division moved from Ptycza in the afternoon of 15 July towards Zahorce – Sady, and at 03:00 on 16 July launched an attack on Dubno and Chorupań.

Patrols of Polish cavalry reported enemy approaches towards Białogródka, a whole regiment of Cossack horse in Ptycza, numerous enemy patrols in the forest between Ptycza and Ptycza Budy, and that all these enemy forces were moving towards the south-west.

81. Battle of Mała Milcza. Three battalions of the 49th IR, with one *division* of the 18th FAR, under the command of Colonel Hausner, brigadier of the 36th IB, left Ptycza at 16:30 for Mała Milcza and Sady. The command of the 49th IR had been taken over the day before by Colonel Staszkiwicz.

The advance guard of that column, Battalion 3/49, had barely entered the woods south of Mała Milcza when it started to receive artillery fire at short range. Its energetic commander, Captain Mościcki, immediately advanced his companies and attacked the enemy with the power that characterised the excellent spirit of the 49th IR. The enemy's surprise was complete. The 9th Company, encountered a compact column of one regiment of the enemy's cavalry, and smashed it completely with firepower. The 10th Company, sent to encircle Milcza, charged the enemy's batteries at the bayonet, capturing four guns. The attack was so quick that the enemy, momentarily disoriented, scattered.

Soon however, a counter-attack was organised against the battalion's right wing – but this too was repulsed, using hand and rifle grenades. The battlefield was left with 36 Bolshevik dead and four guns; Polish losses were eight wounded.

The battle was not over, however. Enemy dismounted troops gathered quickly and attacked, this time the rear guard of the column. Again the attack was repulsed. Papers found with a dead enemy brigade commander and testimony from prisoners revealed that the Poles had been facing units of the 14th and 11th Cavalry Divisions, about 600 – 700 sabres, marching on Ptycza.

Around midnight the 49th IR group reached Sady.

This fighting changed the general's plan of action. Too large an enemy force had already passed to the left bank of the Ikwa. According to the observations of the 144th IR, there were about two to three brigades of enemy cavalry in the area of Fort Zahorce alone.

The 144th IR was therefore ordered not to march out from the fort to Chorupań, but to remain there. The General lost interest in the uncertain manoeuvre to Chorupań, intending instead to use that regiment to cover the main attack on Dubno.

82. Evening positions. At midnight the main forces of the division, that is, the 144th IR, two battalions of the 145th IR and the 9th Border Rifle Regiment, and seven batteries, were near the fort and were organised for the assault on Dubno. The Reserve Battalion of the 50th IR manned the fort, and the 49th IR, with two batteries and the headquarters of the 36th Brigade, occupied the Sady dike in preparation for the attack on Chorupań.

On the sector of the 10th IB, near Krzemieniec, there were no great changes during the day. An assault conducted in front of the left wing of the 13th ID, in the region of Katerburg – Juwkowcy – Gorynka, hit a vacuum, and the units returned to Krzemieniec without encountering the enemy.

The first transport of the 42nd IR (1/42) left Rudnia by rail at 20:00. While the second transport was being loaded, the rest of the 42nd IR received an order from the army command to immediately march out, together with battery 4/18th heavy artillery, through Dunajów to Kuniniec (north of the town of Wiszniewiec), in order to be placed there as a reserve at the disposal of the command of the 13th ID.

83. Combat numbers. The combat strengths of the 18th Infantry Division and the 10th Infantry Brigade, reported on 15 July, were:



	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>HMGs</u>	<u>LMGs</u>
42nd IR	28	1,254	29	109
49th IR	15	1,132	20	106
144th IR, less 1st Battalion	24	744	22	43
145th IR	22	759	19	not reported
6th Lancer Regiment		173 (sabres)		
105th IR		2,200	11	
19th IR		737	22	
40th IR		320	11	

16 July

84. Assault from Fort Zahorce to Dubno. Carrying out an assault from Werba to Dubno with the whole division at night, as the general wished, proved unfeasible because of the late hour. The troops, grouped next to fort Zahorce, moved to the attack under the orders of the commander of the 35th Brigade only at 04:00.

Tarakanowo was heavily garrisoned by the enemy. However, heavy fire from our artillery forced it to withdraw and the 144th IR took the village easily. For a while the attack continued unopposed, but at Hill 227, some two kilometres to the north of Tarakanowo, the enemy was again in position and resistance was became stronger. A large number of machine-guns and the accurate fire of several batteries held our infantry back. We managed though to drive the enemy away from those hills with the fire of our artillery. However, the large number of enemy sotnias moving around the front lines, in both extended and closed formations, showed that we were dealing with a very numerous enemy.

In this way our attack almost reached "Palestyna Park".

85. Enemy counterattack. There remained enemy machine-gun fire so heavy that the infantry units were unable to advance further. Especially the attack of the 9th Border Rifle Regiment which, although it possessed excellent manpower compared to the ragged 18th Infantry Division, and was superbly equipped, was utterly unaccustomed to being under fire. Its assault broke down completely, as the men of that regiment were not sufficiently combat trained.

A vigorously pursued counter-attack by about two regiments of enemy cavalry caused the regiment to panic momentarily and retreat, which subsequently, due to the threat to the right wing, forced the entire 35th Brigade to retire to the level of the fort and to the hills west of the fort, i.e. to their initial positions. There, with the help of the division's reserve, the enemy's further advance was halted, and a reorganisation of the troops begun.

86. Fighting of 3/145 on the east bank of the Ikwa. Another major reason for the failure of the 35th Brigade was the heavy flanking enemy artillery fire from the Strakłów side. This arose because Battalion 3/145, which was tasked with covering the right flank of the 35th IB, suffered a setback. It did not cross the newly-built bridge over the Ikwa River near Nosowica until 03:40. At 04:40 it received heavy infantry and machine-gun fire near the village of Zamczysko. After launching an attack, the Bolsheviks retreated through Kluki to Dietyncze, where they reasserted themselves near the bridge on the road. The battalion attacked without delay and managed to drive the enemy back across the bridge to the village of Dietyncze, but during the fighting for that village it unexpectedly received a counter-attack from the rear, from the direction of Birok. As a result, the battalion had to retreat to Kluki, where it arrived at 09:00, having captured one MG. This failure resulted in the flanking fire on the right flank of 35th IB, mentioned above, and contributed to its retreat.

After receiving a report from Battalion 3/145 at 10:00, the division commander ordered direct heavy artillery fire on Dietyncze and Birok, and for the battalion to make a renewed attack to reach Strakłów. This attack was also to be supported by the armoured train *Chrobry*, positioned just outside the village of Podluże.



87. Division commander's manoeuvre concept. The general intended to wait in the area of the fort with the main forces of the division until a link between the 35th IB and the "Sady group" could be established, and only then carry out a renewed attack on Dubno, with reinforced forces. The main weight would be shifted to the division's left wing, i.e. where he had initially intended to carry out only an auxiliary attack.

88. Battles of the "Sady group". There was no news from the command of the 36th IB in Sady; just the roar of cannons from the direction of Chorupań, which allowed one to assume that a battle was taking place there.

It was feared that the enemy would slide a major force between the 35th and 36th Brigades, especially as Bolshevik squadrons had already been observed moving from Dubno to Krzywucha. The General therefore advanced the 145th IR from Zahorce to Kol. Aleksandrówka, for the purpose of securing the flank, and, as already stated, with the intention of later conducting the main assault on Dubno from that side.

A number of patrols, sent by the division from Zahorce to establish communications with the 36th Brigade and draw it closer to the left wing of 35th Brigade, did not return until after 16:00.

The 36th Brigade had set off from Sady at 03:00 and stood without fighting at dawn near the village of Chorupań. There it met large forces of enemy cavalry. An energetic attack of the 49th IR provoked a violent counter-attack of about 800 horsemen. The enemy came very close, but with good support from the 1st *Divizion* of the 18th FAR, it was bloodily repulsed by salvos of Battalion 3/49. The battalion pursued the retreating enemy with machine-gun fire, and 49th IR took Chorupań and Golowczycy. The enemy left more than 100 men on the battlefield including three regimental commanders killed, and also two machine-guns and several horses were captured. Battalion 3/49 had only 9 killed and 25 wounded.

After receiving news from Division Headquarters that the assault of the 35th IB on Dubno had failed and that it was to be repeated with the participation of the 36th IB, the 36th IB commander reported from Chorupań that he could begin the assault from the line of the Chutor Niemców – Miatyń road at 18:00.

89. Joint assault by the 35th and 36th Brigades. So at that time the 35th Brigade also set off.

Surprised by the addition of the 36th Brigade, which hit it in the flank, the enemy fled, pursued by artillery fire, suffering heavy losses in Dubno.

Dubno was taken at 21:00.

Our own losses on 16 July were about 30 killed, 120 wounded and 30 to 40 missing.

The enemy 11th and 14th Cavalry Divisions were badly bruised. The Soviets had four guns and eight MGs lost, and about 200 left dead and severely wounded on the battlefield, which – assuming more or less a further 400 or more wounded were evacuated – meant a quite serious defeat.

90. Battles at Krzemieniec. In the sector of the 10th IB, there was heavy fighting in the meantime. At 03:00 the Battalions 1/4 Podolian and 1/144, with the support of two batteries, launched a renewed attack from Krzemieniec in front of the left wing of the 13th ID. The group reached, after heavy fighting, a kilometre from Folwarki, but could not advance any further. At 10:00 the enemy responded to the attack with a counterattack from Czugale on the eastern positions at Krzemieniec, supported by intense fire from three batteries.

After a stubborn fight and bringing all the reserves from Krzemieniec into the battle, the attack was repulsed at 20:00. The enemy remained at a short distance, but at the same time (20:00) attacked the positions of the 19th IR at Biała Krynica and Wielki Andruha, again supporting this attack with two batteries. Initially the enemy managed to penetrate into the barracks of Biała Krynica; but after moving reinforcements from the sector of the 40th IR along with a company of the 105th IR, however, it was thrown back at 21:30. On the right flank of the Krzemieniec position, our advance group managed to take Folwarki at 21:50.



Our losses were 3 officers (including 1 killed) and 30 rankers. The enemy suffered more serious losses. Two Soviet brigades of the 45th Rifle Division were found to be engaged. They had had the task of taking Krzemieniec unconditionally.

17 July

91. Battle of Dubno. Meanwhile in Dubno General Krajowski was preparing for a battle with Budenny. (Sketch Map 10 insert).

Late in the night of 16/17 July, the General decided to send two infantry regiments (49th and 141st) under the commander of the 36th Brigade, with artillery, from Dubno back to the area of Golowczyce – Chorupań, with the aim of converging with the right wing of the 2nd Army, while the 145th IR was ordered to attack from Dubno across the bridge over the Ikwa to the eastern bank of the river, seize the town of Surmicze and the Dubno barracks and thus create a bridgehead which,

would allow us to strike at the enemy on the right bank of the river, should the direction of the 2nd Army's movements require it.⁵⁶

This bridgehead was later to be joined with the Strakłów bridgehead to form one line.

At 04:00 both groups set off from Dubno. The 145th IR initially encountered a heavily manned bridge over the Ikwa River, which it was unable to cross, despite vigorous artillery support. The lake and marshes on both sides of the bridge made it impossible to cross elsewhere. Only with the participation of part of the Reserve Battalion of the 50th Regiment, from Major Matczyński's group in the Zahorce fort, who were well acquainted with the terrain, was the bridge captured and then Surmicze and the barracks taken. At around 13:00 communication was established with Battalion 1/145 in Strakłów.

That battalion, during the night of 16/17 July, had attacked Dietynicze for the second and third times, but when it encountered very strong resistance again in Wolica, it returned to the town of Kluki, crossed to the western bank of the Ikwa River in Kamienica, moved north to the bridge in Strakłów, attacked Strakłów from the west together with part of the garrison of Fort Zahorce, and was successful this time. The battalion was commanded very well by 2nd Lieutenant Piotrowiak.

The 36th Brigade meanwhile set off from Dubno at 04:00 in two groups. The 144th IR along the Dubno – Golowczyce axis, and the 49th IR via Chutor Krzywucha and Mały Gapki. Due to fatigue in the 49th IR four trucks were put at its disposal to carry those walking.

The column of the 144th IR occupied Golowczyce after a short battle, but it received such heavy fire from Chorupań, which had once more been occupied by the enemy, that it could not take it by itself. However, with the participation of the left column of the 49th IR, Chorupań was also taken at 09:30, throwing the enemy to the north.

At about 14:00. the 49th IR occupied a forest three kilometres to the west of Chorupań, thus forming the left wing of the 18th ID and the 6th Army. The seizure of the woods was answered by an immediate counter-attack by the enemy, which was repulsed. Bolshevik cavalry squadrons and regiments struck twice more during the day from the flanks and even from the rear, against the positions of the 49th IR and a battery of the 18th FAR. Both times, however, without success and with heavy losses.

The 36th IB stood unwavering in its appointed positions, awaiting, as ordered, the arrival of the 3rd Legion ID or the 6th IB in the Młynów area.

92. News of 2nd Army movements. (Sketch Maps 10 and 11).

There had been talk of the action of the 3rd and 6th Infantry Divisions for three days at this time. Orders of the Front command of 13 July had directed an attack by the 6th Infantry Division. However, the 6th Army command could not even tell the Front command on 14 July where the 6th Division was

⁵⁶ The concept of operating offensively is apparent in all of General Krajowski's orders. The creation of the Dubno bridgehead in such a difficult situation as this is an outstanding example of his constant desire to keep the initiative in his own hands, or to at least ensure that he could spoil the enemy's initiative, should it develop.



at the time. On the 17th it notified the 6th Army that two battalions of that division should have already occupied Młynów on the 16th; but unfortunately the 36th Brigade could not see any movement or sound of battle from that direction. On the contrary, lively movements of Bolshevik horsemen were observed there, and columns of enemy cavalry on the march from Pogorelcy to Podhajce, of about 2,000 to 3,000 horsemen, were seen from Dubno Castle. One of the squadrons of the 6th Lancer Regiment, sent to establish communication with the 2nd Army troops two days before, reported that it had found the 65th IR, with one battery from the 6th ID, on 16 July at 09:30, and that the regiment was advancing on Młynów, but did not say where the regiment was located at the time. From the report it could be inferred that it was at Michajłówka, i.e. still 30 km west of Młynów.

93. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade reported from Beresteczko, around noon of 17 July by telephone. General Krajowski immediately sent a dispatch to the 6th Army asking for an order that the brigade should immediately pass through Demidówka and Wołkowyje to Młynów, in order to establish communications between the 6th and 18th Infantry Divisions.

Unfortunately, however, news was soon received that the brigade was marching to Hrubieszów for reorganisation.⁵⁷

The 3rd Cavalry Brigade, still reinforced by the 11th Regiment, had an order from the Front command, dated 13 July:

Head for Beresteczko and further on to the right wing of the enemy unit which moved towards Brody after the capture of Dubno intending to roll up the front of the 6th Army or to threaten Lwów and Brody. The 6th Army has directed the 18th Infantry Division to the Werba area for an attack on the southern flank of the enemy. After completing this operation and handing it [Beresteczko] over to the 6th Army troops, the 3rd Brigade is to go to Hrubieszów.

The brigade commander reported to General Krajowski that:

He had not helped the 18th ID to eliminate the movement of the Bolsheviks towards Dubno, in view of the fact that he received the above order at 20:00 on 13 July, being the day the 18th ID had already occupied Dubno. Therefore, having received the news from the Front command in Gorochów that Dubno had already been taken by the 18th ID, he was leaving for Hrubieszów to reorganise.

94. Enemy position and thoughts of the 18 ID's commander. There was no new information for the 18th ID of any movement or not by the enemy's 4th Cavalry Division. The Polish 6th ID, located at 09:30 on 16 July, could easily have reached Młynów by the evening of 17 July. It seemed, therefore, that the moment for the 18th ID to establish a combat link with the 2nd Army troops was quickly approaching and that soon Cossack squadrons and regiments would cease to circulate in the division's rear.

95. Wagons of the 18th ID. The general therefore decided to bring up the heavy wagons of his regiments from Radziwiłłów to his troops. The two and a half week separation from the heavy wagons had been quite hard for the regiments. In them were supplies of uniforms, spare parts required to fix the heavy machine-guns and artillery, horse tack and horseshoes, paperwork needed to deal with staff affairs at HQ, etc. The order was therefore given to bring the heavy wagons from Radziwiłłów closer to the frontline troops.

The wagons of the 49th IR was ordered to proceed to Pełcza, those of the 144th IR to Sady, those of the 145th IR to Mała Milcza, those of the 18th IR to Sady, and those of the staff to Werba.

The remainder of the rolling stock, i.e. of the 42nd IR and 6th Lancers, the repair workshops of Columns 20 and 86, together with Field Hospital 609 remained in Radziwiłłów. (Columns 22 and 29 had previously worked between the division's distribution point at Werba and Kamienica, and the front).

⁵⁷ The brigade had barely 300 sabres, so it needed reinforcements, and was to become part of the then-forming Operational Cavalry Group.

All of the aforementioned wagons set off in a long column from Radziwiłłów around midday on 17 July. Late in the evening they reached the designated towns. (See inset to Sketch Map 10).

96. The 2nd Army from 14 to 17 July. Here is the activity of the 2nd Army from 14 to 17 July.

The Front commander's order of 13 July, quoted in Item 70, ordered the commander of the 2nd Army to immediately relieve the 6th ID and 1st Cavalry Brigade in their occupied sectors (Sketch Map 9) and send them in the direction of Młynów. According to the order, the two units were to move in close consultation but independently. Two battalions of the 6th ID, directed as early as 13 July to Michajłówka, were to be ordered to turn back to Młynów, seize that village, hold it until the arrival of a division (!) of cavalry, directed there by the Front, and attack the enemy together with that division. The Army commander gave the whole action the character of a raid, and that the troops would return to their sectors after completion.

14, 15, 16 and 17 July

But the change-over of the 6th ID in its sector took a long time and that division did not set out from Łuck for the attack on the night of 14/15 July, as ordered by the Front and Army commanders, but only on the day of 15 July.⁵⁸ During the day the action did not proceed quickly (Sketch Map 10). During the night of 15/16 the division moved more rapidly and on 16 July it occupied Dorogostaj.⁵⁹ But it did not reach Młynów.

The 6th ID returned on 17 July to the Łuck area, specifically around Rykany, Mstyszyn and Pułganów, together with the 1st CB. At the time of the action the 6th ID had no communication with the 2nd Army command. The two other battalions of the 6th ID, under the command of Colonel Korewo, struck from Michajłówka in the direction of Młynów, but reached only Kniahinin by 16 July.

On the evening of 17 July the Front commander ordered the 2nd and 3rd Armies to regroup as follows:

The 6th ID, after concentrating on 17 July in the area of Mstyszyn – Pułganów – Mały Rykany will move northwards, replace the 3rd ID, and will cover the sector of Kulczyn – Nowostaw (8 km south of Łuck), together with the bridgehead at Łuck.

The troops of the 6th ID located in other sectors, will be assembled with the 6th ID immediately after the 1st CB has taken their sector.

The 3rd ID will march on 19 July to the Targowica – Bokujma area, garrisoning Targowica securely and the crossings there of the Styr and Ikwa, and on the same day will garrison Młynów with one regiment, where it will organise a fortified defensive point and burn the bridges, and immediately establish communications with the 18th ID in Dubno.

So from the 19th onwards, the sector of the 3rd Legion ID will be from Młynów inclusive to Targowica inclusive, with the division's reserve at Bokujma.

The 1st CB will proceed to the region of Ławrów – Mały Rykany, from where it will carry out observation of the sector of the Styr between the 3rd Legion ID and the 6th ID, and secure the crossing of the Styr near Werbajew north of Mstyszyn.

The 4th CB will, immediately on receipt of this order, hand over the guarding of the bridges at Wielki Boratyn to the 6th ID, and will immediately march in column through Radomyśl and Bokujma to Młynów, which it will occupy and hold until the arrival of the troops of the 3rd Legion ID, and will establish communication with the 18th ID at Dubno.

After being relieved by the 3rd ID, it will move to the Kniahinin – Ochmatków area as reserve for the Army.

The 3rd Cavalry Brigade will move immediately to Ostrow, 8 km east of Beresteczko, where it will remain as reserve for the Army.

The Army headquarters will be in Torczyn from 19 July.

General Krajowski, however, was not informed of all these movements.

⁵⁸ The 6th ID was not commanded by General Linde at this time, but by another officer as a replacement.

⁵⁹ At that time the 18th ID was advancing from Fort Zahorce through Dubno to Chorupań. See inset to Sketch Map 10.



XI. Chorupań

Position on the evening of July 17 – inset to Sketch Map 10.

97. Preliminary battles at Chorupań. At 22:00 the enemy attacked Battalion 3/49 in the woods by the road from Chorupań to Smordwa for the third time with one regiment of cavalry, supported by the fire of six cannons positioned south of Smordwa. That attack was repulsed, but the situation was becoming more serious. The enemy were just in front of our lines, so that with the dawn of 18 July new assaults could be expected. One of our intelligence officers, who had broken through from Chorupań to Młynów and back, found Soviet cavalry in Młynów, and there was not even a hint of the arrival of 2nd Army troops there.

At 23:30 a report about these events arrived at the division HQ. The General ordered Battalion 1/14 in Dubno to be put on high alert, intending to use the last reserves of the 18th ID in the battle near Chorupań, if only to force a link with the 2nd Army, and at the same time disconnect the enemy forces who had crossed the Ikwa River to the south from those still north and east of the river.

Although the 6th Army commander again assured by telephone that the Front command had vowed to give firm orders for the right wing of the 2nd Army to push on to Młynów and that the 2nd Army commander had personally left to see to this happened, this was not seen at Chorupań.

98. Locations on 18 July. (Sketch Map 11). At dawn on 18 July it was found that the enemy had left Smordwa, but to where could not be ascertained. An interesting phenomenon was observed from Dubno, with the passage of about a brigade of cavalry from the area of Iwanie, Koloniya Ludwarka to Raczyn, that is eastwards (!) and then on to the south-east.

99. 1st, 3rd, and 4th Cavalry Brigades. At 09:30 a liaison officer of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, reported that it was in Rogoźno, the 1st and 3rd Brigades were in Beresteczko or Ostrów, and the right wing of the 6th Infantry Division was in Bokujma.

It seemed, therefore, that it would soon be possible to start a major battle – the objective of the now two and a half weeks long action of the 18th Infantry Division.

The general therefore sent a liaison officer immediately back to Rogoźno with an order to the commander of the 4th Cavalry Brigade:

Set out without delay from Rogoźno via Smordwa to Młynów in order to establish communication between the 2nd and 6th Armies, and notify the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Brigades to move as a reserve of the Front from Beresteczko to the Demidówka – Rudka area. I take full responsibility for this writing this order.

Unfortunately, however, the news that followed in rapid succession changed the situation like a kaleidoscope.

By 11:00 the 6th Army notified that

The action of the 2nd Army did not lead to the intended seizure of Młynów, as the 6th ID encountered strong enemy resistance in the area Dorogostaj Wielki (4 km north of Młynów). The 6th ID is to occupy on 18 July the line of Jałowiczy – Targowica – Bokujma. The 4th CB, concentrated in the Rogoźno area, is to carry out reconnaissance in the direction of Młynów and establish communications with the 36th IB. The 1st CB will concentrate in Beresteczko, while the 3rd CB will concentrate in Ostrow as the 2nd Army's reserve.

Despite this change, General Krajowski did not lose hope. He still intended to remain with the 18th ID in the position achieved, and to resist possible enemy assaults at Chorupań until the arrival of the 6th ID at Bokujma. The seizure of that village would have repercussion in Chorupań.

He therefore ordered the commander of the 36th Brigade:

Without waiting for the arrival of the 4th CB in Smordwa, occupy the hills south of Smordwa with one battalion, send reconnaissance through Młynów to Dorogostaj and through Arszczyn to



Użyniec, and seek communication with the 6th ID, using a strong patrol of officers through Smordwa, Bokujma to Targowica.

At the same time the general ordered the entire 145th IR to be relieved on the outskirts of Dubno by the reserve battalion of the 50th IR and the 9th Border RR and to move the 145th IR to the towns of Dubno and Straków as divisional reserve.

100. New battles near Chorupań: – In the meantime, at 11:30, a report from the Chorupań area came from one of the patrols sent out, saying that one of the brigades of the 2nd Army had entered Młynów at 24:00 on the night of 17/18 July. The veracity of this report, however, was strongly questioned at divisional headquarters. An army aviator reported that between 07:00 and 08:00 on 18 July, he had observed an enemy column of cavalry moving from Młynów town on the left bank of the Ikwa River through Pereweredów to Wojnica. And the tangible fact was that at 11:00 about four Bolshevik squadrons attacked our artillery, which was behind the left wing of the 49th IR, north of Bienenhöfe.

The attack was repulsed, and in the pursuit Battalion 2/49 occupied, in accordance with the division commander's orders, the terrain fold of Feature 196, south of Smordwa.

At the same time the Battalion 1/49, which had replaced 3/49 in the woods south of the Smordwa – Chorupań road, was repulsed by several attacks of dispersed Bolshevik cavalry, supported by three armoured cars. In that wood there were two withdrawals by Battalion 1/49, and two re-captures of the old positions with counterattacks. Batteries 2/ and 3/18 Field Artillery, under the *division* commander, Captain Pietras, held their positions despite the withdrawal of Battalion 1/49. Firing their cannons and machine guns at the enemy from a distance of 200-300 metres, they contributed significantly to the repulse of the attack.

In these combats the commander of the 36th Brigade, Colonel Hausner, and the commander of Battalion 1/49, Lieutenant Lapinski, were wounded. The command of the 36th Brigade was taken over by Colonel Staszkiwicz (49th IR), and the command of the 49th IR was once again taken by Captain Nadachowski, despite his still unhealed wound.

101. Raid on Pełcza and Radziwiłłów. The heavy wagons of the 49th IR were destroyed in Pełcza, where they had just barely arrived from Radziwiłłów.

But they would not have come out unscathed in Radziwiłłów either. That town was unexpectedly attacked by an entire Bolshevik cavalry brigade, with two guns, on 18 July at 16:00. Feeling sufficiently far from the enemy, the commander of the wagons did not reconnoitre deeply enough and was surprised by the enemy's attack.

Our men defended themselves fiercely, especially the repair workshops of Columns 20 and 86 under the command of Cadet Zegliński, who inflicted heavy losses on the enemy with their two machine-guns. However, it was not possible to prevent both the 42nd IR and the 6th Lancer wagons, as well as the workshop vehicles and the 609th Field Hospital from being destroyed. The Bolsheviks mistreated the wounded and sick lying in the hospital in a bestial manner.

A dangerous situation at the railway station was saved only by chance. Half an hour before the attack began, a transport of three companies of reinforcements for the regiments of the 10th Infantry Brigade arrived, along with Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk, who was on his way to take command of the 145th IR. Under the energetic command of that officer, the three companies repulsed the attack on the station. But it was only at 21:30 that the enemy withdrew from the town in the direction of Baranie, when the armoured train *Chrobry* arrived. The losses in Radziwiłłów, killed and wounded, were one officer and 36 privates and about another 50 missing.

The first news of the events did not reach the 18th ID HQ until 16:30 and detailed reports only after the armoured train had established communication.

102. Enemy and Polish forces at Chorupań. In the meantime (at 13:30) one of the batteries near Dubno reported that it had observed a column of about 1,000 horsemen, with two cars and 40 to 50 wagons, on the march from the town of Pogorelcy to Podhajce, and at 13:45 a second column of 500 horsemen had just occupied Chorupań.



Although the movement of enemy cavalry columns from Młynów and Arszczyn to the south had been observed several times previously, those columns had been accurately shelled by our artillery, suffered losses and dispersed, retreating in great disorder towards the north-east. Eventually, however, the enemy did manage to take Chorupań, abandoned by the 144th IR, due to a misunderstanding by the new commander of the 36th Brigade. Now the 144th IR, positioned in the forest one kilometre south-west of Chorupań, was unable to drive the enemy from it with its own forces.

General Krajowski therefore ordered an immediate call up of the division's reserves, i.e. Battalions 1/ and 2/145 with one battery, from Dubno to Chorupań in order to counterattack and support the right wing of the 36th Brigade, leaning against the marshes located between Chorupań and Miatyn.

By 19:00 Chorupań was again occupied. The enemy retreated to a hill located a kilometre north of Feature 206.

At 19:30 about 500 horsemen, with the strong support of machine guns and two armoured cars, attacked again on the Smordwa side the left wing and rear of the 36th IB, positioned south of Smordwa and in the woods on the Smordwa – Chorupań road. The infantry manning the woods by the road suffered so much under the fire of the armoured cars that they withdrew about three-quarters of a kilometre to Hill 239. A lack of ammunition for our artillery was the main reason for this. However once the ammunition trucks arrived after half an hour, a counter-attack was immediately launched with the help of Battalion 3/49, and not only were the old positions taken, but also the village of Smordwa in the pursuit.

The enemy retreated to Młynów and garrisoned that village and also Pereweredów, Beregi and Bokujma.

There were not troops from the 6th ID in Bokujma.

103. Intentions of the enemy. The 145th IR captured prisoners during this fighting who gave important testimonies. According to them, the Soviet 4th Cavalry Division was in Demidówka at the time, and had been ordered to strike on 19 July through Kozin at Radziwiłłów and Brody, destroy the railway station and wagons there, cause panic, and then return to the Polewa area. The 6th Cavalry Division, deployed in the Ostrożec area, was to protect against Łuck. The 11th and 14th Cavalry Divisions, located in the area of Młynów, Bokujma and Pełcza, were to strike through the 18th ID at the rear of Krzemieniec, in order to link up with the Soviet 45th RD, which was again to attack Ptycza and Werba simultaneously from Nosowica. Kotowski's cavalry group was to attack Krzemieniec from the east. Budëny's further objective was Lwów. The positions of the enemy, according to those testimonies, is shown in Sketch Map 11.

A report came from Krzemieniec at 20:30 that enemy infantry and artillery units were observed moving in a northerly direction. (!)

So there was no doubt that the enemy was aiming for a major battle at Chorupań. Budëny intended to attack that town frontally with two divisions of cavalry, i.e. a two to one advantage (the Polish 49th, 144th and 145th IRs were about 3,000 bayonets, and the Soviet 11th and 14th Cavalry Divisions together were about 5 to 6,000 sabres), and in addition to this to strike with an infantry division at the rear of the 18th ID.

104. General Krajowski's orders. General Krajowski took the news calmly, as he was prepared for it. Budëny's intentions coincided completely with those of the General. He, too, was aiming for a pitched battle in the Chorupań – Młynów area. Unfortunately, there was no accurate news of the arrival of the 2nd Army troops.

It was therefore necessary to be prepared for a possible isolated battle.

The General entrusted the observation of the sector from Fort Zahorce through Dubno to Miatyn to the commander of the 35th Brigade, Colonel Szuszkowski. He subordinated to him the garrison of the fort and the 9th Border Rifles, while the last reserves from Dubno, i.e. Battalion 3/145 and Battery 4/18 FAR, were ordered at 20:30 to march to Chorupań.



The commander of the 10th IB in Krzemieniec received an order to immediately send Battalions 2/ and 3/42 to Werba. According to the order of the army commander, they were in Dunajów near Krzemieniec, and at the disposal of General Krajowski. Moreover, the General continued to strive with unwavering energy to establish a link with the 2nd Army.

Battalions 1/ and 3/49 were withdrawn from Smordwa, back to the forests they had previously occupied. Only strong observation posts with machine-guns were left in Smordwa.

105. Losses. – The losses of the 36th Brigade on 17 and 18 July, up to 12:00, were: a brigade commander wounded, in the 49th IR: 12 killed, 3 officers and 80 privates wounded; in the 144th IR: 3 privates killed, 49 wounded, 3 missing; in the 1/18th Field Artillery: 1 officer killed, 3 privates wounded, 3 missing, 7 horses wounded and one caisson broken.

106. 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The 2nd CB, which it turns out had not left for Hrubieszów, sent a report from Beresteczko to Werba during the day of 18 July, dated 17 July, stating that:

The brigade, with a strength of about 200 sabres, is in Beresteczko, conducting reconnaissance in the direction of Koziny, Rogoźno,⁶⁰ Pełcza, and Demidówka and is manning the bridges of Peremyl and Gumniszczce, while the 11th Lancer Regiment, also part of this brigade, is manning the bridges of Bilcze and Stawrow.

further that:

It has no communication with any higher command and is not informed of the situation.

This report was addressed to the command of the 18th ID, in Rudnia.⁶¹ The brigade commander therefore immediately received from the HQ of the 18th ID a written general orientation and a request from General Krajowski to set off to Bokujma without delay, as well as to establish communication with the 18th ID, in Chorupań.

However, an order came from the 6th Army command a short time later:

The 3rd ID is ordered to strike at night through Bokujma on Młynów, and the cavalry brigades are to head for the enemy cavalry at Beresteczko.⁶²

Thus the arrival of the 3rd or 6th ID could be expected very soon.

This news was immediately communicated to all the units of the 18th ID to raise spirits, but the division staff was no longer believed such news until it became a fact. Nor, in fact, had any movement of Polish troops been spotted in the direction of Młynów or Bokujma before midnight, despite many patrols dispatched. On the contrary, the clatter of enemy wagons betrayed the shifting of large Bolshevik forces to the left flank of the 18th ID, and foretold a battle for the following day.

19 July

107. Dawn of 19 July. (Sketch Map 12) The morning of 19 July arrived with nervous anticipation. The announced night-time strike of the 3rd ID on Młynów had not taken place, or was unsuccessful. No sounds of fighting were heard.

108. Battle of Chorupań. First attack. At about 09:00 the battle began with an attack by about 400 horsemen and two armoured vehicles on Smordwa and then on to a wood situated on the Smordwa – Chorupań road. The attack was repulsed. Simultaneously a counter-attack was launched by our own 144th IR from Chorupań via Hill 206, to the north, in order to repel enemy nestled on a hill one kilometre north of Hill 206. That failed, as the enemy had already accumulated too great a force there during the night.

⁶⁰ According to a report of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, the 4th Brigade was stationed there.

⁶¹ Proof that the brigade commander was completely unaware of the general position.

⁶² Our 3rd Cavalry Brigade was already there.



A patrol sent by Battalion 2/49, under the command of Lieutenant Kijanowski, to Smordwa and Bokujma to search for the 3rd Legion ID, returned at 10:30, having found a large enemy force in Smordwa.

It was therefore a certainty that strong enemy assaults would arrive any minute from all sides. The assistance of the right wing of the 2nd Army could not be counted on. The battalions therefore continued to rapidly reinforce their forest positions, up to that time only lightly thrown up.

109. Own positions. Battalion 2/49 occupied a wooded area 15 km southeast of Smordwa, less than a kilometre east of Feature 196. Battalion 1/49 a wooded area halfway between Smordwa and Chorupań, half a kilometre south of that road. Battalion 3/49 was the brigade's reserve, in a wooded area between the two other battalions. Battalion 1/144 occupied Chorupań from the manor house up to and including the cemetery, with machine-guns covering the branch of the road leading to Arszczyn. Battalion 2/144 was the regiment's reserve, in the valley half a kilometre south of the manor house. The entire 145th IR formed the division's reserve in a forest one kilometre south of the Battalion 1/49. The artillery (seven batteries) was grouped on both sides of Hill 239, with five batteries on the edge of the woods south of that feature, and two batteries closer to Chorupań.

110. Enemy movements. At about 12:00 a strong column of enemy cavalry was observed moving from Smordwa along the valley leading south. Clouds of dust rose from Smordwa and music could be heard from that area.

111. Battle at Chutor Dubina. At this time General Krajowski arrived at the 49th IR, on Hill 239, exhorting commanders and soldiers to persevere until the arrival of the 3rd Legion ID. The mobility of that brave commander was admirable. Despite the breakdown of his only passenger car, he was present everywhere, using a truck. In spite of the constant fighting and movement, everyone else had moments of rest – for him there was none. Noticing the enemy now pouring around the division's left flank, the general ordered the 49th and 145th IRs, less one battalion, with artillery support, to attack Dubina and Smordwa and seize the hills at the southern end of Smordwa. The general intended this blow to break up the enemy forces before they went on to the attack, and at the same time was trying to get closer to the 3rd Legion ID.

Battalion 3/49, from the brigade's reserve, therefore extended the left wing of Battalion 2/49. The 145th IR was due to arrive and fill the gap between that battalion and 1/49 Battalion in the woods by the road. However, when at 13:30 the 145th IR had still not arrived, and the enemy was gathering in the ravine around Feature 196, the commander of the 49th IR struck, after consulting with the brigade commander, for the time being just with two battalions.

Right at the forest's edge, the battalions of the 49th IR came eye to eye with a compact group of several hundred horsemen, preparing to attack. At a distance of a few dozen paces, Battalion 3/49 started to fire rapidly, and smashed the cavalry in the blink of an eye. Some of them, two to four squadrons, cut off by the movement of Battalion 3/49 galloped past the battalion's left wing, through Bienenhöfe and the hill between the woods on which the brigade's headquarters stood, reaching the rear of the right wing of Battalion 2/49. There, taken by a heavy fire, they rushed towards Smordwa under incessant fire from our machine guns. The ground in front of Battalions 2/ and 3/49 was strewn with enemy dead and wounded. The two battalions of the 49th IR, intoxicated by their success, did not wait for the arrival of the 145th IR – whose commander, in the face of Cossacks galloping everywhere, could not grasp the situation – and immediately struck further towards Chutor Dubina, reaching the terrain Feature 196, south of Smordwa.

But the enemy reserves managed to quickly regroup in the ravine and in the woods southeast of Dubina and moved to a counter-attack, simultaneously flooding Battalions 2/ and 3/49 with a hail of small arms fire and artillery shells. Battalion 3/49, under the command of Captain Mościcki, heroically repulsed the fierce attacks at the closest possible range. The enemy machine gun fire, however, did its work. Within minutes, Lieutenant Juźwik of 2/49, Lieutenant Siedlecki of 3/49, and Captain Mościcki, one of the division's best officers, were wounded.



The regimental commander, Captain Nadachowski, had overextended himself – he found that a gap had been created between Battalions 2/ and 3/49 and Battalion 1/49, fighting in the woods by the Chorupań – Smordwa road. Enemy cavalry began to push in and fire on Battalions 2/ and 3/49 from the right flank, and six dense lines of cavalry were hurrying from Chutor Dubina, while his artillery could not fire at them, as they were out of sight. As the 145th IR was not approaching, he gave the order to withdraw to the starting positions at 17:00.

112. Further course of the battle. Meanwhile Battalion 1/49 was repelling furious attacks by dense cavalry, backed up by two armoured cars. Right from the start there appeared to be a need to push some of the division's reserve there to counterattack. Later several hundred horsemen again turned up beyond the left wing of the 49 IR's advance group. The 145th IR, the division's reserve, therefore led counterattacks to the right and left side of the 49th IR, then again to the rear of the regiment towards the south, then again to aid Battalion 1/49 in the woods.

The battle lasted without a break from 13:30 to 20:00. It is difficult to describe: over a dozen attacks were carried out by the enemy's cavalry regiments – with a fury and rage never seen before, even during the battle of Ostróg – from the front and flanks against infantry and from the rear against single batteries, which defended themselves with grapeshot at a distance of up to 200 metres, and then all the constant counter-attacks of our reserves.

113. Krajowski, Budëunny. General Krajowski stood on Hill 239 with his close staff. Bolshevik prisoners pointed out a car, visible from afar on the road near Arszczyn, from which Budëunny allegedly was issuing orders in person, threatening with a revolver “comrades” approaching him with reports.

114. The battle's outcome. According to the testimony of the prisoners, it was the hardest day for Budëunny's regiments since the creation of his Army.

The front of our infantry was literally swarming with loose horses, and covered in human and horse corpses. The positions of the 18th ID, as they had been occupied in the morning, remained held and in the evening:

At nightfall the enemy retreated to Smordwa and south of that town, having achieved nothing in the field.

No definite news could be found about the right wing units of the 2nd Army. Although the 6th Army Command had been comforted by a telephone call that the 3rd ID should have already occupied Młynów, this was not verified at Chorupań, despite the fact that three squadrons of the 6th Lancers had been constantly searching for a link for three days. On the other hand, about a brigade of Bolshevik cavalry was reported to be marching from Bokujma towards Beresteczko.

115. Losses. The losses at the battle of Chorupań were very heavy. The 49th IR lost 5 officers and about 400 privates, wounded and killed; the 1/49 had one officer left (Lieutenant Kasprzycki); the 2/49 had only Captain Kocur; and the 3/49 had two officers. The 145th IR lost 2 officers and about 100 privates, wounded and killed. The 144th IR nearly as many. The artillery lost 2 officers and 40 privates, wounded or killed. Carriages full of wounded departed via Chutor Niemcew and Kolonia Aleksandrówka to Fort Zahorce, where they were loaded onto a hospital train. A large number of those wounded were still being attacked in the forests by wandering loose Cossack groups during the transport and cruelly murdered.

116. Enemy raiding parties. Enemy incursions were reaching deep into the rear of the division. During the day it was reported by patrols sent from Werba that Kozin had been occupied by a Cossack regiment around noon, and that another Cossack regiment had badly damaged the wagon train of the 145th IR in Sady at about 14:00. Around 18:00 it was reported in Werba that the enemy had taken Milcza and Piratyn and was advancing in a large column towards Białogródka. At 19:00 patrols from that column were already reaching this village.

117. Fighting near Dubno. On the Dubno sector, enemy concentration in the towns of Zlińce and Zdobica were observed during the morning of 19 July. From 11:00 to 12:00 the enemy shelled Straków and Surmicze heavily, including with one heavy battery, and at 13:00 two infantry regiments



launched an attack on Straków and Dubno barracks. At 15:30 the enemy managed to occupy the barracks and Surmicze; the attacks on Straków were repulsed.

A large column of enemy wagons was observed in the Pogorelcy area, heading north-west.

118. Evening positions. The position at 22:00 are shown in Sketch Map 12.

There was no news of the activities of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades. An officer patrol of the 6th Lancer Regiment broke through on 18 July to Rogoźno, where the 4th Cavalry Brigade was supposed to be stationed, but did not find it there. The patrol leader could assume that the 2nd and 5th Lancer Regiments were in the area only from descriptions given by peasants.

In a telephone conversation, the Front commander notified the 6th Army that he approved all the orders issued by General Krajowski to the 4th CB, and also the 1st and 3rd CBs, and that he would send those brigades orders in accordance with the General's wishes. He also ordered that a messenger from the 18th ID be sent to them with reference to the Front commander's instructions. Unfortunately, this important decision was a little late.

Evening reports to Werba about the advance of strong enemy columns through Milcza and Piratyn to Białogródka, and through Pełcza to Kozin, gave food for thought. Was Budenny intending to abandon further attempts to break up the tough 18th ID, at Chorupań – and had no intention of exposing himself once more to such losses as he had suffered on 19 July – or by going around the 18th ID did he intend to act by means of the advance on its rear? Or would he send only part of his forces to attack Werba and Krzemieniec from the west, in order to facilitate the advance of the Soviet 45th RD and Kotovski's cavalry across the Ikwa, while leaving the bulk of his forces opposite the ID, with the intention of striking it again on 20 July?

119. Commander's deliberations. Under these conditions it was extremely difficult to decide on the course of further action for the 18th ID. The crossings of the Ikwa near Nosowica and Minkowcy were poorly defended. It was there that the enemy's 45th RD was found to be most concentrated, and the 105th IR gave no guarantee that it could resist a strong advance. If the Soviet 45th Division, which had already moved so far north from Krzemieniec, managed to move to the left bank of the Ikwa, the 18th ID would have been in a very unpleasant situation at Chorupań. Its regiments, after two weeks of hardships, and especially after the battles of 19 July, were so exhausted that for them to attack from Chorupań towards Młynów and so to the 2nd Army was out of the question – especially since it was not known where the 2nd Army units were. The regiments might not be able to withstand renewed enemy attacks, if carried out with the vigour of those of 19 July. For the division to remain in the Chorupań area until daybreak on 20 July, waiting on the arrival of the 2nd Army, would have been tantamount to further passive defence and could, in the event of a renewed failure from that side, lead to the division being smashed by the enemy.

General Krajowski's goal remained to be undefeated, but also to maintain his forces until such time as, with the participation of the 2nd Army, it would be possible to move forward to that battle mentioned in General Romer's first order. This, though, required the containment and tying down of enemy forces in the area where the battle could be fought. At that time, however, such large enemy forces had already passed through the Młynów gap that a battle could only be fought in the Młynów area if there was an immediate massive attack by the 2nd Army from the north.

A decision on the further actions of the 18th ID had to be taken before midnight, as a possible breakaway from the enemy at Chorupań would absolutely require starting before dawn. Time was pressing. It was already 21:00. There was no news of the 2nd Army troops.

The command of the 6th Army, although reassuring and advising the 18th ID to remain near Chorupań, could not give details of the whereabouts of the 3rd ID.⁶³

General Krajowski therefore decided to issue an order at 21:00:

⁶³ A telephone conversation between the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Army and the Chief of Staff of the 18th ID.

If communication with the right wing of the 2nd Army has not been established by 24:00, the 18th ID will concentrate in the area of Werba – Białogródka, leaving only the Fort Zahorce manned in the present front line.

In issuing that order, General Krajowski intended:

- 1) not to restart the battle of Chorupań without the participation of 2nd Army units;
- 2) by concentrating the division in the area of Werba – Ptycza – Białogródka to oppose the attempts of the Soviet 45th RD to pass to the west bank of the Ikwa River and to prevent that division from joining with Budëny's cavalry in the rear of the 18th ID;
- 3) after resting in the area of Werba – Białogródka, to turn against that group of enemy cavalry which had already managed to occupy Pełcza, Sady and Kozin, and for that purpose to strike from the area of Werba – Ptycza in the direction of Beresteczko – Demidówka and to repel these enemy forces to the north;
- 4) that third intention was to be facilitated by leaving a garrison at Zahorce Fort, which was to tie up part of the enemy forces approaching from Dubno.

The decision on 4) was largely due to Major Matczyński's strong pleas, as he wished to hold the fort, which he had defended so successfully up to that point. The direction of the attack towards Beresteczko was based on the directives received from the 6th Army Headquarters on the afternoon of 19 July.

In the case of a necessity for the retreat of the front line of the army:

In the first stage, to the line of the Seret River – Założce – Podkamien – Sucza Wola – Brody – Szynarów – Beresteczko and the Styr River as far as Malewo,

In a possible second stage, to the line of the Strypa River, that is, to Zborów – Młynowce – Koltsov – Podhorce – Konty – Turza – Niewice – Opłucko – Makanie – Neimitów – Peratyn – Stojanów – Drużkopol – Pieczychwosty.

In the first stage the section from Brody inclusive to Malewo inclusive would fall to General Krajowski's group, and in the second stage, from Turza inclusive to Pieczychwosty inclusive.

A third stage envisaged the line of Żłota Lipa – Gołogóra – Olszanica – Krasne – Busk and the Bug River to Sokal. This line had the 18th Infantry Division's sector as Tadanje inclusive up to Sokal inclusive.

XII. Withdrawal of the 18th ID from Chorupań to Radziwiłłów and Attack Back to Kozin and Rudnia

120. Situation at 21:00 on 19 July, see Sketch Map 12.

The 3rd Legion Division did not arrive in Młynów before midnight. There was no news of its activity.

121. Departure to the Werba area. (Sketch Map 13). The 18th Infantry Division, therefore, began to withdraw its units from the Chorupań area. The 36th Brigade, consisting of 145th IR, with two artillery *divisions*, moved through Sady and Milcza to Białogródka. The 144th IR, with two batteries, left at 03:00, due to a delay of one of its subdivisions, from Chorupań to Dubno, and from there, together with the 9th Border Rifles and two further batteries, under the commander of the 35th Brigade, to Werba. The enemy pursued us just behind the rear guards of our columns.

The Reserve Battalion of the 50th IR, Sapper Company 2/8 and Battalion 3/145 remained at the Zahorce Fort. The training battery was meant to remain, but departed against orders with the 35th Brigade to Werba. This was not noticed until halfway from Zahorce to Ptycza, when it was too late to send it back to the fort, as the enemy was approaching from the north, and was already at Podłuże.

The 36th Brigade encountered Bolshevik troops in Sady and Milcza during the march, and dispersed them. The brigade's rear guard was attacked several times by enemy squadrons, in the Milcza area.



The 2/18 field artillery battery, under the command of Lieutenant Unger, was assigned to the rear guard, and distinguished itself several times in repelling Cossack attacks. During these skirmishes Colonel Staszkievicz commanded the brigade.

At 08:00 the 36th Brigade reached Białogródka. The 35th Brigade arrived in Werba at 11:00 without fighting.

By this time, however, the enemy's positions had changed fundamentally. Many of our patrols reported that there were already several thousand sabres in the Kozin – Dobrowódka area and that the leading units were heading for Krzemieniec and Radziwiłłów.

The enemy's encirclement had already reached so deeply that General Krajowski's intended strike from the Werba – Białogródka area towards Beresteczko needed to be postponed; especially as the strike could have taken place in the night of 20/21 July at the earliest.

General Krajowski therefore changed his plan. The division's area of concentration had to be shifted further to the south-west, in order to first block the enemy's path towards Brody, and only then act in an offensive manner.

122. From Werba to Rudnia. At 11:30, the 18th ID, after barely one hour's rest, set off from Białogródka and Werba in a south-westerly direction and by 15:00 was concentrated in the area of Iwanie Puste – Rudnia.

The 10th IB remained unchanged in Krzemieniec and on the Sapanów – Turja – Stołbiec line. The only change was that the 105th IR moved its left wing to Spalenaja (a road junction 6 km south of Werba), thus maintaining contact with the 18th ID.

123. In the Rudnia – Iwanie Puste area. General Krajowski intended to spend the night in the Rudnia – Iwanie Puste region, to give the utterly exhausted men at least one night's rest. It was impossible to take on more combat with their physical condition at the time.

It was a nasty surprise then when, at 17:00, our batteries in Iwanie Puste sounded the alarm.

From an observation post at the division HQ, near the Rudnia railway station, a long column of enemy cavalry and artillery could be seen on the march from Hill 257 northeast to Kozin. It was watched for more than 45 minutes, and the column continued on its way despite our artillery fire. Occasionally a few squadrons scattered, when hit by our shrapnel, but they all moved on to Kozin. The village of Kozin itself could not be seen from the observation post, so it was not possible to ascertain for the moment the enemy's further actions. However, as our patrols from the Iwaszczuki – Staryki area reported nothing, it had to be assumed that the 11th or 14th CDs – it could only be them – was occupying the Kozin area, alongside Budënný's 4th CD.

The somewhat too close proximity of these two cavalry divisions was not necessarily pleasant. An enemy attack could still have taken place in the evening of 20 July, and if the 18th ID had remained until the morning of 21 July in the Rudnia – Iwanie Puste area, the arrival of the Soviet 45th RD, which no one now blocked from crossing the Ikwa, could be expected during the day. This was not what the general wanted. First and foremost, the division required a few hours of complete peace and rest, without which it was incapable of fighting. Some formations were already beginning to show signs of nervousness, and regimental numbers had also declined considerably in the previous few days.

The 49th IR now had only 6 officers, 550 rifles, and 14 HMGs.

Battalions 2/ and 3/144 had only 14 officers, 520 rifles, and 14 HMGs.

Battalion 1/144 was at Krzemieniec.

Battalions 1/ and 2/145 had 16 officers, 400 rifles and 18 HMGs.

Battalion 3/145 was at Dubno.

Two battalions of the 42nd IR were on the march from Krzemieniec to Rudnia, and one battalion had left on July 15 for Tarnopol, as part of the Army reserve.



Taken together, therefore, the infantry of the entire "division" had in total only 36 officers, 1,470 rifles, and 46 HMGs. To these could be added two battalions of the 42nd IR. The 9th Border Rifle Regiment also had 731 rifles and 4 HMGs, but its combat value was minimal. On top of the weak infantry strength, though, we had strong artillery – greatly outnumbering the enemy's artillery, with 12 batteries of four guns each, while the enemy had only 12 batteries in all his cavalry divisions – but our artillerymen were by now completely exhausted.

In its condition at the time, the division could not take another battle while isolated.

General Krajowski was therefore in a difficult position. On the one hand, he could not expose the exhausted and isolated division to a renewed fight with a superior enemy; on the other hand, he had to consider that the garrison of Fort Zahorce, would now be exposed to siege without any possibility of relief. Finally, a further withdrawal to the south-west would have to result in the 10th Brigade leaving Krzemieniec, as well as radical changes for the 2nd Army.

But at the time there was no choice. His priority was to prevent the entire division from being destroyed, leaving thoughts of taking renewed offensive action to a later date.

124. Orders of the 6th Army commander and General Krajowski's decisions. In a telephone conversation between the 6th Army chief of staff and General Krajowski's chief of staff, it was learned that General Iwaszkiewicz had taken command of the Army. The new commander directed:

The 6th Army will remain on the line of the Zbrucz River, despite the breakthrough of Budëny's units to the rear of the 18th ID. The task of the 18th ID is to protect the left wing of the 6th Army, along the axis of the Dubno – Brody – Krasne railway line.⁶⁴

General Krajowski therefore decided to move from Rudnia to Radziwiłłów during the evening of July 20, and only after a suitable rest to resume an offensive back towards Rudnia and Beresteczko, as far as Fort Zahorce. It had been found in the recent battles that it was easier to attack Budëny's cavalry than to receive their attacks. Success was almost guaranteed when we were attacking, but repelling the enemy's attacks depended on the nerve of our soldiers, and that was now under pressure.

General Krajowski ordered the 10th IB and 105th IR to remain in their current positions on 20 July. On 21 July that brigade, together with the 105th IR, was to leave Krzemieniec and the Ikwa line before dawn and regroup in the area of Berezyna – Drańcza – Ledochów (18 km southeast of Brody), in order to operate offensively together with the 18th ID.

The 6th Army HQ and the 13th ID were informed of the above.

125. From Rudnia to Radziwiłłów. At 19:00 on 20 July the 18th ID set out from the Rudnia – Iwanie Puste area and arrived, after a 4-hour rest in Sitno and Michajówka, at Radziwiłłów at 09:00 on 21 July.

21 July

In the previous 36 hours the whole division had marched 64 kilometres, the 35th Brigade in three hours less, and that after a day's hard fighting at Chorupań.

The positions at 10:00 on 21 July are shown on Sketch Map 13.

126. 2nd Army's activities from 18 – 20 July. The 2nd Army had made the following movements in the meantime. (Sketch Map 10).

The Front commander's order of 17 July, quoted in Item 96, directed the 2nd Army to garrison the right part of its sector more strongly, up to and including Młynów, where a fortified defensive point was to be organised. The Army commander assigned the 3rd ID that task, giving it the sector from Młynów to Targowica inclusive. According to that order, the 1st CB was to act as a liaison group between the 3rd and 6th IDs, covering the sector from Łuck, the 4th CB was to take the positions of the 3rd ID, which was to quickly occupy Młynów, while the 3rd CB was to be the Army's reserve in Beresteczko and Ostrów.

July 18

⁶⁴ Compare this order with that of the previous commander of the 6th Army, Item 119

On the night of 17/18, the 2nd Army HQ received a report from the 3rd CB, that a strong column of enemy cavalry was heading from the north towards Werba, weaker forces had occupied Plaszówka, and larger forces were in Ostrów (east of Beresteczko). There was also a message from the 6th Army that the 18th ID was near Chorupań. It had been ordered to seek contact with the 3rd Legion ID near Bokujma. The 2nd Army commander therefore changed his orders and ordered the 3rd Legion ID to attack through Targowica and Bokujma towards Młynów, with the instruction that the town must be absolutely be occupied by 19 July (Sketch Map 11). The 3rd and 4th CBs received orders to conduct reconnaissance to track enemy movements and to help in the attack on Młynów by covering the right wing of the Army. The 1st CB received an order to march through Małe Rykany, Suchowola, Krasne, Bokujma and establish communication between the 3rd Legion ID and the 18th ID.

19 and 20 July

At dawn on 18 July the 3rd Legion ID set off from the Łuck area. After a fierce battle it reached, together with the 4th CB, a line of Targowica, Wolniczy, Hill 215, Perekale by the evening of 19 July (Sketch Map 12). But it had to retreat on 20 July, after a day's fighting, to the line of the Styr between Targowica and Chryniki. The losses of the 3rd ID, were about 250 killed and wounded.

The 3rd and 4th CBs received orders on 19 July to attack the enemy cavalry together, and break through Młynów to Ostrów, but they did not manage to carry out the attack together.⁶⁵ On 20 July the 4th CB, fought alongside the 3rd ID, in the area of Żabcza (Sketch Map 13). The 3rd CB observed the Styr crossings from Szczurowice to Chryniki, while 1st CB did so from Targowica north to Nowostaw.

127. 18th ID at Radziwiłłów. The 18th ID reached, as stated, Radziwiłłów at 10:00 on 21 July. (Inset to Sketch Map 13). The division's commander wanted above all a few hours' peace and quiet, to give the men a rest and revive their strength after the fierce fighting and hard marches of the past few days.

The heavy regimental wagons were already in Radziwiłłów, as well as the division wagons and equipment.⁶⁶ The regiments therefore began to sort themselves out.

The survivors from the fighting at Chorupań had their company kitchens returned, ammunition was replenished, etc. Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk, who had arrived as commander of the 145th IR in place of Lt-Colonel Steinbach, took deputy command of the 36th Brigade. Colonel Szuszkowski retook command of the 35th Brigade, which included, in addition to the 144th IR, two battalions of the 42nd IR once more. A new commander, Lt-Colonel Podracki, commanded the 144th IR. The command of the 18th FAR was assumed by a newly appointed commander, Lt-Colonel Strzeminski. Three captains to command battalions and twenty junior officers also arrived from Army command. However no reinforcements arrived for the ranks.

128. The fate of Fort Zahorce. In the evening, just as the division's headquarters were pondering the fate of the abandoned crew of Fort Zahorce, the door to the room opened, and there stood Major Matczyński, huddled between two men, supported by a cane, bent under a huge German-style helmet, reporting with tears in his eyes as the "former commander of Fort Dubno".

The joy was great, as the fort's garrison had been considered lost.

By noon on 20 July (Sketch Map 13) the Bolsheviks had already launched an attack on the fort. After it had been surrounded from all sides, an almost hurricane fire from six field batteries and one heavy battery began, which lasted from 14:00 to 19:00. The fort's garrison had nothing to answer back with, as it had no guns.⁶⁷ The Bolsheviks also fired gas shells. The garrison took considerable losses, but when the enemy launched an assault from the north-west at dusk, it was bloodily repulsed by MG fire. However a second assault, carried out shortly after the first, broke into the fort.

⁶⁵ These units of the 3rd and 4th CB in question had scarcely 300 to 400 sabres each.

Reinforcements for them, with the same unit names, were part of the Operational Cavalry Group, which was forming near Zamość. The new recruits for the 4th CB had set off from Zamość a few days before the Cavalry Group was completed, and had already reached Wladimir Wołyński on 21 July.

⁶⁶ Those that still existed, as the wagon trains of the 42nd IR, 145th IR, 49th IR, 18th FAR, 6th Lancers, Hospital 601, and Motor Workshops had already suffered considerably.

⁶⁷ The battery assigned to defend the fort had marched away. See Item 121.



A few dozen men led by Major Matczyński, well acquainted with the terrain, managed at the last moment to slip away in the darkness, down the steep eastern slopes of the fort towards the railway track, and escaped capture. They followed the railway track as far as Werba during the night of 20/21 July, and during the next day managed to sneak between Bolshevik patrols to Radziwiłów.

From Battalion 3/145, almost all of whom were taken prisoner at the fort, three officers and seventy rankers managed to escape during the night of the 20/21 July, and also made it to Radziwiłów. The following were killed from that battalion: Lieutenants Frank, Wasileńko, Mańkowski, and Bochenek, Cadet Szyling, and about 120 men. Six HMGs and the entire supply column were lost. One company was formed from the remnants of the battalion in Radziwiłów, under the brave 2nd-Lieutenant Piotrowiak, former commander of the battalion.

The remnants of the Reserve Battalion of the 50th IR departed on 22 July, together with Major Matczyński, by rail from Radziwiłów to Ostrów Łomżyński.

129. Battles of the 10th Infantry Brigade. There was no rest in the sector of the 10th IB on 21 July (Sketch Map 13). The brigade commander received an order from General Krajowski in the evening of 20 July, ordering a withdrawal, along with the 105th IR, from the Krzemieniec position to Drancza and Ledóchów.

Almost simultaneously with that order, he received an order from the 6th Army addressed to the 18th ID, also sent to the HQ of the 18th ID, via the telephone exchange of the 13th ID.⁶⁸ This order, having accidentally reached the 10th IB commander too soon, triggered several unfortunate complications.

Its contents were as follows:

I) Budenny's 11th and 14th Cav. Div.s have attacked the 18th ID for the last two days, in the Dubno – Chorupań area.

Budenny's 4th Cav. Div. crossed the Styr near Targowica and penetrated into the Chotyń – Sestratyn area (north of Radziwiłów). On the 18th the division broke up our wagon column in Radziwiłów and occupied Radziechów.

According to unverified information, a Bolshevik cavalry unit of about 1,000 horsemen, eight cannons and a small number of wagons, crossed the railway track between Radziwiłów and Rudnia on the 20th, heading south-east, to (presumably) attack the rear of the 18th ID, grouped in Rudnia. An enemy grouping was observed in front of Husiatyn and Skąlat.

II) In spite of fierce attacks, especially in the area of Wołoczyska, our front on the Zbrucz is holding firm so far. There is no change on the sector Wołoczyska – Krzemieniec – Werba. The 18th ID, which the enemy by-passed round its left wing, was unable to establish communication with the 2nd Army until 24:00 (19 July). It has retired and is concentrated in the Rudnia area. Fort Zahorce has held so far.

III) The Front command orders:

1) The 6th Army remains on the Chodorow – Tarnopol railway line.

2) The left wing of the 6th Army will operate along the Dubno- Krasne axis, not retreating from the present positions due to the enemy's cavalry manoeuvre, and only as a last resort will depart for the Zbaraż – Tarnopol area.

3) The 4th Cavalry Brigade, will stay overnight of 20/21 July in Werbowice (east of Zamość).⁶⁹ It is then to march through Belzec to Kamionka-Strumiłowa.

⁶⁸ The direct line, Radziwiłów – Brody – Zloczów, was broken.

⁶⁹ These are the reinforcements for the 4th CB. See note to Item 126.



4) The 2nd Army, which garrisoned Młynów in the afternoon of 20 July,⁷⁰ and sent the cavalry (units of the 1st and 3rd CBs, about 600 sabres) in pursuit of the enemy, who had advanced to Beresteczko, has not reported its situation since 18:00 on 19 July due to telegraph interruptions. The Front command wishes to establish the present position of the 2nd Army and, after that is done, it intends to send the 3rd Legion Division in the general direction to Beresteczko – Radziechów. The 2nd Army, with its left wing at Łuck, will remain to the north of the 3rd Legion Division.

IV) In view of this I order:

A) The 12th and 13th IDs to remain in their positions.

B) General Szymanski's group, still under the orders of General Krajowski, will garrison Krzemieniec and the Ikwa line up to and including Werba.

C) The 18th ID, after resting in the area of Rudnia, will regroup on 21 July in the area of Brody – Radziwiłłów area (the bulk) and in the Rudnia area (smaller group), with the task of covering the left wing of the army by reconnaissance and active operations to the north. The manning and holding of Fort Zahorce is left to General Krajowski to decide. Communications with the 3rd Legion ID should be sought at Beresteczko.

In case it is not possible to hold in these areas, the 18th ID will leave for the region of Sassów – Zloczów.⁷¹ At the same time it will send General Szymanski's group to the region of Założce, and notify the 13th ID, which will then turn its front towards the north, resting its left wing on General Szymanski's group in Założce, while linking up its right to the 12th ID in the town of Szelpaki (on the flank of the 13th ID).

The Army HQ remains in Zloczów (castle). After the 18th ID leaves for the Brody area, the Army Command will move to Brzeżany.

The commander of the 10th IB, General Szymanski, noting paragraph IV) B) that:

General Szymanski's group ... will garrison Krzemieniec and the Ikwa line up to and including Werba

considered it his duty to remain in place on 21 July without retreating, in accordance with General Krajowski's last order received from Rudnia, and exposed his brigade to an overwhelming advance of enemy forces from the front and left flank.

At 10:00 on 21 July, the enemy, after a strong artillery preparation, attacked the positions of the 19th IR at Biała Krynica and the 105th IR at Minkowce. Both attacks were repulsed. Two further assaults in the same places on the section of the 40th IR were successful for the defenders. But when, at 17:00, the infantry of the Soviet 45th RD struck the left wing of the 105th IR at Spalenaya Werba, and at the same time several squadrons of the cavalry advanced to the rear of that regiment, the brigade was forced to retreat at 20:30, during which the not very steady 105th IR suffered heavy losses.

130. General Krajowski's orders. Before the order related above from the commander of the 6th Army reached the headquarters of the 18th ID by the circuitous route through the 10th IB, General Krajowski received the same order by rail courier. He immediately sent an order to the commander of the 10th IB, changing the previous day's order to concentrate the brigade in the area of Drancza, ordering instead a retreat to the line Taraż – Poczajów – Budki and to prepare there for a renewed assault on Krzemieniec, as the brigade would become isolated if it remained in its previous positions. This order was sent from Radziwiłłów on 21 July at 07:30 by two officers from the divisional headquarters, by different routes. General Krajowski hoped that those officers would find the 10th IB, on the basis of his first order of yesterday, already marching in retreat and that the brigade would only need to change its

⁷⁰ The source and veracity of this news the author has not been able to verify so far.

⁷¹ So not Krasne, as prescribed previously.



direction of march on receiving the new order. The general further hoped that the brigade would be able to take renewed offensive steps as early as 22 July, alongside the 18th ID.

131. Army commander's orders. He was even more concerned when, at 06:30 on the 22nd, a second order from the 6th Army commander arrived, outlining a concentric attack of the 3rd ID, 18th ID, and 1st and 3rd CBs on Budëny with the following content:

I. As a result of the desire of the main parts of Budëny's cavalry army to link up with the enemy group operating east of Krzemieniec, the South-Eastern Front Command orders a strike on Budëny jointly between the flank units of the 2nd and 6th Armies.

II. According to our current information, three of Budëny's cavalry divisions (4th, 11th and 14th) and two brigades of the Soviet 45th Rifle Division, which on 19 and 20 of this month forced the 18th Infantry Division to retreat to Radziwiłłów, are moving from the area of Chotyń – Srebno – Rudnia – Kozin and through Onyszkowce to the south-east.

Last reported by General Szymański's group at 19:00 on 21 this month, the enemy were pressing on the line: Rafałówka – Onyszkowce – Białokrynica, with continued fighting. At present the pressure is strong on Krzemieniec. One division of Budëny's cavalry (6th) with an infantry division of unidentified affiliation, are tying up the forces of the 3rd Legion Division in the area of Targowica – Wolniczy – Perekale.

III. Our left wing's situation:

The 18th ID, grouped and ready to strike in the Radziwiłłów area is in communication with General Szymański's group, holding the lines Rafałówka – Onyszkowce – Białokrynica – Krzemieniec.⁷²

The situation of the right wing of the 2nd Army:

General Linde's newly-formed group (consisting of the 3rd Legion ID, the 60th IR and all the cavalry of the 2nd Army) is grouped on the line Targowica – Michajówka.

IV. The Front command orders a joint strike of the 18th ID and General Linde's group on 22 July, in order to break the enemy located in the area between the two Armies and so establish communication between the striking groups.

1) General Linde's group will make a vigorous attack on 22 July, with the main axis being towards Pełcza. The zone of action of this group is: from the north the Ikwa River, from the south to Michajówka – Wołkowyje.

2) In concert with this action by General Linde, General Krajowski is to carry out, on 22 July, a general strike to the north along the Radziwiłłów – Ptycza railway line, and aim for Dobrowódka with the main force, to establish communication with General Linde's group, the right wing of which is to be sought in Pełcza and a little to the west of that village.

General Szymanski's group will also take an active part in the attack.

V. I leave the detailed method of carrying out the action to General Krajowski.⁷³

VI. In emergencies requiring the two striking groups to communicate, use radios. Airmen can also act as liaison.

VII. In the case of failure to notify the time of the blow of General Linde's group, General Krajowski will begin his action according to his own situation and will choose the moment of the blow himself.

VIII. For the information of the 18th ID, it is reported that General Linde's group has arranged a raid for 22:00 on 21 July on the Demidówka – Ostrów road.

⁷² Sent before the withdrawal of the 10th Brigade was known.

⁷³ Compare with the authorisation received from General Romer, Item 72.



IX. Confirm receipt, etc.

and at the same time a third order was received:

Command of Captain Majewski's group in Brody.⁷⁴

To the Commander of the 18th ID, in Radziwiłłów.

At 01:30 on 22 July I received the following phonogram from the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, Lt-Colonel Kessler, to the 18th ID. The 6th Army commander has passed this to Captain Majewski's group for transmission due to the lack of direct telephone connection to the command of the 18th ID. The phonogram reads:

The Front Command orders, that in order to smash the enemy, carry out a quick and decisive concentrated action on the line Pełcza – Dubno on 22 July.

2nd Army: General Linde's group, consisting of the 3rd Legion ID, 60th IR and all the cavalry, will strike as quickly as possible to the south-east. Region of operation: Ikwa River to the north; Michajłówka – Wołkowyje to the south. The focus of the attack will be on the right wing, which is to establish communication with the 18th ID.

6th Army: the 18th ID is to attack along the Radziwiłłów – Dubno axis, directing as much force as possible to its left wing, which will advance on Dobrowódka.

By order of

Lieutenant Colonel Kessler, Chief of Staff of the 6th Army.

In addition, Lt-Colonel Kessler notifies that the Krzemieniec group is retreating to Poczajów, and asks that the 18th ID notify the Army command of the commencement time of the action by General Linde, which will be needed at the Front.

Due to the lack of telephone connection, this is sent by special messenger.

(–) Captain Majewski, commander of Guard Bat. 4/2.

132. General Krajowski's dispatches. The concentric attack was thus to begin on 22 July. The hour of the attack was not stated in the order. It was now 06:30 on 22 July. The soldiers of the division were not yet sufficiently rested. The 10th IB had presumably only arrived during the night from its previous positions. The prescribed action was therefore uncertain to produce results and could have led to complications.

As can be seen from Sketch Map 13, before reaching the starting situation for a major battle, i.e. the Dobrowódka – Kozin – Rudnia – Hrada area, first required removing a number of enemy groups already south of that line, i.e. it required a preliminary attack.

General Krajowski therefore ordered the 35th IB, which was less exhausted, to set off at 12:00, with the task of advancing to the right flank of the 2nd Army and forming up in Chotyń for the attack.

By 19:00 the whole brigade was to be in Chotyń. From the line Chotyń – Radziwiłłów – Budki – Taraż the whole of the General's group was to move at 19:00 for a new attack. During the night it was to reach Dunajów – Hrada – Rudnia – Kozin, establish communication with the 2nd Army's cavalry units at Dobrowódka and at dawn on 23 July enter battle.

It was calculated that the 2nd Army would also not reach the prescribed area of Pełcza before dawn on 23 July.

133. The attack on Rudnia and Kozin. Battles of the 35th Brigade. The 35th IB set off from Radziwiłłów at 12:00 in two columns. At 13:00 the right-hand column encountered unexpected enemy resistance in Krupiec, and it took until 16:30 to break through, capturing one machine gun. However, a column of enemy cavalry several kilometres long was observed marching from Janówka to Plaszeva. This showed that the enemy already had considerable forces in the area south of Rudnia. The bridge at Krupiec was

⁷⁴ Commander of the Guard Battalion 4/2 and the four platoons of Gendarmerie.



destroyed and had yet to be repaired by sappers. Srebno was taken at 19:30, after a battle. The right group of the brigade was now met by a counterattack of about two dismounted regiments of cavalry near the town of Honoratka, supported by two armoured cars. After a long battle, Honoratka and Żabokryki were taken.

The left column of the 35th IB broke through some resistance at Baran and, after several times running into enemy squadrons, took Chotyń at 20:30, where it also broke up a group of wagons.

However, a link with the 2nd Army cavalry was not established. The 35th IB was already an hour and a half behind the schedule. Not waiting for the cavalry to turn up, the brigade struck at Boratyn and Dobrowódka, dispersed several hundred cavalrymen there during the night, and advanced along the north bank of the Plaszewka River to Kozin, which it occupied after a brief battle at dawn on 23 July. Surprised, the enemy retreated into the woods.

134. Fights of the 36th Brigade. The 36th IB set off from Radziwiłłów at 19:00 on 22 July through Krupiec to Rudnia. Enemy squadrons were encountered in all the villages, i.e. Michajłówka, Sitno, Karpiówka, and Janówka. Surprised by a night attack, they fled in all directions. The entire village of Karpiówka was set on fire by the Bolsheviks, who escaped our attack. In the morning, the 36th IB was in the area of Iwanie Puste – Tarnówka, and established communication with the 35th IB in Kozin.

XIII. In the Rudnia – Kozin – Iwaszczuki Area

23 July

135. Positions. The night attack of the 18th ID from Radziwiłłów on Rudnia and Kozin threw back about one division of cavalry and parts of the 45th RD, towards Stołpiec and Turja (Sketch Map 14).

Elements of the disrupted enemy divisions wandered into the rear of the 18th ID, continually interrupting communications with Radziwiłłów. The villages of Krupiec, Michajłówka and Sitno were garrisoned again by the enemy as early as noon on 23 July.

Throughout the entire action, no sign or sound of fighting from the direction of Pełcza or Beresteczko was noticed. The action of the 3rd ID, it seemed, had failed. The scouts sent from Kozin to Beresteczko and Pełcza had encountered a strong enemy forces in Tesluszów, Korytno, and in the woods north of the Plaszewka River (Sketch Map 14).

The armoured trains *Chrobry* and *Pionier*⁷⁵ had already had to repair the broken railway track several times during the night, on their way from Radziwiłłów to Rudnia. Now during the day they were unable to maintain constant communication between Rudnia and Radziwiłłów.

Enemy patrols, cavalry, squadrons – and even whole regiments with batteries – were scurrying all over the area around the division, which had no communications either to the left or right

Extending the area occupied to the right and left, the division commander tried to get closer to the 10th IB and the 3rd ID. Thus, at 11:00. the right wing of the 18th ID occupied Hill 252, some 2½ km northwest of Onyszkowcy, while the left wing extended as far as Hill 239, some 3 km southwest of Zabokryki, but all in vain. No neighbours could be seen or heard.⁷⁶

From the Iwanie Puste church tower, a column of about 2,000 cavalry with artillery was observed at 16:00 moving from Turja to Hrada, which showed that the 10th IB was either not there yet or no longer there.

⁷⁵ Assigned as of 22 July.

⁷⁶ A defensive grouping similar to that which the division occupied on 15 July on the Ikwa (Sketch Map 10). On a wide front from Hill 252, located 2½ km northwest of Onyszkowcy to Hill 239, located 3 km southwest of Zabokryki, General Krajowski's observation cordon stretched for 20 km, keeping the bulk of his forces concentrated in Rudnia and Iwanie Puste, in order to be able to strike with force where necessary.



As the column was not visible in its entirety, but only partially at points of the terrain favourable for observation, it continued on its way despite the fire of our artillery.⁷⁷

136. News of the 2nd Army. At noon on 23 July an armoured train brought news from the 6th Army command that the 3rd Legion ID had failed to launch any attack on Pełcza, as the front command had ordered, but was in the Michajłówka area.

The 18th ID, therefore, was isolated among Budëny's encircling brigades.

But the general did not yet give up hope and tried to remain in the area attained with a wait-and-see mindset. He simply moved Battalion 3/49 from Hill 252 to Iwanie Puste, with the aim of concentrating the right wing more and being ready to strike, either east or south. He intended to attempt send the 35th Brigade to the west, if only to Korytno, in order to seek communication with General Linde's cavalry units, which had been ordered to advance through Beresteczko to Chotyń.

Therefore still in the evening of 23 July, he gave the commander of the 35th IB an order to attack along the south bank of the Plaszewka River in the direction of Chotyń – Korytno, manning the river crossing as they advanced westwards.

137. Fighting at Boratyn. The 35th Brigade, however, lacked spirited command and did not manage to carry out the attack during the night, only starting at dawn on the 24th. This was the first reason for the failure it later suffered.

24 July

According to the orders of the commander of the 35th Brigade, its troops were to advance as follows (Sketch Map 14). The main attack was to be led by the 42nd IR, with three batteries, from Iwaszczuki through Hill 245, located 2½ km south of Zabokryki in the direction of Chotyń. Behind it, advancing by a step to the right, was to proceed the 9th Border Rifles, supported by two batteries, on Zabokryki, and then advance further on Boratyn and Korytno. Two battalions of the 144th IR, with two batteries, were to advance behind the 9th Border Rifles, and then man the crossings over the Plaszewka River. An assigned squadron of the 6th Lancers was to conduct reconnaissance, while a company of sappers, remaining at the brigade headquarters, was to fortify the anticipated position east of the river flowing west from Chotyń and Korytno after the assault was completed.

If conducted at night this assault would have been, despite its faulty organisation,⁷⁸ sure to have been successful – as were all night actions against Budëny's cavalry. Launched at dawn, it encountered the enemy right from the start, who was able to find the weaknesses of the attackers, exploit their mobility, and use that accordingly.

Already by Hill 245 the enemy were putting up fierce resistance, which the 42nd IR did not manage to break despite four hours of fighting. The enemy then gathered reinforcements and struck on foot, and then on horseback, along and across the Plaszewka River at the 9th Border Rifles. That regiment could not withstand the attack and began to retreat, and the 144th IR was not properly grouped to make an immediate counter-attack. The 35th Brigade began its retreat to Iwaszczuki, without proper orders from its commander, and with the brigade commander failing to report it to the division staff.

138. Enemy movements. In the meantime the division commander had received a number of reports from patrols sent from Iwanie Puste to the east and south-east, and from an armoured train on the Rudnia Radziwiłłów line, stating that enemy columns were encircling the right wing of the division and advancing further and further south; that the enemy was garrisoning all the villages along the Rudnia – Radziwiłłów road; and that all communication with Radziwiłłów was broken. The last news brought by the armoured train was that Brody was under attack from the north-east and being shelled by artillery;

⁷⁷ The 18th ID did not attack that column, as it was primarily concerned with seeking a link with the 2nd Army in the area of Pełcza. A strike against the enemy column, marching towards Hrada, would have been a move away from Pełcza.

⁷⁸ The 9th Border Rifles, of low combat value, were used for the attack, while the 144th IR were to perform a secondary function, manning the river crossings and securing communications with the rest of 18 ID.



that several squadrons of Bolshevik cavalry had arrived at Stanisławczyk; and that the commander of the Brody garrison was asking for help.

There was no news of the brigade of Bolshevik cavalry that had been seen the previous day at 16:00 on the march from Onyszkowce towards Poczajów. There was no news of the activities of 10th Brigade. General Krajowski therefore sent a request to the army commander that the 10th Brigade temporarily be given orders directly or be subordinated to the commander of the 13th ID.

139. News on the movements of the 2nd Army. From the command of the 6th Army came the belated news that General Linde's group, together with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, had retreated after the raid to Demidówka back to the line of the Styr, in the Lipa area (10 km north of Beresteczko).

The intended major battle against Budëny's army therefore, once more, did not take place.

140. Decision of the 18 ID commander. Under those conditions, it was pointless for exhausted and isolated 18th Division to stay any longer in the Rudnia – Żabokryki area.

In accordance with the order of the commander of the 6th Army (Item 131) General Krajowski had the freedom to decide how to carry out the action. He therefore decided at 09:00 on 24 July that the division would return to Radziwiłłów. His intention was to resume fighting from there against the enemy, who was attempting to move south and bypass the division's flanks. This decision was of course reported to the Army without delay.

At the time of his decision, the General had not yet had news of the failure of the 35th Brigade at Boratyn. The operational order stipulated that at 12:00 the 36th Brigade would move by the Rudnia – Radziwiłłów road, while the 35th Brigade, depending on the position reached in its assault, via Karpiówka or Srebno to Krupiec and Radziwiłłów.

141. From Rudnia – Kozin to Radziwiłłów. Battles of 36th Brigade. The 36th IB moved from Rudnia in a programmed manner; it broke through the enemy resistance in Sitno and Karpiówka; dispersed several squadrons in the woods north of Karpiówka with artillery fire, which several times prepared to attack the marching column; smashed several squadrons opposing it in the woods north-east of Michałówka and in front of Michałówka itself; and repulsed several attacks of the enemy cavalry with its right flank guard. Reaching the town of Krupiec, it started to repair the destroyed bridge there, when it was joined by the first refugees of the 9th Border Rifles and 42nd IR, trying to escape with all their might towards Radziwiłłów.

142. Defeat of the 35th Brigade at Iwaszczuki and Sitno. The 35th Brigade, as noted, had retreated under enemy pressure from near Żabokryki and Hill 245 without sufficient orders from the brigade commander, towards the town of Iwaszczuki. The 9th Border Rifles, and in its wake the 42nd IR and its wagons, partly in disorder, concentrated in that village. Parts of the 42nd IR and 144th IR, with artillery, salvaged the situation by manning the hill south and west of the village and repulsing the encircling enemy pursuit.

Even now though, the brigade commander had still not yet issued clear orders. This was soon exploited by the enemy, charging into the village, and he was taken prisoner along with his staff. Detachments of the 144th IR, commanded by Major Zagórski, alongside artillery and Battalion 1/42, defended themselves fiercely, but finally had to begin a retreat to the south. Fortunately, an officer of the division's HQ caught up with the retreating troops, with an order for a general retreat and a direction for that retreat.

The enemy now began to encircle the unfortunate brigade from all sides and attack, either from the rear or again from the left or right flank. The deputy brigade commander, Lt-Colonel Podracki, commander of the 144th IR, behaved identically to his predecessor. The batteries and companies of the 144th IR defended themselves as best they could, concentrating around their commanders. The wagons however caused confusion because, upon hearing the battle being carried on simultaneously by the 36th Brigade at Krupiec, they assumed that their line of retreat was cut off.

The brigade retreated, still relatively unharmed, as far as Sitno. But the 144th IR had suffered such heavy losses in these battles that a major attack of several Cossack regiments, carried out in the area



southwest of Sitno, broke them. Now everything moved in disorder: infantry, wagons and artillery fled through the fields towards the armoured train *Pionier*, which had taken part in this unfortunate battle from the railway line east of the town of Michajówka. It was to a great extent due to the armoured train that not all the 35th Brigade was destroyed. Renewed resistance was organised around the train, and was able to repel further assaults.

Those men who did not head towards the train, but along the road to Krupiec, ran into the tail of the 36th Brigade. That group was not at all numerous. Only the lack of command and panic had prevented the organisation of effective resistance.

143. Fighting at Krupiec. The rear guard of 36th Brigade, Battalion 2/49, under the personal command of the regiment's commander, Captain Nadachowski, immediately turned and advanced towards the fleeing soldiers. The battalion held back those fleeing with fixed bayonets, preventing the disorganisation from spreading. Once calm, the men were allowed to pass to the town of Krupiec.

Meanwhile, a pursuing brigade of enemy cavalry, sabres drawn, struck at the remnants of the fleeing 35th Brigade, simultaneously opening artillery fire on the town of Krupiec. There was a jam of wagons at the Krupiec bridge. Taking advantage of the confusion, the enemy managed to position some machine-guns undetected at a distance of a few hundred metres from the village and directed fire at the bridge. Major Pietras, commander of the 1st *Divizion*, 18th FAR, organised Battery 2/18 in an instant. The heroic crew, losing half of its number, forced the enemy to be silent with a few shots from two of their guns. At the same time, part of the Battalion 2/49 and Battery 1/18 FAR moved to counterattack and forced the enemy to retreat behind the hill. Krupiec was held by the 49th IR and 1st *Divizion*, 18th FAR until all the rolling stock had left.

Radziwiłłów was defended by the division commander, who personally organised, with his staff, the retreating troops on the road between Krupiec and Radziwiłłów – mercilessly clearing out hundreds of “rascals” from the wagon train.

144. In Radziwiłłów. The troops were put back into order at Radziwiłłów. Our losses amounted to 14 guns (2½ batteries of the training *divizion* and Battery 4/18); but the number of missing men could not be ascertained yet. The survivors were collected in Radziwiłłów by Lt-Colonel Podracki.

145. Combat numbers. The infantry combat numbers of the whole division were at this time:

	<u>battalions</u>	<u>officers</u>	<u>bayonets</u>	
42nd IR	2	10	260	one battalion detached in Tarnopol
49th IR	3	7	500	
144th IR	2	5	360	one battalion detached with 10th IB
145th IR	2	12	350	one battalion disbanded.
9th Border Rifles		?	120	
Total:		34	1,590	

These numbers improved somewhat in the following days, as many survivors soon returned to the ranks.

Taken prisoner were: the commander of 35th Brigade, Colonel Szyszkowski; the commander of the 18th FAR, Lt-Colonel Strzemiński; the commander of the 42nd IR, Major Zagórski; the entire staff of the 35th Brigade; and a number of officers of the 42nd IR and the 144th IR.

The position on the evening of 24 July was almost identical to that on the 21st (Sketch Map 13) with only minor differences in the manning of the Radziwiłłów defensive sectors and the enemy grouping.

The 18th ID was, however, temporarily incapable of serious combat. The tired and partly demoralised troops needed a rest. Radziwiłłów was not fortified. So, in order to allow the division's troops to rest in prepared positions, and at the same time to prevent the enemy from seizing Brody, General Krajowski decided to leave Radziwiłłów at dawn on 25 July and move with the division to the lightly fortified Brody.



146. Battles of 10th Brigade at Waligóry and Komarówka. A report came to Radziwiłłów from the command of the 10th Brigade HQ that the 105th IR had set out with one battery at 04:00 on 23 July from Ledóchów to attack in the direction of Plaszowa. It was to be a liaison group between the 18th ID and the main forces of the 10th IB, advancing through Dunajów on Hrada. In the village of Waligóry the regiment encountered an enemy detachment of about 450 infantry and a squadron of Cossacks, which it threw back after a three hour battle. Further on, the regiment occupied Komnatka, where it was in communication with the left wing units of the 10th IB (19th IR). It also drove back the enemy from Zielona Komarówka in a further attack, taking four HMGs, but around 18:00 a strong counter-attack of several regiments of cavalry with two armoured cars⁷⁹ struck its left flank and it was almost surrounded.

While fighting strenuously, the 105th IR withdrew to the station of Poczajów and then, having lost contact with the enemy, to the town of Podkamień. Losses amounted to about 75% of the entire regiment.

The bulk of the 10th Brigade had meanwhile reached Dunajów and Sawczycy.

147. News of the movements of the 2nd Army. All that was known about the 2nd Army at this time was that the 4th CB had rejected a group of Bolshevik cavalry advancing through Beresteczko to Gorochów (30 km northwest of Beresteczko) and that the 3rd ID was observed by an aviator at 11:00, just before the start of the retreat of the 35th IB from Iwaszczuki, on the march through Łopaszce and Demidówka towards Wołkowyje.⁸⁰(!) This news was received by the command of the 18th ID only once they reached Radziwiłłów, in the evening of 24 July.

148. The activity of the 2nd Army from 21 to 24 July. The activity of the 2nd Army from 21 to 25 July was as follows:

On 20 July the 3rd ID retreated after heavy fighting in the area of Targowica – Hill 215 – Kniahinin in a western direction to the area of Targowica – Chryniki on the Styry (Sketch Map 13).

21 July

Units of the 2nd Army remained in those positions until the evening of 21 July. Then, at 22:00, an advanced group, consisting of five battalions and four batteries of the 3rd ID and part of the 4th CB, under the command of General Linde, went from Michajłówka to Demidówka, intending to operate on 22 July from Demidówka depending on the situation. In order to establish communication with the 18th ID the 6th ID moved two of its battalions to the area of the 3rd ID.

After crossing the Styry at Chryniki, General Linde's advanced group captured the road from the town of Gleboka Dolina to Demidówka in the morning of 22 July.⁸¹ General Linde intended, in accordance with the orders of the Front commander, that during the night of 22/23 July he would strike through Wołkowyje towards the Ostrów – Krzemieniec road, after reinforcing his group with a further part of the 3rd ID. The 2nd Army commander therefore ordered the 6th ID to carry out a raid on its front that night in order to tie up enemy forces.

22 July

The advanced group, however, did not carry out the night attack. Attacked by cavalry several times during the day of the 22nd on the line reached, it withdrew towards evening – “particularly due to the total exhaustion in the battalions of the 65th IR” – back over the Styry and settled down along the river and forest from Łopaszce to Gumniszczce.

On that day the 3rd CB observed enemy units moving past its right flank and through Stanisławczyk in the direction of Radziechów (28 km west of Szczurowice), as well as through Merwe to the west.

The Army commander intended, after stopping local excursions during the night of 22/23 and on the day of 23 July, to renew the advance of General Linde's group during the night of 23/24.

There was no major fighting in the sectors of the 6th ID and the 1st Cavalry Brigade, apart from patrol skirmishes.

⁷⁹ This was probably the cavalry observed by the 18th ID at 16:00 on 23 July on the march from Turja to Hrada.

⁸⁰ This information the author has so far been unable to verify. It is probably a mistake.

⁸¹ The same night that the 18 ID went from Radziwiłłów through Chotyń and Sitno to Kozin and Rudnia.



23 July

In the night of 22/23 the enemy crossed the Styr near Merwa and Beresteczko with large forces. At 08:40 an aviator observed about 1,000 horsemen on the march from Beresteczko to Dzikowiny – Pulhany (10 and 16 km west of Beresteczko); on the road from Plaszewa to Beresteczko; and in the Beresteczko area a great number of wagons and horsemen. The 3rd CB withdrew to the line of the Lipa and Bezimienna Rivers (Sketch Map 14) and garrisoned it with the remaining squadrons of the 4th CB from Lipa (on the Styr River) to Jelizarow (21 km north-west of Beresteczko).

The commander of the 2nd Army therefore ordered General Linde's advance group to concentrate in the Lipa area and to execute an attack on Beresteczko. The 4th CB,⁸² whose reinforcements in Gorochów had already arrived in the meantime,⁸³ was also ordered by the Front⁸⁴ to advance in the direction of Beresteczko, going through Pulhany and Dzikowiny.

24 July

During the night of 23/24 July, General Linde's group, of four battalions and two batteries, struck from the Lipa area and took Gumniszczce and Smolawa, smashing about two regiments of cavalry and taking prisoners from the 4th CD. The 7th Legion IR distinguished itself in these battles, reaching Beresteczko on the 24th. Attacked there by much larger forces of enemy cavalry, it had to return to its initial positions in the evening of 24 July, together with the rest of the advanced group.

The 4th CB approached Beresteczko in the evening of 24 July, throwing the enemy forces, which had broken through to Dzikowiny back over to the east bank of the Styr River.

On top of this, the enemy attacked during the day of the 24th several times, at different points, on the sector of the 3rd Legion ID but was repulsed.

149. Operational Cavalry Group. The remnants of the 1st and 3rd CBs departed on 24 July from the 2nd Army front lines to receive reinforcements and to incorporate their brigades into the Operational Cavalry Group. That group, two divisions in strength, had been formed at short notice in the interior to oppose Budëny's cavalry. The remnants of the Front's brigades with the same numbers were to be incorporated into the newly formed ones.

On 25 July the Operational Cavalry Group reached the region of Hrubieszów, Uściług, Werba, Wojnica, Markostaw, Włodzimierz Wołyński. Only the 4th CB, independent of it, took part in the battles of the 2nd Army on 24 July.⁸⁵

XIV. Siege of Brody

25 July

150. March from Radziwiłłów to Brody. The march of the 18th ID from Radziwiłłów to Brody, began at 02:00 on 25 July. The highway was good and wide, and so to shorten the march time the wagons and artillery advanced in two columns side by side. The flanking guards marched on either side of the main column.

Shortly after dawn, as the front of the main column entered the forest to the north-east of Brody, the advanced guard, just in front of the town, was welcomed by heavy machine gun fire. The enemy, who had occupied part of the forest to the north of the town and had attacked Brody's garrison the day before, now directed its fire at the 18th ID coming from the north-east. A quick attack by one of the battalions of the 49th IR cleared the forest and the division entered the town in order.

The same battalion of the 49th IR surprised a group of several hundred Bolsheviks sleeping in the grain during a further assault on Jasłowczyk, destroying it almost completely, taking four HMGs and the banner of the 19th Cavalry Regiment. The battalion's own losses were 8 killed, 27 wounded.

⁸² Or rather, the new 4th CB, which absorbed into its ranks the troops that had so far been in battle.

⁸³ The replenishment came from Werbowice near Zamość.

⁸⁴ It was subordinate directly to the Front commander after the reinforcements arrived.

⁸⁵ As already mentioned in the note to Item 126.



The division's rear guard retreated in contact with the enemy advancing through Radziwiłłów to Brody and reached Brody around 10:30.

In Brody, defensive positions were taken around the town, in the form of the now familiar 'hedgehog', as a concentrated enemy attack was expected soon (Sketch Map 15).

The division's heavy wagons and equipment, which had so far remained in Brody, were simultaneously ordered to march back to Podhorce.

The wait for the enemy was not long. After the defeat of the 35th IB on 24 July, it thought that the 18th ID would be easily finished off. But in Brody, General Krajowski again commanded all the units directly and personally, so matters were somewhat different.

151. Enemy assault on Brody. Around noon the “feeling out” of the town began from everywhere. Enemy patrols, cavalry units and squadrons tried to attack from the north, west and east. However the strongest enemy grouping was seen to be in the woods to the south and north of the town. Machine-guns were “tickling” at our positions from all directions. The 18th ID, was completely surrounded in Brody. Judging from the number of guns fired, there were 1½ to 2 divisions of cavalry. The roads leading south to Zloczów, north to Beresteczko and north-east to Radziwiłłów were heavily manned with enemy forces.

At 13:00 the assaults began (inset to Sketch Map 15), first from the north and north-east, then from the east. These drove back all our outposts to the main line of resistance. During the ensuing brief pause in the fighting, several squadrons were observed moving into the woods south of Brody, and immediately afterwards there was a major attack on the railway station, where the 49th IR was positioned. This attack was accompanied by several auxiliary assaults, here and there, all along the defensive line. The fighting went on without a break from 13:00 to 18:00.

The enemy artillery was pounding the town from all sides. Our guns responded less well due to lack of ammunition. The gendarmerie units defending the north-western edge of the town began to retreat under the enemy pressure, but Battery 8/18 managed to repel it with cartridge fire. The old positions were finally retaken.

The battle was fierce on all sectors of the defence.

152. General Krajowski's intentions and decisions. General Krajowski initially intended to remain in Brody and await news of the movements of the right wing of the 2nd Army.

However, the experience of the past weeks showed it was impossible even to roughly calculate the date of the arrival of this assistance. So the brave commander hesitated for several hours as to what decision to make.

Would the right wing of the 2nd Army arrive or not? When could it come?

How long would it be necessary to wait in besieged Brody, under the ever-increasing fire of enemy artillery and HMGs, whose bullets whistled through all the streets of the town?

Could our soldiers' nerves, so exhausted that they looked unhuman, withstand a siege of several days?

The number of wounded increased alarmingly with every hour.

Would they have enough ammunition?

Where were the ammunition supplies that arrived in Brody from Krasne before noon? Well, it turned out that the train was no longer there. It left with another train and the entire staff of the railway station to the south-east when the enemy began to surround the town from the south.

That news was the final straw that tipped the scales. The division had run out of artillery ammunition.

At 19:00 the general decided to leave Brody.

At 19:15 the division's radio station sent a dispatch to Army command:



The enemy has encircled Brody from all sides, with probably two divisions of cavalry, and has been attacking continuously since 13:00. The 18th ID will break through to the Olesko – Podhorce – Bobułycha area on 25 July at 22:00. Commander of the Podhorce Division.⁸⁶

153. Preparations for marching. The troops thus prepared for an advance to the south.

The 36th IB, with the main part of the artillery, was to follow the road from Brody to Podhorce. The 35th IB, along with the original garrison of the town of Brody – the 4/11 Guard Battalion and a company of gendarmerie – through Hołoskowice to Olesko.

Fortunately, the hour of the departure from the starting position (the railway track) was moved from 22:00 to 23:00, as precisely at 22:00 a general attack of all the enemy forces began simultaneously from all sides.

154. The main enemy assault. The frenzied roar of enemy cannons, the crackle of machine guns, the incessant shouts of “ura” around the city, the groans of the wounded in the streets – it was all reminiscent of the fiercest battles of the World War. The enemy was attacking with unbelievable fury, no longer on horseback but on foot, from all sides, especially from the south, at the railway station, and from the north-east. As the assaults broke down in the furious fire of our machine guns, new lines of dismounted enemy cavalry rushed at our positions.

The assault lasted half an hour. The nerves of our heroic men, stretched to the extreme, withstood this test as before. The enemy was repulsed with very heavy losses.

Now it was our turn to fall back. It was already 22:30.

155. Breakout of 18th ID from Brody to Podhorce. The bridge on the road to Zloczów, located just at the town exit, was covered by two enemy machine-guns. To the left and right of the bridge the enemy was settled in the hills.

The 49th IR, which was to form the front of the strike of the 36th IB, brought up its machine guns to the bridge in the darkness of the black night, with two guns of the 2/18 FAR positioned just behind them.

The leading units of the 35th IB set up in a similar manner on the road to Hołoskowice.

Punctually at 23:00, rapid fire from the machine guns and advanced cannons began, and a few moments later both brigades launched an attack to the south.

Initially surprised, the enemy quickly realised what was happening and began firing machine-guns from the adjacent hills at the places where breaches had been made. However, a quick assault by individual companies to the right and left of the roads soon opened a gap in the ring surrounding the city and the columns began to move more rapidly in the dark night in the indicated directions. Only one elusive enemy MG, mounted on a cart, drove up in the darkness several times here and there at a medium distance to the road and unleashed whole cartridge belts at the marching column of the 36th Brigade, killing 8 privates, and wounding 3 officers (including the brave brigade adjutant, Lieutenant Koperski), about 40 privates and a dozen horses.

Eventually that fire ceased as well, and the division's flank and rear guards began to advance normally towards the south.

26 July

At about 09: 30 the division reached Podhorce and Olesko (Sketch Map 16).

A few days later civilians told us that the Bolsheviks made a renewed attack on the now-empty Brody at 04:00 on 26 July. Having realised that the entire 18th ID had disappeared during the night, they immediately set off after it, observing the good tactical rule that a beaten enemy must be pursued and not allowed to rest. But the time for that had passed. When the Bolshevik cavalry columns approached

⁸⁶ See note four to Item 129



Kadłubiska and Jasionów at 10:00 they – having already been seen from afar – were taken by such a fire from an already organised artillery defence that they dispersed in all directions.

156. Withdrawal of the entire 6th Army. The command of the 6th Army meanwhile, on the basis of the radio dispatch received from the 18th ID concerning the withdrawal from Brody, gave the order to withdraw the front of the whole Army to the Seret River and to bend the left wing of the 13th IID, and the 10th IB, along the Graberki River. These troops also retreated still during the night of 25/26 July, so that the 18th ID, in its new positions, could already establish communication with General Szymanski's group in Żarków.

XV. Results of the Struggle to Contain from 12 to 26 July

Compare Sketch Maps 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16.

In the evening of 9 July the 2nd Army, after temporarily occupying Równe (Sketch Map 7), moved in a compact group towards Łuck. There was a gap of 60 km between the 2nd Army at Łuck, (Sketch Map 8) and the left wing of the 6th Army, the 18th ID at Krzemieniec.

Budëny intended to move for Lwów. The road through Młynów – Beresteczko – Kamionka Strumiłowa to Lwów was therefore completely open to him.

Not the 6th Army Headquarters, nor the 2nd Army Headquarters, nor the Southern Front Headquarters, nor the Supreme Command of the Polish Army had any reserves to oppose the enemy's Horse Army.

The first strike of the 18th ID, from Werba to Dubno (Sketch Maps 8 and 9) on 13 July, threw back the one whole enemy mounted division already on the south bank of the Ikwa, over to the north bank and thwarted Budëny somewhat in his plans. In this General Krajowski temporarily deprived Budëny of the initiative to act.

Fort Zahorce played a major role in this period, or rather even before this period. The merciless, persistent defence of that point of resistance, despite being surrounded on all sides by superior enemy forces, persevering with faith in the arrival of relief despite "a critical situation" greatly facilitated the action of the 18th ID, and made it more difficult for the enemy forces to advance to the south. On 14, 15 and 16 July (Sketch Map 10) this centre of resistance again played its role admirably. After the 9th Border Rifle Regiment withdrew from Dubno on 14 July, it withstood the enemy's advance until the arrival of relief, and on 16 July it even provided very good support for units suffering a momentary setback.

After the first capture of Dubno and Chorupań on 13 July, the main forces of the 18th ID were withdrawn back to the Werba area (Sketch Map 10) because they needed to be closer to the left wing of the 13th ID, at that time in some danger. Otherwise the area of Pełcza or Wołkowyje would certainly have been more favourable for the retirement.

Meanwhile, Budëny took the initiative again. Already by the evening of the 14th he had reoccupied Dubno and pursued towards Brody. His action shows that he was fully aware of the sizeable gap between the 2nd and 6th Armies. His 4th Cavalry Division had already passed through that gap on the 13th at Młynów (Sketch Map 9) and was attacking at Demidówka. Nevertheless, he failed to take advantage of a convenient situation. By quickly concentrating the whole of the Horse Army in the Dubno and Młynów area and vigorously striking through the 18th ID against the 13th ID, Budëny could, as he had done during the period from 26 June to 6 July, successfully strike at the completely exposed flank of the 6th Army.⁸⁷

After the capture of Równe on 8 July, Budëny appeared to have two options for action:

⁸⁷ See also "Results of the fighting from 3rd to 12th July".



either 1) without caring about the 2nd and 6th Armies, move with the bulk of his forces in a drive directly towards Lwów in order to create confusion in our rear,

or 2) strike with all his might on the flank of the 6th Army, jointly with an advance of the Soviet 14th Army, to destroy it and open the way to Eastern Małopolska.

A third possibility, i.e. a strike from Równe through Łuck to Kowel, and from there perhaps through Dorohusk and Włodawa to Brześć (Brest) to the rear of the main Polish forces fighting on the northern front, will not be discussed. Its objectives would be too far-reaching to be discussed briefly.

Budënyy, however, decided against either option. From 10 July onwards he dispersed his forces from Rożyszcze to Krzemieniec and Brody over an area of 100 kilometres, without deciding to take a decisive step anywhere. The Soviet cavalry brigades and divisions and infantry chased the 18th ID and the 2nd Army, but always with forces too weak to make a radical decision and achieve a decisive result.

Budënyy's aim from 14 to 26 July was to advance towards Lwów. To this end, he pushed one of his cavalry divisions after another through the gap between the 2nd and 6th Armies. This drive is highlighted by comparing Sketch Maps 9, 10, 11, and 12. He was trying to prevent the wings of the 2nd and 6th Armies from merging. To that end he attacked the 6th ID on 16 July near Dorogostaj (Sketch Map 10); attacked the 18th ID at Chorupań on 19 July (Sketch Map 12); repulsed the attack of the 3rd ID, in the area Targowica – Perekale; formed a defensive front against the 3rd ID (Sketch Maps 13, 14, 15); and attacked the 18th ID near Iwaszczuki and Brody – but all these attacks brought only advantages in the field, destroying only a small amount of the Polish strength. The gap between the 2nd and 6th Armies was not bridged, and Budënyy kept advancing, but the unbroken forces of the 2nd and 6th Armies constantly held back his march – until the moment came when they received reinforcements and could take their part in a decisive assault at Brody.

The time Budënyy lost in these battles did not at all make up for the results achieved.

The doggedness of General Krajowski's defence at Chorupań, despite serious enemy forces already in his rear at Radziwiłłów and Brody (Sketch Maps 11 and 12) and the threatening attitude of the Soviet 45th RD (Sketch Map 12), then the breakaway from Chorupań, the unexpected blows from Radziwiłłów on Kozin (Sketch Maps 13, 14) and the defence of Brody (Sketch Map 15), together with the closing of the Styr crossings from Łuck to Beresteczko by the 2nd Army, contributed the most to our success.

A major battle by the Polish army against the Horse Army had already been possible in the area of Młynów (Sketch Maps 9 and 10). It did not materialise because our Front command realised too late the direction of the main enemy attack. In the battle itself, of 19 July (Sketch Map 12), insufficient forces were engaged on our side to achieve greater success.

The 18th ID therefore retreated at 24:00 on 19 July from Chorupań to Radziwiłłów and launched a renewed attack on Kozin and Dobrowódka on 22 July (Sketch maps 13 and 14). This time the assault had already been ordered by the Front command, but the forces used for the assault were again too weak. Budënyy was already far too strong in the area of Wołkowyje – Chotyń and, just as at Młynów, was able to prevent a concentric assault by taking on the 3rd and 18th IDs separately.

So, as it had at Chorupań, the 18th ID had to withdraw to prevent a complete encirclement (Sketch Maps 14 and 15). And again it undertook an active defence from the Podhorce – Olesko area on 28 July.

On 26 July the first reinforcements for our cavalry brigades had already arrived. The Front commander also decided to pull the 6th ID from Łuck to Beresteczko, as well as the 1st ID (27 July) from the area north of Łuck to Radomyśl and so the battle for Brody would begin with already enlarged forces.⁸⁸

The unusually long period of heavy fighting conducted by the 18th ID from Dubno to Podhorce was driven by the fact that two major battles intended at that time (at Młynów and at Wołkowyje) did not

⁸⁸ The relevant order will be given in Item 171.

take place, the opportunities having been missed. The 18th ID therefore conducted three periods of holding actions, one after another.

The final balance of these battles, though, shows that time was gained.

The 18th ID, was tasked to take part in a major battle against Buděny together with units of the 2nd Army. The major battle was not fought until near Brody from 27 July to 3 August. From 12 to 26 July, the division conducted only containment battles.

On 26 July the leading units of Buděny's army reached Podhorce (Sketch Map 16). In 14 days, therefore, they advanced a mere 60 km towards Lwów. Such a small advance, compared to the 14 day time gained by the Polish army, may be considered a major success, and counted a Pyrrhic victory for Buděny.

During that time, the Polish army created a whole series of new large cavalry units in the interior of the country, which, after the lapse of the 14 days, were already in battle with Buděny's army at Brody.

Gaining time is the key task of a commander fighting a delaying campaign. That goal was therefore fully achieved by General Krajowski. The heavy losses of the 18th ID were not suffered in vain.



Battle of Brody – 26 July to 3 August

XVI. Battles at Podhorce and Toporów

26 July

The positions at 09:30 on 26 July can be seen on Sketch Map 16.

157. Enemy movements. Immediately after discovering our new positions on the Podhorce – Olesko line, the enemy began to look for a breakthrough which would again get it into our rear. To this end it even attacked Majdan at 18:00, but after a short battle was repulsed by a counterattack.

From the excellent vantage points in Podhorce, a column of some 2,000 to 3,000 horsemen could be seen marching from Suchodoły to the forests in the area of Żarków – Majdan. A captured Soviet telephone operator from the 11th CD, taken prisoner during the night battles, testified that on 25 July that the entire 11th CD was operating near Brody, with the 4th or 14th CD to its right. It could therefore be assumed that the 11th CD was now standing in front of the right wing of the 18th ID.

The night from 26 to 27 July passed quietly.

During 26 July Colonel Becker took over command of the 35th, while Lt-Colonel Podracki, commander of the 144th IR, who had been deputy commander of the 35th Brigade, left to go to the Army command.

27 July

158. Front commander's intentions. The day of 27 July began with auspicious news at the HQ of the 18th ID. (Sketch Map 16) The 6th Army command notified that the Front was preparing a major offensive action against Budëny's army, which would involve the 3rd ID, the 6th ID, and the newly-formed 1st and 2nd CDs, all led by the 2nd Army commander. The direction of the assault was from the Michajłówka – Beresteczko area towards Brody and Radziwiłłów. The beginning of the action could take place within four days. The task of the 18th ID was:

to tie up the enemy standing in front of it for three to four days, so that the action of the 2nd Army does not hit a vacuum, to not let it pass in the direction of Zloczów, so that it does not cut the Tarnopol – Lwów line. Try to establish communication with the 4th CB, which is to break through from Szczurowice to the left wing of the 18th ID.

Observations made by the units of the 18th ID on 26 July led to the conclusion that on 27 July the enemy 11th CD would try to penetrate from the occupied area through the forests between Majdan and Żarków to Sassów and Zloczów.

General Krajowski therefore undertook to carry out this task with his own forces, asking only that the 4th CB go to the Sokołówka area (10 km north-west of the town of Olesko).

The night of 26/27 July was spent peacefully, giving the division's soldier some fresh energy and increased combat strength.

159. Bypass of the Soviet 2nd Cavalry Division. The enemy probably noticed that the 18th ID, had taken such strong positions at Podhorce and Olesko that it would be very difficult for the cavalry to repel it. The terrain at Podhorce, quite hilly and wooded, was not suitable for operations by large units of cavalry.

At 10:00 the division command received the first report that in the morning hours about 1,000 horsemen had been observed passing from Jasionów to Dubie, that is away from the front and along the road to the west. The presumption was that the enemy was either turning to meet the approaching 4th CB or was trying to bypass the left wing of the 18th ID.

General Krajowski immediately ordered strong reconnaissance be sent out in front of the whole front line and for the trains *Pionier* and *Chrobry* to urgently patrol up to the railway station at Zabłotce.



The commander of the 36th IB, Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk, observed at 13:15 from Podhorce the passage of about 800 horsemen, with their wagons, from the town of Kadłubiska along the road to the north-west. Patrols reported that Jasionów was completely deserted by the enemy.

At 17:00 the commander of the 35th IB noted the passage of about 1,000 horsemen and three batteries, of two guns each, from Kadłubiska to Czechy, and so directly to the west. This column, was shelled effectively by our artillery and armoured trains, and retreated northwards to Zabłotce.

At 19:00 the commander of the armoured train *Pionier*, Lieutenant Szwek, noticed the passage of about 500 horsemen through Zabłotce to Sokołówka and fired at them with his guns.

Local peasants brought news that these forces were continuing towards Busk.

It was therefore clear that the enemy was regrouping towards the gap still remaining between the 2nd and 6th Armies, while bypassing the left wing of the 18th ID.

All this news was in each case immediately reported to the 6th Army.

160. The regrouping of the 6th Army and the commander's instructions. On the basis of these reports and the observation of the 13th ID that the enemy was moving its forces from the south to the north, the commander of the 6th Army, General Iwaszkiewicz, ordered the regrouping of the entire Army to the north in such a way that the 13th ID would cover the entire section currently occupied by General Szymanski's group (10th IB), while that group would be concentrated as the Army's reserve in the area of Busk – Krasne. Other divisions of the 6th Army were to move accordingly.

General Krajowski received this order at 23:30. At the same time, a preliminary instruction from the Front about the 2nd Army's attack on Budëunny's army arrived.

This instruction provided, in summary, as follows:

The basic intention is to gather all possible forces from the less endangered sections and launch a strong attack on Budëunny's Horse Army, which is trying to reach the Lwów – Rawa Ruska line, and further to capture the San, Przemyśl and Sieniawa crossings.

The strike group is to be formed by the 2nd Army consisting of: 1st Legion ID, 6th ID, the Operational Cavalry Group (1st CD, 4th CB, 1st, 3rd, 7th, 11th CRs) with the task of breaking up the Horse Army and relieving the left wing of the 6th Army. The direction of the attack is to be towards Radziwiłłów – Brody, seeking to strike the flank and rear of the enemy.

Positions: 1st Legion ID in the Radomyśl – Kohnatycze area,

6th ID in the Michajłówka – Lipa area,

Operational Cavalry Group in the Goroarów area.

The intended date of commencement of action is 1 August. Up to that time it will be the task of the 6th Army to withstand the enemy's onslaught, particularly on the left wing.

Specifically, General Krajowski's group should, with the help of General Szymanski's group, form a strong left wing group, with the aim of actively breaking up any attempted bypass.

161. Regrouping of General Krajowski's group. General Szymański's group was once more subordinate to General Krajowski's from 26 July.⁸⁹ The likely battles near Busk would thus have to be fought by the General with troops and with commanders he did not know well, in addition to which the main part of General Szymański's infantry was the 105th IR, which we have seen had minimal combat value, as the men were unsteady. The general therefore decided to change the way in which he carried out the

⁸⁹ As requested by the commander of the 18th ID, mentioned in Item 138, the 10th IB on 24, 25 and 26 July took orders directly from the commander of the 6th Army.



Army commander's order and not use General Szymański's group to cover the army flank, but his own men – namely the 36th IB, with the addition of the 19th IR from the 10th Brigade.

Only units of lower combat value were to remain from Żarków through Podhorce to Oźydów: the beaten 35th IB and the 105th IR, with the 40th IR in the centre between them, to carry out counter-attacks if necessary.

28 July

At 06:00 on 28 July the 36th IB, under the sprightly command of Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk, went from Podhorce to Krasne, leaving only patrols of the 6th Lancers on its sector, as ordered by the division commander.

General Szymanski's group likewise only left only patrols with tachankas in front of their old positions when they marched away, with the more important points having single companies. During the day of 28 July there was no significant fighting in either of these sectors. A local incursion of enemy infantry (405th RR) into the town of Majdan was quickly eliminated. Patrols all along the front of the division observed the approach of the enemy 45th RD up to our positions.

162. Battles at Busk. When the 36th IB arrived at Krasne, after a strenuous march, (Sketch Map 17) the commander received the news that Busk had been seized by the enemy at 10:00. After a short rest, Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk moved to attack and recaptured Busk at 21:00 to the enthusiastic joy of the inhabitants. It had been a unit of the 11th CD, about 200 horsemen and three machine-guns, who retreated northwards.

29 July

The night of 28/29 and the day of 29 July passed peacefully. The 18th ID received reinforcements – three companies of 100 men each. These were the first reinforcements to the ranks since the division had been organised in France. In the following days several more such companies arrived.⁹⁰

163. Numbers and reorganisation of the division. The numbers had thus improved somewhat. Because of the small number of bayonets in the regiments, the division commander disbanded one company in each battalion, which made it possible to incorporate the staffs of those companies – clerks, craftsmen, cooks, etc – into the line. The regimental wagons were also disbanded similarly, in line with the reduced number of companies. The three companies of reinforcements that arrived were incorporated into the 42nd IR and the 144th IR.

No battalion commands were disbanded so as not to hamper the administration. On the contrary, the division commander re-formed Battalion 3/145, taking a few dozen men from the other battalions of the 145th IR.

164. Enemy positions. (Sketch map 17) Numerous patrols sent out on 29 July, and reports received from D. O. G. Lwów units guarding the Bug River, clarified the enemy situation considerably. The presence of about 1,000 horsemen with four guns in Grabowa; 400 horsemen in Adamy; large detachments of cavalry in Toporów; the entire Soviet 45th RD in front of Podhorce – the 405th RR opposite Majdan, the 404th RR in Jasionów, the 403rd RR in the region of Dubie and Kadłubiska and

⁹⁰ The 18th ID had been the 7th Division of General Haller's army. It had been initially, with the reorganisation of the army administration by the Ministry of War, intended to be disbanded. This was the reason why the division did not receive reinforcements for so long, despite considerable losses. The 42nd and 49th IRs had had their own reserve battalions for two months, but those had until this point not received orders to send reinforcements to their parent regiments. Only in mid-July 1920 did the Ministry of War decide not to disband the division.

Even then, the 144th and 145th IRs were considered reserve regiments until the end of the war – and so to be disbanded after the war – which meant that they did not have their own reserve battalions. Reinforcements for those regiments came partly from the reserve battalions of the 44th and 45th IRs, partly from the most varied sources. The reserve battalions, supplementing their own regiments and, in addition, other regiments of the 18th ID, outnumbered their parent regiments in terms of manpower.



the headquarters of the 36th⁹¹ RB was in Dubie (that brigade was about 600 bayonets, 80 sabres, 25 HMGs and eight guns); a second brigade of that division was to the east of the first brigade while the third brigade was in reserve at the division headquarters in Brody.

The general picture showed that the mounted units of Budëny's army were advancing through the wooded region of Toporów towards Kamionka Strumiłowa.

165. The decision of the group commander. General Krajowski therefore decided to proceed, without further orders, to carry out his task, i.e. to tie up the enemy in front of him, and prevent the left wing of the 6th Army from being bypassed.

He therefore ordered an attack by General Szymański's group and 35th Brigade, under the unified command of General Szymański, towards Brody, while the 36th IB, 19th IR and Battalion 1/4 was to advance on Połoniczna and Toporów.

The operational order specified the attack of the 10th IB and 35th IB as a demonstration attack in two groups. One was to strike along the Podhorce – Brody axis, the other, the main one, along the Olesko – Czechy – Połoniczna axis. The objective of the assault: to beat back the enemy grouping in front of the section, take Hill 283 "Ptasznik" and the town of Suchodoły, and if the enemy resistance was weak, even the town of Brody. The left wing of this attack was to be covered by two armoured trains, *Pionier* and *Iwaszkiewicz*.⁹²

The main attack of the 36th IB and the 19th IR, on Połoniczna and Toporów, was to be led by the general himself, in order to ruthlessly repel Budëny's forces moving eastwards towards Kamionka-Strumiłowa. This assault was also split into two groups. The main group of the 36th IB through Grabowa to Połoniczna, while the auxiliary group was to go through Adamy to Toporów. The latter was also to take any enemy survivors, retreating before the main group's assault, in the rear.

Only a few weak units, consisting of the 105th IR and the Guard Battalion 4/11 and the armoured train *Chrobry*, which was to patrol along the line Krasne – Ożydów, were left in the starting positions of Podhorce and Olesko.

30 July

166. Battle of Grabowa. At 05:00 on 30 July the 36th Brigade, having set out from Busk, occupied Jabłonówka after weak resistance, and reached Grabowa before 09:00. There it encountered very strong resistance from enemy riflemen, with a large amount of cavalry and eight guns. In spite of this, our riflemen advanced rapidly, and when it was noticed that some of the defenders were breaking off and mounting their horses, our armoured car (which had been sent the day before from the Army Headquarters to be at General Krajowski's disposal) went onto the attack and drove straight between the squadrons of the 2nd Brigade of the 11th CD, defending Grabowa. In a mad rush, the Cossacks raced north-east, shot down in masses by our infantrymen. A banner, apparently of the HQ of the 11th CD,⁹³ was captured. Połoniczna was taken at 12:30 after breaking through brief resistance.

According to the testimony of prisoners of war and civilians, the 11th CD was at that point severely shaken and had very little combat value.⁹⁴

⁹¹ A mistake, as this is clearly the Soviet **135th** Rifle Brigade of the 45th Rifle Division, composed of the 403rd, 404th and 405th Rifle Regiments mentioned just previously.

⁹² Initially, General Krajowski had at his disposal only one armoured train, *Chrobry* from 12 to 23 July, two – *Chrobry* and *Pionier* – from 23 to 26 July, and three – *Chrobry*, *Pionier* and *Iwaszkiewicz* – from 26 to 31 July. *Chrobry* then departed for repairs, so that only *Pionier* and *Iwaszkiewicz* remained during the last battles from 31 July to 3 August.

⁹³ That banner, later sent back to the 6th Army HQ, was in the National Museum in Kraków in October 1921.

⁹⁴ Later the 11th CD would send deputies to the 18th ID expressing their intention to surrender. See the Introduction, last paragraph.



From Połoniczna, General Krajowski turned towards Toporów, from where the sound of battle drifted. But having arrived with the 36th IB, he found his right-hand group already there, i.e. the 19th IR and Battalion 1/4.

167. Fighting at Adamy and Toporów. The 19th IR group had reached Adamy after a short battle in Bołożynów, breaking the resistance of about 200 horsemen, and by 11:50 had already reached Toporów and occupied it, having thrown back a further approximately 1,000 cavalry to the east.

168. Seizure of Monastyrek and Turze. On the basis of testimony from prisoners that Budëny's main forces were still to the east of the Styr, in the Brody – Ruda – Stanisławczyk area, General Krajowski ordered the redeployment of the entire 36th IB and the 19th IR from Toporów in the direction of Brody as far as the line of the Styr, then to Monastyrek and Turze, sending reconnaissance to the north in the directions of Łopatyn, Batyjow, Laszków, Ohładów, Krzywe and Radziechów.

169. Fighting at Jasionów and Czechy. Meanwhile General Szymanski's group was also attacking.

The 35th IB had already encountered strong resistance at Konty and Czyski. It seized those towns and, after another major action, also the town of Czechy. As it continued to advance, however, it received increasingly heavy flanking fire on its right, and the detachment assigned to maintain communication with the 10th IB found itself in a situation where it was unable to maintain that contact. The 10th IB was at that time in the town of Kadłubiska, which had been completely occupied by the enemy.

Positioned with the 10th IB, General Szymański sent the 105th IR in the first line to attack. This naturally ran away at the first shots, which was to be expected, and had to be held back by a squadron of the 6th Lancer Regiment. Five companies of the 40th IR, thrown in from the rear guard, succeeded in capturing Jasionów with difficulty, but they could not withstand the counter-attack.

In view of the situation, at 10:30 General Szymański ordered the entire advance group to withdraw from Jasionów, back to the starting positions. Losses were three officers, 30 privates wounded and a large number of missing from the 105th IR.

However in spite of this setback, the objective of General Szymański's strike was achieved, as not only was the entire Soviet 45th RD found to be in the fighting, but also the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd RRs from another division (the 7th?),⁹⁵ which had been sent to replace the 45th RD, in order to enable that division to move northwest.

170. The result of the fighting. The enemy was thus tied down, as the Front had wished, and driven back from those places where it had reached too deeply beyond the left wing of the 6th Army.

171. The 2nd Army's activities from 25 to 30 July. Meanwhile, the 2nd Army fought as follows:

24 July

(Sketch Map 14) General Linde's group and the 4th CB struck on the night of 23-24 July, or at dawn on 24 July, from the Lipa area and the northern bank of the Lipa River, against the enemy who had crossed the Styr River at Beresteczko and Merwe and were advancing westwards. General Linde's group reached Beresteczko, but had to retreat back to their initial positions as a result of strong enemy attacks; the 4th CB threw the enemy out of Lobaczówka and Dzikowiny and were approaching Beresteczko by the evening of 24 July.

As a result, the Front issued an order on the night of 24/25 July, with the following content;

- 1) The enemy, two to three cavalry divisions strong, drove back the 18th Division to the Brody – Radziwiłłów area, and General Linde's group beyond the Lipa and Styr. Two brigades of Bolsheviks have occupied a bridgehead at Wołoczyska and slid in through Nowy Sióło to Obodówka; east of Husiatyn the enemy has occupied Chabarówka.
2. The 18th Infantry Division, withdrew after heavy fighting against overwhelming enemy forces to the Radziwiłłów – Brody area, where it is now fighting.

The 12th ID has bent its left wing from Podwołoczyska through Klebanówka and Zbaraż.

⁹⁵ These units were from the Soviet 21st Rifle Brigade, attached to the 14th Army. The bulk of its parent division, which was indeed the 7th RD, was much further north with the 12th Army (source: Kakurin and Melikov).



On 25 July our 1st Cavalry Division made it to the Włodimir Wołyński area.

3) The intention of the front command is to hold the Zbrucz unconditionally, to temporarily bend the front through the Miodobory hills to Brody and by a vigorous attack by the 2nd Army, drive out the Horse Army, threatening our flank and rear.

4) Execution:

a) 2nd Army: the commander of the 2nd Army will personally take the lead in the offensive action and will carry out, disregarding soldier fatigue and losses, an immediate attack on the rear of the enemy, who is advancing on the 18th Division in the Radziwiłłów – Brody area. For the duration of this action the 4th CB is at the disposal of the 2nd Army. The command of the 2nd Army will inform the 4th CB in writing of the current situation and send it an order to attack the enemy between the 3rd and 18th IDs as quickly as possible, and to establish communication with the 6th Army. The general direction of the attack is Brody.

b) 6th Army will hold the Zbrucz line at all costs. I authorise a temporary withdrawal of the northern wing to the line Poczajów – Zbaraż – Miodobory. The 13th and 18th IDs will strive to establish communications with the 4th CB as soon as possible, maintaining the present front line at all costs until its arrival. The 4th CB should be used on the north wing of the 6th Army to continue fighting the Horse Army and to maintain combat communications with the 2nd Army.

5) It is pointed out that in view of the possibility of an armistice, it is a point of honour to hold the line of the Styr and Zbrucz at all costs – all the more so as the armistice may take place soon and the Bolshevik troops are at least as tired as the Polish. The successful suppression of the action in the Dubno – Brody area and the holding of the Zbrucz is an absolute necessity.

The staff of the 2nd Army Command therefore are to move immediately to Radomyśl, in order to direct the action. The army commander is to personally leave for Lipa.

25 July

During the day of 25 July (Sketch Map 15) the 4th Cavalry Brigade took back Beresteczko, Merwe and Peremyl. The army commander ordered the 4th CB to be relieved on this sector by the 7th Legion IR from the 3rd Legion ID, to allow further action by the 4th CB towards Szczurowice and in the direction of Brody. At dawn on 26 July the 3rd Legion ID occupied the line of the Styr from Beresteczko to Malewo. The positions were as follows:

3/12 and 11th Lancer Regiment – Beresteczko; 1/65 – Soloniewo; 3/65 – Peremel; 3/7 – Gumniszcze; 1/7 – Michajłówka; 2/7 – Szybienna and Tolpyżin; 2/8 – Chryniki; 3/8 – Wyczółki; 1/8 – Malewo.⁹⁶

26 July

In the course 26 July the 4th CB, after fierce and glorious battles with the troops of the 6th CD, reached Smorzów, Zawidze, Lasków, Hrycowola; meanwhile the troops of the 3rd ID garrisoned Beresteczko and Merwe. (Sketch Map 16).

The commander of the South-Eastern Front, General Rydz-Śmigły, in the meantime ordered on 26 July:⁹⁷

1) The Horse Army, four divisions of cavalry and 45th RD, concentrated in the area of Beresteczko – Brody, is striking south-west along the axis Brody – Krasne and Beresteczko – Kamionka, aiming at capturing the railway line Lwów – Rawa Ruska and seizing the San crossing. After forcing the Zbrucz River near Wołoczyska – Husiatyn and Skałat, the enemy is advancing at a rapid pace to the west. The Soviet 25th Rifle Division, supported by parts of the 58th Rifle Division continues its attacks, with the intention of crossing the Styr in the direction of Brześć-Litowski.

2) Due to the retreat of the right wing of the 4th Army, the Polesie Group is to retire to the line Lubieszów – Drohiczyn – Bereza Kartuska, stopping temporarily on the 26th on the line Rzeczyca – Wólka Rzeczyca – Kończyce – Brodnica and so on. The 18th ID, attacked by the Horse Army from all sides, is to break through in the direction of Olesko – Sokołówka.

3. The intention of the Front command: to gather all possible forces from the less endangered sections and move to attack Budëny's Horse Army. To do this it will be necessary: a) to withdraw

⁹⁶ Compare with the manning of the Rudnia – Kozin area by the 18th Infantry Division, Item 135, and accompanying footnote.

⁹⁷ This order only arrived at the staff of the 18th Infantry Division in excerpts on 27 July. See Item 158.



the northern wing of the 3rd Army over the Stochód, still holding the line of the Styr from Nawoz inclusive to the south; b) as a result of the shortening of the front, to extend the section of the 3rd Army up to and including Łuck; c) to withdraw the 6th Army as a last resort over the Strypa River, its northern wing towards Krasne.

4) Execution: the 3rd Army, consisting of the 7th ID, the 3rd Legion ID, the 157th IR, the 132nd IR, the 6th Ukrainian Division, and General Balakhovich's detachment, are to withdraw in close cooperation with the Polesie Group. The 7th ID, 6th ID, and 6th Ukrainian Division and the 23rd IR over the Stochód River on the 26th and 27th.

The 1st Legion ID is to send at least one infantry regiment, with an artillery *divizion*, to Łuck immediately upon receiving this order. After their arrival the 6th ID will move as quickly as possible south to the area of Michajłówka – Lipa, in order to relieve the 3rd Legion ID, which will immediately march to Łuck at the disposal of the 3rd Army. The 1st Legion ID, less the one infantry regiment which is to leave for Łuck, will march, as soon as part of the 3rd ID arrives, by the shortest possible route directly to the Radomyśl – Kalniatyczy area (on the Ikwa River), at the disposal of the 2nd Army.

After the arrival of six battalions of the 3rd Legion ID in Łuck, the 1st Legion IR, in Łuck, will march to the Radomyśl – Kalniatyczy area at the disposal of the 2nd ID. The new line of demarcation of the 3rd Army will run in the north through Novosiólki – Lubieszów – Lake Orzechowo (all inclusive for the Polesie Group), in the south Boratyn exclusive, Torczyn inclusive, the Turja River, Dubienka inclusive. The 3rd Army command will be in Kowel.

The 2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Legion ID, 6th ID, Cavalry Group, (1st CD, 4th CB and 7th Lancer Regiment) will secure the line of the Styr River from Boratyn to Targowica and will be grouped as follows: 1st Legion ID in the Radomyśl – Kalniatyczy region; 6th ID in Michajłówka – Lipa; the Cavalry Group in Gorochów. The task of the 2nd Army is to break up Budëny's Horse Army and facilitate the movements of the 6th Army. To this end, the 2nd Army is to attack quickly and vigorously in the general direction of Radziwiłłów – Brody, trying to strike at the enemy's flank and rear, while covering its own left flank with weak cavalry units and concentrating the bulk of the cavalry for the decisive strike. The line of demarcation to the north is as for the 3rd Army, to the south; Brody, inclusive, Kamionka Strumiłowa inclusive, Żółkiew exclusive, Rawa Ruska inclusive. The 2nd Army Command will be in Brody.

The 6th Army, consisting of 18th ID, 10th IB, 13th ID, 12th ID, and Ukrainian forces, and the 9th IB (when it arrives) is to defend the access to Eastern Małopolska, withdrawing, if finally necessary; the 18th ID is to go to Krasne; the 13th ID to Zborów; with the rest of the army over the Strypa River. It is necessary, before securing the Dniester up to the Romanian border, to protect the Kolomyja area. As soon as the 2nd Army moves to the flank attack, the 6th Army will join in as vigorously as possible along the Krasne – Dubno axis, aiming to retake the Zbrucz line. The line of demarcation for the 6th Army: from the north as with the 2nd Army, to the south the southern Polish border. The 6th Army Command will be in Lwów. The 9th IB is directed by the Supreme Command to be at the disposal of the 6th Army in Lwów. The 64th IR remains, in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Command, at the disposal of the North-Eastern Front.

5) The 2nd Army will submit a detailed plan for the regrouping and attack by 18:00 on the 27th.

6) Material, aviation and communications orders will come separately.

As a result of this order, the commander of the 2nd Army ordered at 12:00 on 26 July a regrouping the army, stating that by 29 July:

The 1st CD is to occupy the Merwa – Beresteczko area, securing the crossing of the Styr from Werben to Merwa,

The 4th CB is to occupy the area of Szczurowice – Leszniów – Korsów (if it does not manage to occupy the area closer to Brody).

The command post for the Operational Cavalry Group will be Beresteczko.

The 6th ID, which includes the 11th Lancer Regiment, will concentrate in the area of Michajłówka – Lipa, securing crossings of the Styr up to and including Wyczólki. The division command will be in Smyków.



The 1st Legion ID, which also includes the 7th Lancer Regiment (after leaving one squadron, the MG squadron, the technical squadron and one battery in the sector Targowica – Boratyn) will concentrate in the area Radomyśl – Kalniatyczy – Bilcze, securing the passages from Wyczółki, exclusive, to the mouth of the Ikwa River to the Styr. The division command will be in Radomyśl.

The sector Targowica – Boratyn (commanded by Captain Jędrychowski,) is secured by Battalion 3/3 Podolian, one squadron of the 7th Lancer Regiment, its MG squadron, its technical squadron and two batteries.

The 3rd Legion ID will leave for the 3rd Army, manning its right wing from Boratyn starting ... etc

The above regrouping was to be completed by 02:00 on 29 July.

Upon completion of the regrouping, the 2nd Army commander intended:

I) The Cavalry Group will strike in two columns at Brody and Radziwiłłów and pursue the enemy, trying to establish communication with the 18th ID.

Aim: to smash the enemy 6th CD in the area of Laszków – Stanisławczyk – Ruda – Bordołaki and to clear the area of Stojanów – Kamionka – Krasne – Brody of the enemy.

II) The 6th ID, exiting through Beresteczko, will strike Brody and Radziwiłłów, establishing communication with the 18th ID, or with the 10th IB (General Szymanski).

III) The 1st Legion ID, exiting from its area through Malewo, will break up the 14th CD and other forces in front and, marching south, will reach the area of Plaszewa – Dobrowódka. Task: protection of the 6th ID from enemy attacks from Dubno or Pełcza.

27 July

At dawn on 27 July the regrouping of the 2nd Army began and went as planned. The enemy did not interfere much.

The 4th Cavalry Brigade occupied Szczurowice at 09:00 on 27 July, after heavy fighting, and moving towards Brody also garrisoned Stanisławczyk and Monastyrzek.

By the evening of 27 July from the Operational Cavalry Group, the 1st CD had reached the Gorochów region, the towns of Starostawy – Chołoniew – Cegów – Boroczyce, and the 7th CB (from the 2nd CD) was in Włodzimierz Wołyński. The group's headquarters were in Hrubieszów.

28 July

In the evening of 28 July the regrouping of the 2nd Army was basically completed. The 1st ID arrived in the night of 28/29 July by motor vehicle in Radomyśl from Łuck.

The 2nd CD reached the Kryłów area in the evening (50 km northwest of Gorochów).

An aviator observed the following at 10:00 on 28 July:

In the area of Wojnica – Kniahinin – Wojnica Dobratyn: saw nothing.

In Młynów (where on 27 July he had observed 1,500 cavalry) the airman saw about 500 cavalry and about 300 carts.

The region Smordwa – Chorupań were not observed, however it is known that the materiel bases of Budënný's Horse Army are there.

Dubno: empty.

Between Tarakanowo and Ptycza about 400 carts, Pełcza 250 carts, near Dubina (east of Kozin) 100 carts and 50 horsemen.

Kozin – 100 carts, Żabokryki – 300 carts, Dobrowódka – 100 carts, Tesluhov – 100 carts.

Further according to the report of an aviator and the 6th ID: Werben, Plaszewa and Soloniewo were occupied by the enemy.

According to the report of the 7th Lancers, there was one enemy battalion in Targowica and two companies in Krasnoye.

On top of that, in the area in front of Łuck and along the Styr, south to Targowica, there were weak enemy garrison, but almost no artillery.



The 2nd Army commander therefore ordered an attack on 29 July. The order read:

1) The 4th CB will continue to operate through Stanisławczyk in a southerly direction, with the aim of establishing communications with the 18th ID, clearing the area west of the Szczurowice – Brody line from the enemy on the way.

2) The 1st CD will set out as early as possible on 29 July, in the direction of Radziwiłłów, breaking up any enemy forces on the way, and on reaching that village send out reconnaissance in the direction of Dubno and Krzemieniec, and further to the south-east establish communications with General Szymanski's group.

3) The 6th ID, which includes the 11th Lancer Regiment, will set out at 06:00 on 29 July for Brody and Radziwiłłów, smash the enemy on the road, establish communication with the 18th ID, stay overnight in the area and prepare for action towards Dubno.

If necessary, it will co-operate with the attack of the 1st Legion ID on the Bolshevik 14th CD.

4) The 1st Legion ID, with those regiments and artillery that arrive in time, as well as with the 3rd Lancer Regiment, which is hereby subordinated to it, will leave at 02:00 on 29 July through Malewo, strike to the south, smash the enemy 14th CD and other troops, and reach the area of Plaszewka – Dobrowódka.

The assigned 3rd Lancer Regiment will cover its flanks and rear; the enemy forces at Młynów should be accounted for in particular. Destruction of the bridge at Młynów would be highly desirable.

The 1st Legion ID is to stay overnight in the Plaszewka – Dobrowódka area, conducting reconnaissance on Kozin, Pełcza and Młynów.

The rest of the 1st Legion ID will concentrate, on arrival in the 2nd Army sector, in the Radomyśl area, where it will receive further orders.

Securing the Styr line:

The 6th ID is to man all the bridges and crossings over the Styr in its sector up to and including Wyczółki with infantry companies with machine-guns.

Two battalions of the 8th IR will secure the Styr crossings in the above manner from Wyczółki to the mouth of the Ikwa at the Styr and remain there until relieved. Further protection of the Styr as far as Boratyn will be secured by the 7th Lancers and Battalion 3/3 Podolian and the 1st battery of the 4th Horse Artillery *Divizion*. The sector commander is Captain Piasecki.

The reserve of the Army, from the evening of 29 July will be the Cavalry Group⁹⁸ in Gorochów.

The airmen will carry out reconnaissance ... etc.

29 July

Dawn of 29 July therefore saw the assault of the 1st and 6th IDs, and the 4th CB. (Sketch Map 17)

The 1st Legion ID, which had arrived in Radomyśl by vehicles on the night of 28/29 July, immediately launched its attack and, after forcing the Styr crossings, stormed Ochmatków and Łopasz by the evening. The 3rd Lancer Regiment assigned to it reached as far as Hill 215, located 4 km west of Bokujma.

The 6th ID, which had moved the bulk of its forces to the Beresteczko area, with only detached companies on the Styr River at Chryniki, Boremel, Tolpyżyn, Gumniszczce and Peremył, waited on 29 July to establish communications with the 1st Legion ID.

The 4th CB advanced through Szczurowice towards Korsów and Leszniów, but was driven back to Szczurowice by the overwhelming enemy forces.

The headquarters of the Operational Cavalry Group and the 2nd CD reached the Gorochów region in the evening.

The enemy attacked the Łuck bridgehead on 29 July with large forces from his 24th RD, but the attack was repulsed.

30 July

⁹⁸ The Group Command and the 2nd Cavalry Division.



On 30 July the assault was to continue, with the participation of the 1st CD, as previously ordered. The 4th CB, however, received a revised order to head for Toporów on 30 July to counter the enemy cavalry found there.

The 1st ID moved on, fighting the enemy troops of the 14th CD through Demidówka as far as Rogoźno and Kopanie, disregarding the Soviet 24th RD attacking its left flank and rear. The 3rd Lancer Regiment prevented that enemy attack as best it could, but had to retreat as far as Lisznia and Kniahinin.

The 6th ID waited with its left wing for the advance of the 1st ID to proceed, sending only one liaison battalion through Plaszewa to Werben. With its right wing it moved slightly south and east, taking Ostrów, Mytnica and the forest between Beresteczko and Szczurowice.

The 1st CD and the 4th CB also began their advance. Here, however, the battle began to turn. Simultaneously with our advance, substantial enemy forces concentrated in the area of Leszniów, Mytnica and Redków, began their attack, leading their main effort through Szczurowice, i.e. where our forces were weaker. Pressing with overwhelming force on our 4th CB, they threw it back through Szczurowice northwards towards Mikołajów and Merwa after a short battle. The enemy at the same time found enough strength to hold back the advance of our 1st CD, which led through Beresteczko towards Redków.

The wheel began to turn. The 4th CB retreated to Michajłówka and Merwa, the enemy 6th and part of the 4th CDs followed. The 1st CD therefore changed its direction of attack and did not go to Radziwiłłów, but through Mytnica to Szczurowice and Skryhołów. The enemy drove our 4th CB beyond Michajłówka and Merwa and headed west towards Stojanów and Drużkopol.

In the evening of that day the 4th CB was in Lobaszewka and Smolawa, the 1st CD was grouping for a new attack on 31 July in the area of Merwa and Dzikowiny.

Our 2nd CD, coming from the interior, reached Gorochów on 30 July with its advanced units at Drużkopol and Boroczycze.

The Commander-in-Chief was in Chełm, awaiting reports on the course of the battle, needing them to make important further decisions.

XVII. Toporów – Brody

172. Positions of the Krajowski group on the evening of 30 July. Sketch Map 17.

The 36th IB and 19th IR occupied Monastyrzek and Turze, having no communication with 4th CB, 10th or 35th IBs, who were back in the Olesko – Podhorce positions.

173. News of the 2nd Army and enemy movements. During the night of 30/31 July, news arrived at the 18th ID HQ in Krasne, from the 6th Army, that the 2nd Army had launched an attack on 30 July. It was reported that the 6th ID had reached Beresteczko – Burkaczy – Szczurowice – Mytnica – Ostrów on 30 July; the 1st Legion ID to Bokujma – Rudka – Rogoźno; the 1st CD had gone west through Zawidczce to Skryhołów; the 2nd CD reached Horochów and Łobaczówka; and the 4th CB, which was already in Leszniów by 29 July, had retreated to Smarżów.

At the same time, the 6th Army Command informed them that the enemy was moving a considerable force of cavalry from the east to Stanisławczyk, that the enemy 6th Cavalry Division had broken through Beresteczko to Łobaczówka, and their 4th Cavalry Division through Szczurowice to Stojanów and Drużkopol.

31 July

174. General Krajowski's orders. The general was with the 36th Brigade in the town of Turze, so did not receive the news until 08:00 of the 31st.

The breakthrough of the two cavalry divisions towards Stojanów seriously puzzled the General. This fact, as well as the news of the failure of General Szymański's advance (35th and 10th IBs) prompted him to withdraw the 36th IB and 19th IR from Monastyrzek and Turze to the area of Toporów – Trójca – Majdan. He intended to leave the 36th Brigade in Toporów in a waiting position, with orders to carry out reconnaissance to the north and east and the intention to strike later from Toporów, according to the way the situation unfolded. He himself, meanwhile, returned to the group headquarters in Krasne



to keep an eye on the movements of the enemy 45th RD and 9th CD. General Szymański was ordered to be resilient.

175. Evening positions. The retirement of the 36th IB had been made in the late morning of 30 July. The 145th IR, which received the orders a little later and could not immediately break away from the enemy at Monastyrzek, did not arrive at Toporów until around midnight, having fought several rear guard battles on the way (Sketch Map 18).

In General Szymański's sector, the enemy advanced to attack his flank, but the attacks were easily repulsed.

Otherwise the day passed calmly.

176. Battle of Toporów. At 19:30 an order came from the 6th Army Command that the 36th Brigade, in accordance with the order of the Commander-in-Chief:

Organise during the night of 31 July to 1 August an advance from Toporów to Łopatyn, with the aim of causing as much panic as possible there between 03:00 and 04:00, breaking up the serious enemy forces, alongside the Operational Cavalry Group.

The Cavalry Group was to attack Łopatyn and Stanisławczyk simultaneously from the north-west.

1 August

So at 01:00 Captain Kocur led off the two least tired battalions of 36th IB, relatively speaking i.e. 2/49 and 1/19, and one battery through Łętków and Stary Majdan towards Łopatyn.

When the front of this column encountered resistance in the darkness in front of Stary Majdan, Captain Kocur ordered an immediate energetic attack. Quite unexpectedly, however, they encountered a hard-wired position, still left over from the World War, and the advancing battalions suffered heavy losses.

The enemy soon advanced with overwhelming force to counter-attack. The fiercest fighting took place around the windmill in Łętków. Captain Kocur, heroically fighting in the front line, held his men in a difficult position until the arrival of reinforcements from Toporów.

The arriving battalion, 1/49, twice made counter-attacks, relieving somewhat the right wing of the 2/49. Captain Nadachowski personally led the riflemen into the attack on several occasions, and after a hard fight, the entire advance group was fortunately able to return to Toporów without further major losses.

However, the enemy pursued on the heels of the retreating battalions and launched an immediate assault on Toporów.

The 49th IR defended the northern part, the 145th IR the southern part of the town. Enemy artillery started fires in several places. The enemy completely surrounded the entire town and attacked several times. However, all assaults were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy.

Our patrols found the presence of the enemy in Bażany and Lasowe, about 200 Cossacks in Kasztelany, a strong detachment in Czanyż, Huta Połonińska and on the road between Toporów and Połoniczna. They also reported the march of a large column of cavalry with considerable artillery at 14:30 from Turze through Przewłoczna to Adamy.

177. Fighting at Adamy. Meanwhile all communication was lost between the 36th IB and the group's headquarters in Krasne, so that the general had no news of either the fighting just described at Toporów, or the results of the reconnaissance. The wagons with the wounded, sent from Toporów to Krasne in the morning, partly returned from halfway to Toporów, and partly were taken prisoner near Adamy, where the wounded and healthy prisoners were subjected to bestial murders. Four carts of uniforms, sent from Krasne to Toporów in the morning, fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks at Adamy.

In the morning, several more carts arrived in Krasne from Toporów, seeking ammunition and food, but it was no longer possible to send those materials on the return journey.

At the group headquarters in Krasne, at about 10:00 it was only known that the enemy “had approached” Adamy.

So the general ordered the march company of the 25th IR, which had just arrived in Krasne as a supplement to the 49th IR,⁹⁹ to take the ammunition wagons and march through Adamy to Toporów.

But at 14:00 the company returned to Busk, reporting that there were at least 300 horsemen in Adamy, so the company could not pass.

The general was still unaware of the 36th Brigade’s struggles in Toporów. He thought that this could only be some survivors of the Soviet 11th Cavalry Division, retreating eastwards after the fighting in Adamy two day’s before. The General sent another battalion from the 35th IB, together with a squadron of lancers to Sokołówka, in order to cut off the road for that enemy group to Brody; he also intended to order the 36th IB to garrison Przewłoczna, but there was no communication with the brigade. The three best scouts of the 6th Lancer Regiment could not get through to Toporów and returned late in the evening back to Krasne.

Annoyed, the general therefore gave up further attempts, announcing that the next day, 2 August, he would go himself to establish contact with Toporów.

178. Intentions of the commander of the 36th Brigade. Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk, the commander of 36th IB, intended to strike from Toporów towards Busk on the night of the 1/2 August, in order to get the ammunition he already greatly needed, and to approach the left wing of General Szymański's group. In the meantime, however, he received more orders through a plane, which, due to his ignorance of the location of the 36th Brigade sounded quite different.

But because “God gave happiness to General Krajowski” this time too, even these inconsistent orders were successful.

179. Orders for 36th Brigade. At about noon on 1 August, the 6th Army notified General Krajowski's HQ that two of Budëny's cavalry divisions were retreating before the 2nd Army's advance through Leszniów and Stanisławczyk to Brody, while one division was in the area of Majdan Stary – Ohladov – Oplucko north of Toporów. At 16:30 therefore General Krajowski, not knowing the detailed position in Łopatyn, gave an order to 36th Brigade to attack Stary Majdan on the night of 1/2 August and to garrison the bridge over the Styr at Stanisławczyk. However, not being certain how he could get the message to the brigade in Toporów, he asked the 6th Army to send it by plane as soon as possible. The same airman also received the hitherto undelivered order for the 36th IB, mentioned in Item 178, to cut off of the retreat route of the enemy group located at Adamy. This was to be done by positioning one battalion from the brigade in Przewłoczna.

At 20:00 these orders were in the brigade commander's hands.

180. Toporów. The news of the successful start of the 2nd Army’s action greatly refreshed the tired soldiers and officers of the 36th Brigade. Fierce enemy attacks with strong artillery support were repeated relentlessly until 21:00. The brigade's losses in killed and wounded on 1 July amounted to over 200 men.

181. The general's advance from Krasne to Toporów. In Krasne, meanwhile, General Krajowski was preparing his action to establish communication with Toporów.

He gathered during the night a further two march companies of the 19th IR and the entire Battalion 1/42, which had just arrived with one battery from Tarnopol,¹⁰⁰ and threw that group at 04:00 on 2 July into an attack on Adamy. (Sketch Map 19).

At Adamy a great fire-fight began. Our armoured car, so glorious in the fighting of 30 July, had unfortunately broken down. But as the woods surrounding the Adamy from the south and west favoured infantry and were unfavourable to the Cossacks, who were reluctant to dismount, over 1,000

⁹⁹ See the note to Item 162.

¹⁰⁰ It had been detached to the 12th Division since July. See Item 82.



horsemen with four guns were quickly dismissed and Adamy was finally taken. It turned out that the main forces of the Soviet 11th Cavalry Division, together with its headquarters, were there.

Leaving the 1st MG Company in Adamy, General Krajowski went on to Czanyż and Toporów, which he took after a short fight.

182. Battles of 36th Brigade and the occupation of Łopatyn. However the 36th Brigade was no longer in Toporów. Following the orders received from the plane, at 03:00 that brigade launched a vigorous attack on Łopatyn and Stanisławczyk. Leading the main assault was the 145th IR with three batteries through Majdan Stary on Łopatyn, and a supporting assault was the 19th IR and Battalion 1/4 Podolian with two batteries through Niewica on Stanisławczyk. The 49th IR was almost incapable of fighting anymore due to exhaustion and with very weak numbers, so was used to seize Przewłoczna,¹⁰¹ establish communication with the left wing of 35th Brigade at Ożyrów, and take 200 wounded to the railway.

The main group of the 145th IR and the group of the 19th IR attacked Stary Majdan at 04:00 with all their energy. The enemy, surprised by the unexpected renewed attack, defended itself fiercely but briefly and retreated in panic to Łopatyn, leaving three MGs and a few horses in our hands. Immediately pursued, it put up resistance in the towns of Koleśniki and Opłucko, but was thrown out of them as well. The 145th IR took Łopatyn at 11:00.

Meanwhile, the 19th IR, approaching Stanisławczyk, blocked the line of retreat for those retreating from Łopatyn, and utterly broke them. In a panic, Bolshevik groups fled in the direction of the town of Brody, leaving us machine guns, a large number of rifles, some of their wagons and about 250 head of cattle, taken from peasants.

183. Establishing communication with 2nd Army. In Łopatyn the 145th IR group met the 4th Cavalry Brigade, simultaneously entering this village from the north-east.

After so many days of fighting, expectations and unfulfilled hopes, these dreamed of neighbours were finally met. They were greeted joyfully, and the faces of our soldiers brightened, forgetting their exhaustion and looking cheerfully to the future.

184. General Krajowski. In the meantime General Krajowski was driven to Toporów, following the 36th Brigade, ignoring the dozens of marauding Cossack survivors wandering in the woods, and the fact that it had been known for a week, through prisoners, that Buděnyy had placed a high monetary reward on his head. There was only one orderly officer at the general's side. But the general was again lucky, because not only did he make it from Toporów via Łopatyn as far as Stanisławczyk, but he returned the same day by the same road back to Krasne.

185. News of the 2nd Army. The commander of the 4th CB, Colonel Dreszer, notified the general that the 4th Brigade had the task of striking through Łopatyn and Stanisławczyk to Brody; that the 6th ID was in the Leszniów area in the morning of 2 August and was to reach Baranie (north of Radziwiłłów) during the day of 2 August and Brody during the night of 2/ 3 August; that the 1st and 2nd CDs were slightly northeast of the 6th ID, and were to strike towards the Radziwiłłów area on 3 August.

186. Assault on Brody. At 15:00, General Krajowski thus ordered the 36th Brigade in Łopatyn to strike Brody from the west on 3 August; and upon his return to Krasne, after reporting the news of the 2nd Army's activity to the 6th Army's commander, he ordered the 35th and 10th Brigades to attack Brody – Gaje Starobrodzkie – Hill 354 "Makutra" on 3 August.

The 6th Army commander also ordered the appropriate linking action to the left wing of the 13th ID, with the task of reaching the former border of the Austrian partition.

3 August

At 03:00 on 3 August the general attack began.

¹⁰¹ See the end of Item 179.



10th Brigade along the axis of Podhorce, Jasionów, Ponikwa, Boratyn, Suchowola, Mount Makutra,
35th Brigade along the axis Olesko, Czyski, Zabłotce, Hołoskowice, Gaje Starobrodzkie,
36th Brigade along the axis Stanisławczyk, Brody,

The 49th IR, due to exhaustion was unable to fight and was the group's reserve, behind the left wing of the 36th Brigade.

A march group¹⁰² and Battalion 3/42 were to go from Toporów and Adamy via Tura, where they were to join together to form a single group and then go to Ruda and Brody.

Sketch Map 20.

The enemy put up fierce resistance, especially in front of the front of the 10th and 35th IBs. Every hill and every village had to be captured by hard fighting. But General Krajowski was present everywhere, and wherever he went things went well: near Jasionów, in Czechy again, in Kadłubiska, Zabłotce and Hołoskowice. Wherever he appeared he was greeted by the cheers of adoring soldiers and officers. The troops, previously told of the general advance of the entire 2nd Army, intoxicated with the certainty of victory, competed with each other in "redeeming" weeks of anguish on the Bolsheviks' necks.

The 144th IR, under its new energetic commander, Major Ocetkiewicz, pressed forward so vigorously that it constantly ran into the rear of the Bolshevik infantry, who had failed to withdraw in time; the 40th IR of the 10th Brigade fought brilliantly; the armoured trains, repairing several destroyed bridges along the way, also pushed vigorously forward; the 36th Brigade pushed the enemy step by step out of the towns of Holotówka, Cegielnia and Szudno, inflicting heavy losses on them.

187. Seizure of Brody and fighting in the town. Around 17:00 the 36th IB took the Brody railway station, while the 10th and 35th Brigade took Dytkowieckie Forest and Suchowola at 22:00.

Street fighting continued in Brody for another two hours. At 20:00 the armoured train *Iwaszkiewicz* fought a duel with a Bolshevik armoured train that tried to get into the rear of our units fighting in the town.

Towards evening the fighting stopped.

188. News of the 2nd Army's actions. There was no news about the course of the fighting of the units of the 2nd Army.

The 4th CB arrived, together with units of the 36th IB, in the Brody area from Łopatyn and took cover of the left wing of General Krajowski's group, occupying Łahodów and Berlin (7 km NE of Brody).

189. 2nd Army's activities from 31 July to 3 August. The units of the 2nd Army in the interim had fought as follows:

30 July

In the evening of 30 July the units of the 2nd Army, after a day's hard fighting, reached the positions shown by the thin dashed lines on Sketch Map 18.

The enemy, about 1½ divisions of cavalry, occupied the area of Zawidcze – Skryholów – Burkacze. A raid by about one Cossack regiment occupied Družkopol and Boryskowicze during the night of 30th/31st.

31 July

190. Regrouping of the 2nd Army. The commander of the 2nd Army abandoned for the time being his intention of attacking Brody in view of the situation and ordered at 10:00 on 31 July:

The Operational Cavalry Group, consisting of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Cavalry Brigade, 3rd and 11th Lancer Regiments,¹⁰³ under the command of General Sawicki, is to regroup in the area of

¹⁰² A collection of march companies?

¹⁰³ These regiments were then with the 1st and 6th IDs.



Łobaczewska, Smolawa, Merwa to drive out the enemy forces that have penetrated to the north bank of the Sydołówka River. The 5th and 17th Lancer Regiments are to strike at Družkopol,

The 6th Infantry Division is to regroup the bulk of its forces in the Smolawa – Dzikowiny area, leaving the line of the Styr River from Werben to Mikolajów under observation, so that heading in the direction of Mytnica or Smarzów is possible at any time,

The 1st Infantry Division is to withdraw to the west bank of the Styr and to man the sector from Werben to Targowica.

In the course of 31 July the units of the 2nd Army carried out a regrouping: (Sketch Map 18).

The 6th ID was on the Golatin – Zielona – Merwa line, with the 12th IR holding the Beresteczko bridgehead.

The 1st ID, on the commander's own initiative, attacked southwards and took Plaszewa and Ostrów with its right wing, leaving the left wing in Wołkowyje, Rudka and Lisznia.

The commander of the Operational Cavalry Group ordered:

The 2nd CD is to man the sector along the Bezimienna River, from Markowicze to Chołoniew;

The 4th CB is to man from Chołoniew, exclusive, to Golatin;

The 1st CD is to concentrate in the area of Kol. Kowbań, Kol. Kupowatyc – Myśliny, Olgin.

The task of the cavalry units was to defend the crossings of the Bezimienna River and to carry out reconnaissance.

The Army commander arrived with his close staff at Michajłówka to facilitate the leadership of the Army.

The enemy did not push too much on 31 July (except for their 24th RD). Our cavalry scouts found strong garrisons at Skryholów, Mikolajów, Burkacze, Strzemilcze, and small detachments in Dzikowiny and Adamowka. The location of the main enemy forces could not be ascertained, but was thought to be in the area of Leszniów, Mytnica, Redków, Korsów, or in the area of Skryholów, Zawidzce. Kustyń, with strong scout lines along the Sydołówka river,

191. Assault Order. On the evening of 31 July, the 2nd Army commander ordered a general attack for 1 August:

Being that it is verified beyond doubt that Buděny's Horse Army has indeed regrouped in the area mentioned, I order:

The Cavalry Group will strike as soon as possible, crossing the Sydołówka at Mikolajów and Skryholów moving on Szczurowice and Leszniów, attacking the western flank and rear of the enemy;

The 6th ID will strike with its whole force from Beresteczko southwards towards Mytnica – Leszniów;

The 1st Legion ID is to actively protect the left flank of the 6th Division.

The attack is to commence on 1 August:

6th ID at 05:00.

Cavalry Group at 07:00.

1 August

192. Assault. At the appointed hours the assault began.¹⁰⁴

The 6th ID had occupied by the evening Szczurowice, Grzymalówka, Leszniów (12th IR 15:40), Korsów, and Kol. Mytnica, establishing communication with 1st ID in Ostrow. The enemy resistance was initially strong, but later weakened considerably. The Cavalry Group, after heavy fighting at Skryholów and Mikolajów, drove the Cossacks back southwards. The enemy attempted to retreat eastward through Szczurowice, but there encountered the 12th IR, from the 6th ID, so it turned back to Zawidzce. Beaten again by our cavalry, it then retreated south to Lasków.

¹⁰⁴ At the same time as the two battalions of the 36th Brigade set off from Toporów towards Łopatyn, followed by the retreat of these battalions, under strong enemy pressure, and the siege of Toporów.



In the evening the Operational Cavalry Group reached the 1st ID in the area of Smarżów – Szczurowice, with advanced units in Leszniów and Komarówka, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade in the area of Zawidcze. The 2nd Cavalry Division was in reserve in Skryhołów.

The 1st Cavalry Division, on the further initiative of the division commander, struck again on 1 August to the south and east and took Tesłuhów and Dobrowódka with its right wing, throwing back squadrons of the 14th Cavalry Division. Its left wing, however, was attacked by the 24th Rifle Division and the 3rd Lancer Regiment had to retreat. The commander of the division, reinforced the resistance of that regiment with several infantry battalions, and by the evening he had established the battle line of his division on the line of Tesłuhów, Dobrowódka, Edwardówka, Rudka, Lisznia, Dublany, Świszczów, Kniahinin, Perekale.

193. Orders for 2 August. The 2nd Army commander therefore ordered an immediate further advance towards Brody on the evening of 1 August. It was believed that the main enemy forces were in the Redków – Brody area.

The order read:

- a) The Cavalry Group will pursue the enemy, with some of the cavalry, through Lasków – Stanisławczyk, seeking to destroy him. The bulk of the forces of the Cavalry Group will go through Szczurowice eastwards, then through Sestratyn towards Radziwiłłów, and will conduct reconnaissance in the direction of Redków – Chotyń from one side and Sestratyn – Radziwiłłów from the other side. March to action at dawn on 2 August.
- b) The 6th ID will make a night march to Brody and occupy it.
- c) The 1st ID will remain in the area currently reached, clearing Redków and Chotyń of the enemy by night attack. Its main task is to cover the northern flank of the Cavalry Group and the 6th ID.
- d) The passages near Merwe and Beresteczko are to be secured by the 6th ID as a precautionary measure with weak forces.

2 August

194. Assault on Brody. (Sketch Map 19) The 6th ID began its assault at dawn on 2 August.¹⁰⁵ It moved in two groups through Leszniów – Bielawce and through Kors – Szynrów. Overcoming strong enemy resistance in the woods south of Leszniów, it took Berlin, Komuszków and Szynrów at 17:00, at the same time closing the retreat route from Stanisławczyk to Brody to the enemy. The division commander, General Linde, gained the impression that there would be desperate enemy resistance at Brody. He therefore intended to storm the town at nightfall or during the night of 2/3 July.

The Cavalry Group, consisting of the 1st CD and the 5th CB, set out at 09:00¹⁰⁶ from Szczurowice through Chotyń and took Radziwiłłów in the evening, reaching up to the Brody to Rudnia railway line, northeast of that town.

The 1st ID opened an exit for the Cavalry Group through Chotyń, occupying that locality with a strike of one regiment from Ostrow through Redków. In these battles the 1st ID confirmed the presence in Redków and Chotyń of one infantry brigade from the Soviet 45th RD.

The 4th CB, detached from the Cavalry Group in order to destroy the enemy forces that had withdrawn the day before from Zawidcze southwards, encountered a large enemy force near Łopatyn marching north-eastwards.¹⁰⁷ This enemy force charged the 4th CB, but was driven back towards Stanisławczyk and the brigade entered Łopatyn at the same time as the troops of the 18th ID, arriving from Toporów.

195. Order to retreat. In these positions the 6th ID and the Operational Cavalry Group received an order from 2nd Army Command of 2 August, relaying orders from the Front:

due to a change in the general situation, namely, the seizure of Breść by the enemy, and a general retreat to the Bug River line, the 2nd Army is ordered to take the sector: Włodzimierz Wołyński, exclusive, to Rawa Ruska, inclusive.

3 August

The 6th ID carried out this order immediately and began to move even before dawn on 3 August, in the direction of Szczurowice. The commander of the Cavalry Group did not receive the order until dawn. He had previously

¹⁰⁵ A night attack was not possible as the orders did not reach the regiments until between 03:00 and 04:30.

¹⁰⁶ Because of the late receipt of the orders.

¹⁰⁷ They were retreating in front of the 36th Brigade's simultaneous attack.



intended to strike on 3 August from Radziwiłłów south towards Suchowola (13 km south of Radziwiłłów)¹⁰⁸ to cut off the enemy's retreat route from Brody to Krzemieniec. The rapid retreat of the 6th ID, prior to the capture of Brody, and the news received that larger enemy forces were still in the area east of Stanisławczyk caused the group commander to order the 2nd CD to concentrate in Bielawce, and the 1st CD in Bezodnia (14 km north of Brody), with the intention of striking from there in the direction of Bołdury, Berlin or Brody.

The enemy, however, already pursuing the retreating 6th ID, thwarted these plans. (Sketch Map 20). At 13:00 the 2nd CD, which had just crossed the marshes near Klekotów, was unexpectedly attacked and suffered heavy losses.¹⁰⁹ The brigade then retreated to Sestratyn. It was immediately followed by the enemy which moved into the woods north of Baran, thus threatening the 1st CD, still in the Michałówka and Krulec area. The group commander therefore ordered the 1st CD to withdraw through Chotyń to Szczurowice. After further fighting at Chotyń, the 1st CD reached Szczurowice and Beresteczko in the evening of 31 July [sic].

A new order from the 2nd Army commander, issued in accordance with the Front commander's order, called for a stop to the retreat for 24 hours and to exploit the victory obtained over Budëny's army. But this order came too late to the subordinate units. The only thing he could do was to stop parts of the 1st ID at Redków and so allow the 1st CD to evade pursuit and to put its troops in order.

Had it not been for the order for the 6th CD and the Cavalry Group to retreat, given thanks to the enemy's seizure of Breść and the regrouping of the Polish forces for the decisive battle near Warsaw, Budëny's army could have been pinned down on 3 August. However, not only had it managed to withdraw its units in order, it also inflicted heavy losses on the 5th CB.

The 18th ID, carried out the Front commander's intention all the way to the end. In spite of its fatigue and weak numbers, it had in the previous two days, thrown back, together with the 19th IR, almost two of Budëny's cavalry divisions, and then alongside the 10th IB on 3 July had beaten another rifle division, both numerically stronger than it, and taken Brody.

XVIII. Results of the Battle of Brody

(Sketch Maps 16, 17, 18, 19, 20).

The beginning of the Battle of Brody should be sought originally in the enemy's movements of 27 July, advancing through the gap between the 2nd and 6th Armies towards Lwów (Sketch Map 16).

Having encountered upon its arrival in the Podhorce area, the tough defences of the 18th ID, Budëny's 11th CD initially sought a gap through which it could slip. After initial unsuccessful attempts in the vicinity of Majdan, the 11th CD tried to turn the left flank of the 18th ID as a whole, but the breakthrough failed this time as well. The first reason was that the 11th CD moved from the Podhorce area to the west on a clear day and under our most convenient observation; the second reason was a quick reaction on our part, i.e. the immediate push of the 36th IB through Busk to Toporów – Stanisławczyk and Tura (Sketch Map 17).

On 30 July (Sketch Map 17) Budëny broke through in the centre, near Szczurowice, and threw back the right wing of our 2nd Army as far as beyond the Bezimienna River (Sketch Map 18). The whirlwind battle that ensued was caused by the simultaneous attack of the two opposing wings. Budëny's cavalry must be credited with purposeful direction at the beginning of this battle. While defending on its right wing against the attack of the Polish 1st CD, it simultaneously attacked our 4th CB with vigour on its left wing. That initial success, however, was not exploited by the enemy.

Why Budëny's army did not take advantage of the position on 31 July to advance with all its divisions on the 2nd Army or on Lwów is not known. It is probable that their staff was unaware of the position shown in Sketch Map 18. This neglect gave our 2nd Army a whole day to re-group, and thus made it possible for all our forces to move to a simultaneous attack on 1 August.

The 2nd Army struck on 1 August from the banks of the Bezimienna River southwards. But a simultaneously launched attack by two battalions of the 36th IB from Toporów to Łopatyn failed and

¹⁰⁸ The same objective as the attack was being made on the same day by the 10th Brigade.

¹⁰⁹ Four guns, a radio station, and several hundred horses were lost.



the advance units retreated back to Toporów. The 4th CD immediately pursued the units of the 36th Brigade and launched a fierce assault on the Łopatyn force to break through to Lwów. At the same time, the enemy reinforced the resistance of his 14th RD with an infantry brigade from the 45th RD, as our 1st Legion ID, whose commander fully understood its task of protecting the flank of the Army, pressed on, despite the fact that the enemy 24th RD was almost in its rear.

The 2nd Army's offensive and the fierce resistance of the 36th IB in Toporów finally broke the enemy's initiative. On 2 August, all the Polish units operating in the Brody area moved into a concentric, decisive assault that could have a decisive outcome for the entire southern front. (Sketch Map 19). The premature order for the withdrawal of the 2nd Army (Sketch Map 20) unfortunately deprived us of the harvest of the battle that was won. The enemy was not destroyed, but merely repelled. It even managed to inflict heavy losses on our 2nd CD at the last moment.

The strike of the 18th ID, on 5 August, which will be described in the following paragraphs, managed to partly level the account. The enemy retreated on 5 August from around Brody towards Krzemieniec.

The Battle of Brody thus formally ended with the enemy's withdrawal from the battlefield. But we did not get the full benefit possible, as the enemy was not destroyed.¹¹⁰

XIX. After the Battle of Brody

196. Positions on the evening of 3 August (Sketch Map 20).

4 August

Following his successes at Klekotów on 3 August, the enemy grabbed the initiative again in his hand on 4 August. He settled down in the woods just north and north-east of Brody and kept up a heavy artillery and machine-gun fire on the town all day, preparing for an attack.

5 August

General Krajowski devoted the day of 4 August to rest, but prepared a surprise for the enemy for the night. It was known that on both sides of the Radziwiłłów road and between the road and the Brody – Radziwiłłów railway line there was a considerable enemy force, with an armoured train, grouping for an attack on Brody. At 01:45, the agreed signal was given, and nine of our batteries simultaneously began a hurricane fire destroying the enemy, and at the same time preparing for an attack on that forest. After 15 minutes, our regiments launched their attack, which led to the seizure of the northern and north-eastern edges of the woods, and further on to the village of Gaje Dytkowieckie and Mount Makutra (Sketch Map 20).

Taken completely by surprise by the rapid fire and assault, the enemy sustained heavy losses and again left some banners in our hands. Over 300 dead men and masses of horses lay in the forest. The wounded testified that the enemy concentrated for the attack had consisted of the 4th and 11th CDs and part of the 45th RD.

Disorganised and demoralised, the main forces of the enemy horse army retreated through Radziwiłłów in the direction of Krzemieniec (observed by our airmen). Our patrols reached the towns of Kapany and Michajłówka through Radziwiłłów.

For the 18th ID, that final victory also became their farewell to Budëny.

¹¹⁰ In Colonel Dąb-Biernacki's article "Issues of the Defence" ("Bellona" April 1922), we see an equivalent statement in the last paragraph: "When, during the retreat in Ukraine, after Budëny's capture of Zhytomyr, a concentric attack was made by the 1st CD, the 3rd and 6th IDs and my group, consisting of 1st Legion IR and the 12th Legion IR, against Budëny, concentrated to the west of Zhytomyr, and when absolutely all these groups had already begun to succeed in beating Budëny, the order came to break off and retreat."

These comments are typical of the second Battle of Brody. A snapshot of the fighting on 3 August, begun with the clear intention of destroying the enemy, and interrupted just before the objective of the bloody struggle was reached.



197. Withdrawal of the 18th ID, from the front and departure for the Battle of Warsaw. On 6 August, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, the replacement of 18th ID began, by units of the 6th ID. The 18th ID was pulled from the South-Eastern Front, in order to depart for the Northern Front.

The Commander-in-Chief's order took from the South-Eastern Front, the 18th ID, 1st ID, 2nd CD, as well as the staffs of the 2nd Army and Operational Cavalry Group at the disposal of the North-Eastern Front, until the decisive battle of Warsaw. The South-Eastern Front was to merely "cover" from then on. The task of that front was from then on only to "tie up the enemy forces in order to relieve the pressure on the Northern Front", where the main decision was to be made.

Initially intended to be part of the 6th Army, concentrating near Dęblin, the 18th ID was given a different assignment during transport and was moved to the left wing of the 5th Army at Modlin.

And there the 18th ID fulfilled its task to the glory of the Fatherland, just as it had at Ostróg, Dubno and Brody.

The battles of Sochochin, Ciechanów and Mława, fought from 14 to 23 August, were very similar to those which the division fought at Ostróg, Dubno and Brody. There, on the left flank of the army, where there was again no link to the left for several tens of kilometres, constantly half-encircled by larger enemy forces, the 18th ID pressed forward with the same tenacity as at Dubno and at Brody.

However, even before leaving Brody for Modlin, on 7 August, the commander of the 6th Army, General Iwaszkiewicz, arrived in Zabłocie, the location of the division's headquarters, and awarded General Krajowski, ten officers and 25 privates of the division with the highest military decoration – the *virtuti militari*, "on behalf of the Republic of Poland and by order of the Commander-in-Chief".

This was the first Polish division to be decorated with that order since the eternal uprising of 1831, i.e. for 90 years;¹¹¹ the first division of the entire Polish Army to be decorated in the war against the Bolshevik invasion.

Here are the names of those decorated:

Rank	Name A	Unit	Note
Lt-General	Krajowski Franciszek	Commander 18th ID	
Maj-General of Staff	Arciszewski Franciszek	Chief of staff, 18th ID	
Captain	Zagórski Karol	Commander 42nd IR	Taken captive
Sergeant	Przybył Franciszek	42nd IR	
Sergeant	Sniezek Ludwik	42nd IR	
Lance-corporal	Pankiewicz Jan	42nd IR	
Private	Procyk Jan	42nd IR	
Private	Gertukiewłcz Józef	42nd IR	
Captain	Nadachowski Adam	Commander 49th IR	
Captain	Kocur Szymon	Commander 1/49th IR	
Second Lieutenant	Wiktorowski Antoni	49th IR	Wounded.
Lance-Sergeant	Nycz Józef	49th IR	Killed on 24 July at Brody
Cadet	Kasprzykowski Waler	49th IR	
Private	Wojtasik Józef	49th IR	
Lance-Sergeant	Kubica Paweł	49th IR	Killed on 25 July at Brody
Sergeant	Stawski Adam	49th IR	Wounded.
Second Lieutenant	Kramczyński Józef	Commander 3/144th IR	
Lance-Sergeant	Zajac Jan	144th IR	
Corporal	Slawny Józef	144th IR	
Lance-corporal	Warcuła Szczepan	144th IR	
Private	Fibich Józef	144th IR	
Private	Banach Stanislaw	144th IR	
Captain	Uldanowicz Jan	Commander 1/145th IR	

¹¹¹ Not including members of the first chapter of the order.



Second Lieutenant	Plotrowiak Franciszek	commander 3/145th IR	
Sergeant	Zarzycki Michał	145th IR	
Lance-Sergeant	Lakota Bronisław	145th IR	
Cadet	Jarużalski Zbigniew	145th IR	
Sergeant	Groll Antoni	145th IR	
Lance-Sergeant	Jurczyk Wincenty	145th IR	wounded
Lieutenant	Unger Konrad	Commander 2/18th Field Artillery Regiment	
Lieutenant	Ungeheuer Franciszek	Commander 8/18th Field Artillery Regiment	
Artillery Sergeant	Woźniak Wincenty	18th Field Artillery	
Lance-Sergeant	Ceglarek Walenty	18th Field Artillery	
Lance-Sergeant	Dobrzański Wojciech	18th Field Artillery	
Lance-Sergeant	Wach Paweł	18th Field Artillery	
Lance-Sergeant	Jędra Franciszek	18th Field Artillery	wounded

Later, after a modest ceremony held under a bare sky, General Iwaszkiewicz invited all the decorated to board his train and took them to Lwów. There the vice-president of the city and crowds of spectators were waiting at the railway station. When General Iwaszkiewicz addressed the crowd with a speech: “here I present to you those who have contributed the most to the defence of your city – thank them for it”, there was not a dry eye, not only among the audience, but also among the 35 weary men.

It was the most beautiful moment in the lives of those soldiers.

We vowed then that in the great Battle of Warsaw we would contribute even more than to the defence of Lwów – and we kept our pledge.

198. Activities of Budënný's army after 6 August. After retreating on 5 August to the Krzemieniec area and sorting out the troops, the unbeaten First Horse Army made renewed offensive moves towards Lwów on 7 August.

In the Brody – Stanisławczyk – Beresteczko area, it encountered this time only a very weak force guarding it. Even as, on 8 August, the troops of the 18th ID were being loaded up at the Zabłotce railway station, the first news came that the enemy cavalry had retaken Stanisławczyk and was moving towards Toporów.

Later Budënný broke our light cover completely and moved on Lwów. The 6th Army therefore retreated from Tarnopol and the Seret line. Budënný's approaches reached as far as the gates of Lwów; others reached as far as Mikolajów on the Dniester and even Stryia.

But in the meantime, on 16 August, the main decision was being reached outside Warsaw. The strong position of our 5th Army at Modlin, with the 18th ID operating on its left flank, together with the flank thrust of our 4th Army from near Dęblin and Lublin towards the north-east, shattered the main Bolshevik forces.

Budënný, meanwhile, continued to operate near Lwów, promising his Cossacks rich booty on capturing the city. The Soviet high command told Budënný several times to withdraw from Lwów immediately and march his entire army through Zamość towards Lublin, but he delayed responding to that order for four days. By then it was too late. When the First Horse Army reached Zamość in the last days of August 1920, the commander of the Polish South-Eastern Front already had enough units at his disposal to once more properly take on Budënný.

In the Battle of Zamość, where General Stanisław Haller commanded our forces in a specially formed group, Budënný's army suffered a final defeat and did not regain the initiative up to the Armistice of 20 October. He retreated through Hrubieszów, Łuck, Równe, Zwiahel, as far as Korosteń, pursued relentlessly by our infantry and cavalry.



End

XX. Conclusions

The battles described are one of the more interesting parts of the Polish-Bolshevik war of 1920. They give immensely rich material for study. Examples can be found in them of almost every tactical topic. Some will be worthy of imitation, with others one can study the mistakes made. However, the drawing of appropriate conclusions from this treasury of experience must be left to the readers, according to their taste or speciality.¹¹²

This section highlights what seem to have been the main reasons why Budëunny's horse army was able to advance so far into our country, and draws conclusions about infantry versus cavalry combat.

199. Communication. First and foremost there was a lack of communication between the individual infantry divisions and the higher commands among themselves. In the period of the 18th Infantry Division's pursuit of the Horse Army we already repeatedly see that even radios and aviation were unable to provide communication (Items 23, 31, 38, 41). During the period of containment and at the Battle of Brody, as well as with the 2nd Army, this lack was repeated (Items 33, 61, 72 note 2, 74, 93, 96, 106, 129 note 1, 133, 135, 138, 177) And remarks that one army command did not know where neighbouring army units were (Items 72, 76, 96, 114, 118, 119).

From the described incidents, one can conclude that in this type of fighting the usability of our means of communication must be revised, and therefore the organisation of the command, as well as the calculations of the time and place for cooperation of units involved and the economy of the forces, must be dealt with differently.

¹¹² Literally every weapon and service can see topics worthy of reflection. Using this example, for example, one can study:

- The grouping and use of large units in battles against cavalry,
 - The cooperation of large units,
 - The defence of broad fronts with weak forces against overwhelming enemy forces,
 - Infantry vs. cavalry combat,
 - How regiments and battalions might fight cavalry,
 - Manoeuvre of regiments and battalions in an infantry division,
 - The use of MG companies in combat with cavalry,
 - The use of rifle grenades instead of artillery,
 - The use of artillery in highly mobile combat,
 - Destructive and preparatory fire in mobile combat (Brody on 5 August),
 - Persistent defence of field points (Fort Zahorce),
 - Forced marches,
 - Night marches and battles,
 - Disposition of large cavalry units (Budëunny),
 - Cooperation of cavalry brigades with infantry divisions,
 - The use of cavalry brigades in suppression battles,
 - Replenishment of cavalry units during battles,
 - The functioning of the command apparatus at the army, division and brigade level,
 - The speed with which orders are carried out once they are received,
 - The operation of armoured trains and armoured cars,
 - The operation of means of communication in movement warfare,
 - The way the 18th ID dealt with their supply train,
 - Manner of provisioning and evacuation at the 18th ID,
- etc.



Our commanders were still thinking in terms of positional warfare and did not have modern means of communication in sufficient numbers. Suddenly confronted with the necessity of fighting a highly mobile battle, faced with an enemy army of cavalry, they were not always able to draw the appropriate conclusions quickly enough (and some of them not at all). This study leads us to believe that the main reason for our initial failures should be sought there.

The higher commands, lacking constant communication with the operating units, did not understand what was happening or found out too late in situations that were changing like in a kaleidoscope. Attempts to direct the action were shattered by the impossibility of getting the fighting units to co-operate in time and place, and by the lack of mutual understanding caused by the lack of communication. The command system failed in the situation, so we could say that the left hand did not know what the right hand was doing.

In battles of this kind – where radio, planes and armoured trains, to which the carrier pigeons may also be added, remain the mainstays of command – there can be no question of petty interference by the higher commander in the details of the execution of the orders of subordinate units. (For example: the operational order in Item 129, sent by telephone through the headquarters of the 13th ID and 10th CB; the orders of the Front commander listing in detail the actions of individual divisions of the 2nd Army, or given directly to the cavalry brigades, etc.).

The listed means of communication allow only very general orders, giving the commanders a main concept and guidelines, providing for various possibilities of execution and position, and which require absolute maintenance of constant communication between the executive bodies.

Under such conditions, use of less reliable means of communication must be abandoned in advance and, on the other hand, full attention must be given to ensuring the efficiency of the ones used.

Each independent unit taking part in a campaign against unfriendly cavalry must have at least one radio station, and the higher commands should, in addition to this, maintain daily communication with all subordinate units by plane and carrier pigeons. The breakdown or loss of radio stations, too great a distance between airfields and the aviators' lack of knowledge of the current theatre of operations, the difficulty of finding units in dense forests, bad weather, with damaged railways or bridges, or the lack of nearby railway lines, etc. make a high degree of communication difficult. However, it seems unacceptable that all the means listed should fail simultaneously – and for such a long time – as happened several times in the battles described.

When troops are assigned a task similar to that entrusted to the 18th ID, at least one radio station should be designated in advance, set up somewhere secure e.g. in this case in Tarnopol or Lwów, with the specific task of maintaining constant communication. This rule would have avoided the situation of the 8 August when the 18th ID was able to contact the radio station in Lwów (reception was good), but the latter, once it received the situation report, could not on its part, give any answers – firstly, it did not have any, and, secondly, it was assigned different tasks.

The result was that at important moments – 7 July in Ostróg, 8 July in Buderaz, and 9 July in Obgów – the 18th Division's commander did not have crucial information about the fact that at the same time the 2nd Army was attacking Równe, or that Fort Dubno was in our hands.

As further examples of the effects of inadequate communication, incidents in the 2nd Army can also be cited. In the period from 2 to 8 July near Równe, the 2nd Army twice lost an opportunity to strike at the enemy, due to a lack of communication with the 6th ID; later, in the period from 12 to 20 July, the lack of communication was quite frequent, according to the 2nd Army commander and the Front commander. The failure to take advantage of the 6th ID's strike on Dorogostaj (Sketch Map 10) was also due to a lack of communication.

The 6th Army Command was very seldom able to inform the 18th ID what the current position of the right wing of the 2nd Army was, or where the various cavalry brigades of the 2nd Army were.

200. Coordination between large units. Due to the lack of communication, there was also no concerted co-operation between the bigger units of the 2nd and 6th Armies.



On 16 July the 18th ID occupied Dubno and Chorupań for the second time; on the same day the 6th ID, having reached Dorogostai, retreated back to Łuck (Sketch Map 10). On 19 July (Sketch Map 12) the 18th ID and the 3rd ID, while being so close to each other (at noon hours barely 10 km apart) knew nothing of each other and retreated in the evening – the 18th ID to Werba, the 3rd ID to the Styr. On 23 July (Sketch Map 13) at Kozin, Dobrowodka and Demidówka the same situation was repeated almost exactly. In the battle of Brody several such incidents could be listed.

Here another deficiency is highlighted, mentioned above and arising as a result of the nature of the communication systems – that is, the need for a different system of command. If several units are pursuing a common objective, and each is subordinated to a different higher commander, any orders issued have to be very quickly and uniformly delivered, so that the combat units can be coordinated. However, if those various HQs are distant from each other, and from the battlefield, by several tens of kilometres, and do not have constant communication with the combat units, co-ordination is out of the question.

In the combats from 16 to 20 July, the 3rd and 6th IDs were subordinated to the 2nd Army, the 3rd CB directly to the Front, and General Krajowski's group to the 6th Army, and communication was known to be poor. So let us theoretically imagine that simultaneously General Krajowski would report his situation to the 6th Army in Zloczów, the commander of the 6th ID to the 2nd Army in Łuck, and both these army commands and the 3rd CB to the commander of the Front in Kowel. It is conceivable that before the Front commander managed to issue his orders, or before the 2nd and 6th Army manage to agree among themselves and issue their own orders, ideally in agreement with each other, the situation at the front will have changed so thoroughly that all the orders would be obsolete. Some of the units would carry out the orders, others will no longer be able to carry them out as prescribed. A lack of co-ordination will arise, just such as we observed from 13 to 25 July.

All the infantry divisions and cavalry brigades were striving for a common goal – to fight a major battle with Budëny's army. This is why, with the communications we had, they should all have been led as directly as possible by one hand.

In the description of the battles of 16 July, a report is cited showing how the 3rd CB was directed. The Front command, who notified the 3rd CB in Gorochów that the 18th ID had occupied Dubno on 13 July, seems to have forgotten to add that the 2nd Army had not yet taken its position at Młynów. The Front HQ failed to inform that brigade of the current situation, as is evident from the report given in Item 106.

On 18 July a liaison officer of the 4th CB arrived with a report to the commander of the 18th ID that the 4th CB was in Rogozno, and that the 1st and 3rd CBs were in Beresteczko and Ostrow. General Krajowski on his own initiative issued an order for those brigades to set off without delay for Młynów or Demidówka, naturally reporting that to the 6th Army. On 19 July, the staff of the 18th ID received the news that the Front commander approved all the orders from General Krajowski. The Front admitted that it was not able to direct the brigades in the way the current situation required from so great a distance. And it was not in a position to direct them because it had no constant communication link.

Every strike by enemy cavalry must be immediately be parried or followed by a counter-strike. The commander in charge in a battle against enemy cavalry must feel the pulse of that battle; he must notice the slightest change on the battlefield in order to counteract or exploit it. He must conduct the battle from phase to phase, from situation to situation. *A commander who leads his troops in battle against enemy cavalry should be as close to the front as a cavalry commander is – that is, between his units. Otherwise all his orders – given on the basis of invariably late situation reports – will be late and will not correspond to the changing situation.*¹¹³

¹¹³ Note where General Krajowski stationed himself in all the battles described, and where the HQ of the Horse Army was on 19 July (Sketch Map 12). Characteristic examples of the division commander's direct influence on the course of the fighting are the battles at Krzemieniec on 12 July (Item 56), at Dubno on 15 July (Items 85 and 87), at Chorupań on 18 and 19 July (Item 102 and 111) and the decision of General Krajowski at Turzu and



The entire campaign against Budënný's Horse Army was directed by the commander of the South-Eastern Front, for it was in his hands that all authority over the units that took part in the battle was centralised. But the wire communication from the Front to the two Army HQs, and from those to the combat units, was so distant and so often interrupted that it is understandable that the Front commander could not feel the pulse of the fighting in such a way as to be able to actually lead the battle – fought against an opponent who was personally on the battlefield and in command of all the cavalry.

It may have been advisable, therefore, to place all the units that took part in the battles against Budënný's army under one command. This could have been the commander of the 2nd Army, or of the 6th Army, or the commander of an independent group (corps), created for that purpose. That commander would then have been able to place himself on the battlefield and follow all the details of the action.

201. Budënný's army and infantry fighting cavalry. The essential characteristics of the actions of Budënný's army during the described period are given in the chapter "Results of the Struggle to Contain". The forces were dispersed over a wide area and there was a lack of a strong strategic decision.

Tactically, the command of the Horse Army can be credited with great resilience of action. Observing the attached sketch maps, one sees more than one quick decision. Budënný could not have known that the wings of our 2nd and 6th Armies were not working in unison. His energetic response to the seizure of Ostróg, by immediately sending several Cossack regiments to prevent the 18th ID from acting jointly with the 2nd Army at Równe (Sketch Map 5), must be given great credit. One cannot deny the wisdom of preventing the advance of the 6th ID on Dorogostaj Veliky on 17 July, then the vigorous strike on 19 July against the 18th ID at Chorupań and the simultaneous pushing back of the 3rd ID's advance in the Targowica – Perekale area (Sketch Maps 11 and 12), nor the desirability of rejecting the sortie of the 6th ID from Michajłówka to Demidówka and the simultaneous destruction of one brigade of the 18th ID on 23 and 24 July near Iwaszczuki (Sketch Map 14), as well as the flexibility of tactical arrangements during the Battle of Brody (Sketch Maps 18 and 20). But it is impossible to find any strategic value from these battles.

The persistence with which Budënný's Cossacks relentlessly attacked our infantry on horseback, suffering much greater losses than if they had tried to do the same on foot, was a great mistake on the part of the Horse Army. Budënný's Cossacks may be credited with great bravado, but bravado alone is not enough against an enemy wielding modern weapons. It may be that they previously achieved success in mounted formation through the moral effect of charging cavalry, but in the battles with the 18th ID this method failed, as it absolutely must fail wherever the infantry retains even a little calm under pressure.

So sometimes the Cossack charges were successful, and other times they failed? This requires an answer to the question: when should a cavalry charge on horseback and when on foot?

It seems that the simplest answer would be to make the type of attack dependent on the enemy's fire. This can only be decided on the battlefield. If the opponent keeps his cool, the success of a cavalry charge is out of the question. The manner of attacking cavalry could be put into words: cavalry should manoeuvre on horseback, but fight mainly on foot; an enemy that is fresh, or well trained and disciplined, should always be attacked on foot, and the horses should be mounted only when disorganisation or the beginning of panic is perceived. Even in the rear, when conducting a raid, it is possible to come across well-run troops (such as the four march companies at the Radziwiłłów railway station on 18 July) and suffer unnecessarily heavy losses.

Stanisławczyk on 31 July and 2 August (Items 174 and 186.) The rapid detachment of the main forces of the 18th ID from near Krzemieniec on 12 July – even before the end of the fighting, at the moment when the offensive of the 42nd and 44th IR began to progress well to the south – meant that the division was able to occupy the Werba – Ptycza area in the evening of the same day, which was only possible thanks to the general's personal observation of the course of the fighting.



It is sometimes said that infantry in close formation can be surprised by the charge of a cavalry unit. From the experience of the battles described, it can be argued that good infantry can only be surprised by fire. Such a surprise can be very unpleasant. Good infantry cannot be surprised by a charge, even from the shortest distance. A charge by cavalry can only be successful against an enemy already disorganised or of low spirit.

In the battles with the 18th ID, Buděny's army was successful by smashing wagon trains and breaking communications to the rear and on the rare occasion, on 16 and 25 July, with attacks on infantry. In both of these charges, however, it encountered the 9th Border Rifle Regiment, i.e. infantry of little combat value. In addition, it should be noted that the 35th IB was badly commanded at Iwaszczuki, because, as has already been said, even though the 9th Border Rifle Regiment was rejected, the situation could have been rectified – as it was rectified by General Krajowski at Dubno on 16 July.

From 20 July to 1 August Buděny's army was moving towards Lwów. But these movements were so slow that the 18th ID kept pace with it, and even marched faster and further than the enemy cavalry. This is where the consequences of General Krajowski's tactics of attacking at night became clearly visible. Cavalry, constantly harassed at night by infantry units, after two weeks loses its greatest advantage, that is mobility. Humans can be active at night and sleep during the day, or whenever there is a break, but horses that cannot rest at night will soon begin to fade.

To sum up, it can be said that Buděny's army, over the course of persistent offensive battles, was not successful against the good infantry of the 18th ID, having no substantial successes. Butowce on 2 July, Ostróg on 7 July, Chorupań on 17, 18 and 19 July, Brody on 25 July; all are proof of this. The retreat of the 18th ID from near Dubno to Podhorce was caused not by loss in combat, but by the manoeuvre of the cavalry; the isolated division, defending a large section of the front, had to fight both against the enemy in front of it and against one coming towards its rear at the same time. The Army did not have any reserves.

On the defensive, Buděny's cavalry almost never withstood the infantry attacks of the 18th ID.

Thanks to the early success and the resulting feeling of self-confidence, and thanks to the soldier's boundless trust in the division commander, the behaviour of our infantry in the face of the enemy's superiority in numbers was so good that outflanking the division, even reaching complete encirclement, did not frighten it at all. General Krajowski was confident of his troops and was always convinced that he would be able to break through wherever he wanted at night.

But even during the day Buděny's cavalry could not withstand a solid assault by our infantry. Unfortunately, the 18th ID did not have any assigned cavalry¹¹⁴ to exploit the success of its assaults. Each infantry division fighting against a mass of enemy cavalry, should have a subordinated brigade of cavalry to exploit its successes.

Looking at the attached sketch maps, one sees that the 18th ID for a full four weeks had its flanks and rear constantly threatened, and was completely surrounded on 19, 24 and 25 July and the 36th IB on 1 August. This by no means prevented General Krajowski from carrying out his intentions properly. Such situations are often considered worse than they are, and then really only by those who by virtue of their rear assignments believe that they are not obliged to fight with arms in hand, in the way every infantryman in the front line does – and may so fail on the field of glory, carried away by personal nervousness, mostly caused by their own ineptitude.

It is understood that a commander, undertaking a battle against enemy cavalry, must be confident in the spirit of his troops. The charge of several squadrons of cavalry is a disheartening thing. When a company or battalion commander loses confidence at such a moment, his unit feels it immediately, instinctively and involuntarily, just as a horse feels the willpower of its rider when jumping over an obstacle. The words "as is the commander, so are the troops" are probably never more true than under these conditions.

¹¹⁴ The 6th Lancer Regiment had barely 140 sabres, and the division's squadron only 50 – all of which had to be used for reconnaissance, communication, sending reports and orders, etc.



In the individual sub-units – of all weapons – of the 18th ID, it was always noticeable that the combat value of the units depended mainly on the commander. Specially characteristic symptoms were observed in this respect. General Krajowski's strength of will and energy affected all the officers and soldiers of the entire division; that is why the division fought so valiantly. The regiments were formed in France from men coming from all the counties of Poland, and some even came from America, France, Italy and so on. The human material was thus the most varied, and each of the regiments had its own period during the Bolshevik campaign when it was regarded as the best regiment in the division, depending on who commanded it. Thus, the 42nd IR under Colonel Szemiot was considered the best in May and June 1920, the 49th IR under Captain Nadachowski in July, the 144th IR under Major Ocetkiewicz in August, the 145th IR under Lt-Colonel Rachmistruk in August and September 1920. Poland's soldier material is excellent, it just needs commanders who can lead it and use its advantages. To prove this we have plenty of examples across the history of Poland's wars.

On the other hand, it can be said that the repulse of a cavalry charge is a matter of practice and habit. An infantry unit which succeeds in deflecting its first charge by enemy cavalry will never be frightened by such a charge again; in the reverse, a unit once overrun by a cavalry charge will very easily panic as soon as it sees a cavalry unit. Thus, for example, Battalion 3/144, which managed to repel the first charge at Butowce, later on at Iwaszczuki did not fail – despite the panic of the surrounding troops. On the other hand, no measures were able to hold back the bulk of the men of the 105th IR or the 9th Border Rifles when Bolshevik cavalry approached.

From this it follows that, even in peacetime, joint infantry-cavalry exercises should be organised as often as possible, and the infantry should be accustomed to the sight of charging cavalry. As, I repeat, that sight can be quite unnerving.

202. Guidelines for battles between infantry and cavalry. To supplement the above remarks, let us look at a short "Summary of the experience of the 18th Infantry Division in battles against Budëny's Horse Army", issued to its units by the division's staff in August 1920:¹¹⁵

I. *The smallest tactical unit of infantry is the regiment with one or two batteries.* The detachment of single battalions is permissible only in exceptional cases and in places where the battalion is able to protect itself from the charge of large enemy forces (for example: manning small villages, manor houses, small forests, cemeteries, bridges, marsh crossings, etc.). In these exceptional cases the communication between the detached battalion and the rest of the regiment must be extremely close.

It is desirable to operate in groups of compact infantry brigades, consisting of two regiments and at least one *division* of artillery.

On the march the regiments should be so close to each other that, in the event of fighting, mutual assistance is assured and the encroachment of large enemy forces between the two columns is prevented. This distance can therefore be a maximum of 6 km on the march and 4 km at a standstill.

II. *Regimental and brigade commanders should generally be with the troops.* The presence of commanders away from their battalions deprives them of the possibility of immediate, spontaneous action if the enemy appears, and also exposes them to attacks by enemy cavalry.

III. *Carry out marches and assaults, as far as possible, at night.*

During the day the men should rest in villages or woods, having barricaded themselves in.

In conjunction with a strong cavalry of their own, the infantry should approach the enemy at night, attack at dawn, and our cavalry then pursue the retreating enemy cavalry.

¹¹⁵ Adopted almost entirely into the Field Service Regulations, Part II.

As far as possible, do not fight in open fields, but try to reach forest plots, farmsteads, etc, which make it highly difficult for the enemy to charge.

IV. *Every officer and soldier, whether in a company or battery, or in the command, staff or wagons, must possess a rifle and at least 40 cartridges.*

Every unit must, in every situation – whether in quarters, on the march, at rest, in retreat or in any other situation – be on such a degree of combat alert that it can go into battle in the shortest possible time, as the situation demands. At staging areas, the men should occupy quarters with guards, rifles stacked, officers with their units, wagons loaded, pickets posted. On the march, all soldiers should watch to the right and the left. By practising alarms the soldier's alertness and combat readiness should be kept high.

Wagon commanders shall be personally responsible to ensure that all men sitting on the wagons have their rifles at the ready at all times.

V. Infantry.

Good infantry, keeping its cool, can boldly and in the open field repel and even destroy a superior force of cavalry, if properly deployed. The enemy cavalry usually attacks in a loose formation, encircling the wings and rear of the infantry.¹¹⁶ The Cossacks fire as early as 2,000 metres from horseback and MGs to demoralise the infantry with flanking and rear fire. Only when the cavalry perceives that the infantry is losing its confidence does it charge; otherwise the enemy cavalry retreats behind the hills and woods.

The first sign of any infantry's vacillation and nervousness is to respond to that long-range fire of the cavalry.

In a fight against cavalry, the most important thing is to maintain fire discipline. Machine guns start firing at a *lava* at 1,000 metres, at 500 metres against compact squadrons; small arms do not start firing beyond 500 metres, showering the enemy with a hurricane of bullets from that point.

On large targets or deep targets the company commander can direct rifle fire by salvos, and can in these cases start firing as early as 1,000 metres.

Firing by salvo is the best means of disciplining infantry fire and should, against cavalry, be almost the exclusive type of fire.

Without this method of conducting fire, the ranks will fire all their ammunition at 2,000 to 500 metres, hit no one, and when the Cossacks catch up with them, will stand defenceless and die to sabre blows.

As soon as attacking cavalry approach to a distance of less than 200 metres, single sections and squads along the rifle line should join together in groups of six to eight men and, standing with their backs to each other, repel the attack with fire.

Do not shoot at Cossack patrols of two to six men at all. Bring them within 50 paces and, having surprised them, take them prisoner.

VI. Artillery.

In a march the artillery should be distributed along the whole column, possibly even in platoons. Both with the front guard and rear guard, as well as in the centre, there must be columns of infantry interspersed with guns. Infantry units with artillery platoons should be intermingled in long columns of wagons.

In combat the artillery must show extreme mobility and initiative. The targets that appear are very mobile and only visible for a short time. Those few minutes during which a

¹¹⁶ This is the traditional Cossack *lava*, used by virtually all Russian cavalry of the time, apart from a few regular White units.



squadron or regiment of enemy cavalry is visible must be utilised for the most violent fire. At the moment the enemy squadrons, batteries, or MGs appear, *the artillery should not wait for orders*, but should independently and as quickly as possible, at a trot or gallop, leave the march column, stand close to the road and immediately commence a rapid fire. Such fire will be short-lived, as the target will quickly disappear. Continuing to fire single shells at clouds of dust, or at the area from where the enemy cavalry has fled, is completely pointless.

The artillery should only fire when careful observation is possible. As soon as a target appears it must be showered with rapid fire, and similarly, as soon as the target is not visible the battery must cease firing at all.

It is reprehensible for artillery to fire on patrols or at very thin lines of horsemen.

VII. The machine-guns are to be distributed: on the march a platoon of HMGs should be behind each infantry company. Single MGs should be interposed between the wagons, both combat and heavy. It is not good when a whole MG company marches as a compact group, leaving long stretches of the columns without any MGs.¹¹⁷

VIII. Reconnaissance.

All troops should independently reconnoitre in their immediate area, up to 1,500 metres; further reconnaissance by mounted and foot patrols should extend to a distance of up to 10 km. Surveillance of the surrounding area must be carried out continuously, and with such intensity and accuracy, that the units are never surprised.

Reconnaissance, pickets and look-outs ordered by higher commanders, by no means relieve lower commanders from their duty of independent observation of area immediately around them.

IX. Communications.

Immediate notification of neighbouring troops and higher commands of observations and reporting changing situations is the most important prerequisite for success against cavalry. From the battalion headquarters up to the division headquarters, all observations must be communicated instantly in order to allow us to break up lone enemy brigades with a rapid response and a quick blow of one's own – not allowing large enemy units to join in. Where possible, telephone lines should be run. The most certain link, however, is mounted messengers. Each infantry regiment must have 21 liaison riders. If there are captured horses, aim to increase the number of mounted men in the regiments.

X. *Keep unit wagons to a minimum.*

The amount of rolling stock should not be increased by a single unnecessary wagon, under the strict responsibility of the regimental and division commanders. Only the field kitchens and enough ammunition and provisions for two days. All other wagons – baggage, mess kitchens, provisions, etc – are without exception are to be sent to the divisional assembly point for the train, to be moved by the division commander's order. One battery will always be left at the disposal of the commander of the heavy wagons. A defence unit will be formed from the soldiers attached to the wagons by the train's commander. In an emergency a larger guard will be assigned to the rolling stock.

When stationary, the wagons will be placed in villages or towns so that the wagons themselves are not too concentrated.¹¹⁸ Streets will be barricaded. Special attention should be paid to the constant observation of the surrounding area by patrols and observers on high points.

¹¹⁷ The 18th ID had a very small number of MGs; hence these instructions.

¹¹⁸ To prevent enemy artillery causing undesirable panic in the wagons.



XI. Adjutants of the regiments and battalions should only have packs in which the clerks can carry a few of the most important files, relating to the records of officers and soldiers. Taking the entire administration's carts alongside the combat troops is harmful ballast.

XII. Warrant officers should remain with their combat units, administration officers are to remain with the train, coming to their units at intervals determined by the commander.

XIII. The division's economic base is generally to be located at the nearest railway station. That is where the hospital and administrative base is to be. The distribution point for food and ammunition will be advanced at all times and must be at the nearest railway station, even if that requires transport at night or under cover of armoured trains.

XIV. The transport of ammunition and food from the nearest railway station to the troops positioned in the front lines will be carried out by the division's wagons or the unit rolling sections made up of requisitioned peasant wagons.

XV. The wounded shall be sent by cart to the mobile hospital column with the brigade commands, and from there to the division assembly point, at the nearest railway station.

203. Reconnaissance. Communications, aerial reconnaissance and the Second Department of headquarters units play a huge role in battles against enemy cavalry. There was often a lack of communication during the battles described.

Not much can be said about aerial activity in the battles described, as there were only a few planes for the entire 2nd and 6th Armies.

However, the Second Department of the 18th ID deserves a special mention. From the descriptions of the fighting, it can be concluded that the division HQ was generally quite well informed of enemy troop movements. The division commander could usually base his decisions on good information. However this was only achieved because the Second Department missed no opportunity to get close to the battle line, to interrogate each prisoner immediately on their capture – or even, in the humorous extreme, taking prisoners personally, as the head of the 18th ID's Second Department, Lieutenant Harasymowicz, did.

204. Final conclusion. In campaigns against enemy cavalry fought over wide areas, there will always be breaks in the front, flanking movement, encirclements and interrupted communications with the rear. This, however, must not frighten the commander on the defence.

A unit that flanks someone is usually at the same time flanked himself, and the winner will be the one who, in the moments of uncertainty, manages to get himself under control sooner and shows stronger will through decisive action.



XXI. Sources

Operational records of the headquarters of the 18th Infantry Division.

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